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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral dissertation examines the distribution of environmentally risky technologies in the 
Southeastern United States. The empirical target is commercial treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) 
installations of hazardous waste. Two questions motivate the investigation: where are hazardous waste 
installations located, and why? These installations handle substances that increase rates of mortality and 
serious irreversible illness, and pose a significant hazard to human health and the environment. Scholars 
maintain the hazardous waste stream in the United States has a grisly logic - it is distributed on the 
population unevenly, with poor communities of color burdened disproportionately. The dissertation tests 
four hypotheses distilled from four theories of human organization of space for risky technologies. 
The first hypothesis, economic rationality, examines the distribution of TSD installations from the 
standpoint of commercial operators. TSD installation operators insist they select commercially suitable 
locations not areas with historically disadvantaged populations. The second hypothesis, scientific 
rationality, examines the distribution problem from the standpoint of EPA geologists, hydrologists and 
engineers, that insist siting decisions are based on clearly articulated scientific criteria. The third hypothesis, 
community social capital, analyzes the geographic unevenness of environmental health risks as a function of 
the variable capacity of communities to resist the placement of a facility in their neighborhood by levels of 
trust, cohesion, and reciprocity that obtain. The fourth hypothesis, race and class inequality, examines the 
claim that inequitable siting of hazardous waste installations is an outcropping of direct and indirect 
institutional discrimination. 
The dataset is a match of records on fully operational treatment, storage and disposal facilities and 
large quantity generators of hazardous waste from the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Social and 
Demographic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, population and housing data at the 
census tract level from the US Census Bureau, non-profit organization data from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics and the People of Color Environmental Groups Directory, and seismic hazard and 
hydrologic data from the US Geological Survey. 
Bivariate and multivariate statistical results suggest that siting outcomes are predictable by the 
distribution of social capital assets, the racial composition of a community, the seismological unsuitability a 
land use, and TSD installation proximity to adequately skilled labor and hazardous materials for processing. 
The concentration of large quantity generator activity and the percentage of African-Americans in a 
neighborhood prevail as the most consistent and powerful predictors of TSD installation siting at regional 
and sub-regional levels, and across different spatial measures of environmental health risk. Uneven 
distribution of environmental burdens by race violates the promise of President Clinton's Executive Order 
12898, mandating fair treatment of all people in the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. The dissertation ends with a risk allocation scheme to solve 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ANO STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to detail the road ahead. First, the hazardous waste stream is 
sized. Environmental Protection Agency and statistical estimates are presented to give the reader a sense 
of the systemic dangers involved in the generation and proper management of the hazardous waste stream. 
Second, the problem of inequitable distribution of commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities is 
discussed, with brief presentation of hypotheses to be addressed. The empirical purpose of this dissertation 
is to answer two questions: where are commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) 
located, and why? The object of analysis is EPA Region IV, encompassing the Southeastern states of 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. Third, 
the hazardous waste distribution problem is specified against the backdrop of the interventions of the 
modem capitalist state. It is argued the hazardous waste stream is rooted in the structural commitment of 
the state to capital accumulation and economic growth. Fourth, the methodological and theoretical 
contributions and organization of this dissertation are delineated. 
SIZING THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM 
The hazardous waste stream in the United States is immense. The actual size of the hazard 
stream is unknown, but an estimate from the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) places it at 750 million metric 
tons annually (Watts 1998). According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1991-1999) data, the 
hazardous waste stream ranges from 230 to 300 million tons per year (see Table 1.1 ). The EPA only 
measures the activities of Large Quantity Generators (LQGs) 1 of hazardous waste in its Biennial Reporting 
System (BAS). Though the hazardous waste stream has declined nationally by approximately 70 million 
tons from 1991 to 1999, it is still dangerously large. In less than a decade, EPA-classified LQGs generated 
approximately 2 billion tons of hazardous waste. Add to the hazardous waste stream the residential and 
commercial solid waste - an unknown percentage of which contains hazardous materials - and the figure 
eclipses one-billon metric tons generated annually (US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts 2002; EPA 
1999). This figure is greater than the amount of municipal and hazardous waste generated annually 
1 A facility is defined as a large quantity generator if: 1) 1,000 kg of RCRA waste is generated in any single 
month; 2) 1 kg of RCRA acute hazardous waste is generated in any single month or accumulated at any 
time; and 3) more than 100 kg of spill cleanup material is contaminated with RCRA acute hazardous waste 
(EPA 1999, National Biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Report: Based on 1999 Data). 
1 
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Notes: To reduce the reporting burden on the regulated community, the EPA streamlined its data 
collection methods. The 1 997 and 1999 Biennial Reports eliminated the Process System Form that 
required on-site and off-site facilities to indicate the tonnage of aqueous wastes (wastewaters) generated 
and handled. The exclusion of wastewater data drastically reduces estimates of the hazardous waste 
stream in the United States. The EPA does provide new estimates for 1 995, using the 1 997 reporting logic 
of excluding wastewater data. This allows one to create a simple ratio between aqueous and non-aqueous 
waste to estimate tonnage totals for subsequent years. Data for 1 997 and 1 999 presented in this table are 
ratio estimates. These totals do not include small quantity generators of hazardous waste or solid wastes 
of potentially harmful toxicity that are routinely mixed with the regular commercial and residential trash 
stream. Since 1999, biennial reporting has stopped. 
Source: National Biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Reports, 1 991-1 999. 
2 
by the continent of Europe (European Environment Agency 2003). In per capita terms, Americans 
generate six thousand pounds of hazardous and non-hazardous waste annually. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 and amendments authorize the 
Environmental Protection Agency to safeguard human life and the natural environment from improper 
management and disposal of hazardous wastes. Under RCRA, a hazardous waste is: "a solid waste, or 
combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious 
characteristics, may: 1) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or 2) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human 
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise 
managed." Hazardous wastes are evaluated on ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity (Watts 1998). 
RCRA requires all hazardous wastes be tested, recorded, and traced from their generation to 
disposal or destruction. This cradle-to-grave system requires commercial generators, transporters and 
handlers of hazardous substances keep detailed records of their activities. Transfer of waste to permit­
approved, off-site treatment, storage, and disposal facilities is strictly controlled. RCRA also authorizes the 
Department of Commerce to promote market solutions to waste recovery and conservation (Vig and Kraft 
2000). 
Commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) are the last link in the cradle-to­
grave hazardous waste management system. These facilities handle the most dangerous substances 
known to humankind. Treatment, storage, and disposal facilities perform different functions and assume 
different forms.3 Treatment facilities change the physical, chemical, or biological properties of a hazardous 
waste to make it less threatening to the environment. Treatments can neutralize waste, recover energy or 
material resources from a.waste, render the waste less hazardous, or make the waste safer to transport, 
store, or dispose. One type of waste treatment involves high temperature incineration. Incineration 
2 A full text version of RCRA (42 U.S.C. sis 6901-6992k) is available at Legal Information Institute (LIi) at 
Cornell University. The LIi search engine provides up-to-date access to the complete US Code, containing 
the general and permanent laws of the United States. The most recent version of the U.S. Code released in 
electronic form contains the laws in effect as of January 16, 1996. 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/ch82.htm1. 
3 This rudimentary discussion of TSO facility operations does not exhaust all the technologies used by 
commercial operators, nor captures the engineering complexity of such operations. Books are written on 
individual hazardous waste recovery methods (i.e., distillation, carbon absorption, and solvent extraction), 
physical and chemical treatment processes (i.e., filtration, chemical oxidation, solidification, and 
pervaporation), thermal technologies (i.e., rotary kilns, fluid-bed incineration, and asphalt blending), and land 
storage methods (surface and subsurface impoundments). 
3 
significantly reduces the volume of waste, but release of ash and potentially hazardous constituents make 
waste combustion a controversial treatment method. Hazardous waste is typically treated before it is 
disposed. Policies on treatment of hazardous waste are found in the RCRA Permit Policy Compendium 
and in RCRA Online. 
Storage involves holding hazardous waste for a temporary period of time. At the end of the storage 
period, the waste is treated, disposed of, or stored elsewhere. Municipal waste is stored differently than 
hazardous waste. Municipal waste is sometimes temporarily stored at transfer stations. At transfer stations, 
waste is off-loaded from local collection routes and sorted according to type. The waste is then loaded on · 
larger trucks or rail cars for transport to either municipal waste treatment or disposal facilities. Hazardous 
waste storage is more tightly controlled. The most common hazardous waste storage practices are 
container storage, storage in tanks, and storage in hulking containment buildings. The RCRA Permit Policy 
Compendium discusses regulatory requirements for hazardous waste storage. 
The most common method of disposal of hazardous waste is the placement of waste in or on land. 
Disposal facilities are designed to permanently contain hazardous waste, and avert the discharge of harmful 
pollutants to the environment. The most common disposal technology for hazardous waste is the landfill. 
Landfi lls are waste management structures with durable liner and leachate collection systems to prevent 
contamination of groundwater sources. Groundwater monitoring and corrective action systems are design 
requirements. Hazardous waste landfills have numerous design redundancies to prevent system failure. 
Inoperable landfills are required to have an impermeable cover to prevent rainwater penetration. Another 
disposal technology used for liquid hazardous waste is the injection wel l .  Hazardous liquid wastes are 
injected under high pressure thousands of feet underground. Impermeable underground confinement areas 
capture the waste waster. Policies on disposal of hazardous waste can also be found in the RCRA Permit 
Policy Compendium and in RCRA Online. 
Management of the hazardous waste stream is costly but profitable. Comprehensive estimates are 
unavailable and must be assembled from various sources. Cost ·estimates vary by government agency, the 
volume, type, and concentration of hazardous substances, site variables, and method of handling. 
According to the Department of Defense, Environmental Security and Technology Program (2000: 1 6) ,  the 
cost of conventional off-site hazardous waste disposal is $0.45 to $1 .25 per pound of hazardous waste, or  
$900 to $2500 per ton. As RCRA mandates, management of  hazardous waste is  commercialized in  the 
United States. Commercial transportation and disposal of hazardous waste is a multi-billion dollar 
4 
enterprise, with revenues increasing 81 7 percent from 1 980 to 1 999. Hazardous waste management is a 
gro�h industry, with revenue exceeding $5 billion dollars annually. Environmental industry segments like 
analytical and remediation services have experienced similar growth trajectories. The environmental 
industry as a whole, as defined by the US Standard Industry Classifications (SIC) System, is inelastic and 
almost recession proof (see Table 1 .2). Industry periodicals, from Solid Waste Digest to Clean Energy 
Business, recognize the US hazardous waste stream as a feature of chemical-intensive4 production. 
Hazardous waste stream trends, patterns of revenue, and investment in the environmental industry 
clue us to the future. They reveal how markets coordinate system externalities, but the story of hazardous 
waste management is more socially and politically complex. 
Conflicts over the location of TSO installations have erupted nationally, giving rise to a radical 
environmental populism (Szasz 1 994). Most American's recognize and endorse the benefit of scientific 
treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, but very few are willing to take on the burden directly. 
In 1 980, the US Council on Environmental Quality surveyed American citizens on their willingness to accept 
a hazardous waste facility at various distances from their place of residence (see Figure 1 . 1 below) . . 
Results revealed an almost unanimous unwillingness to accept a hazardous facility within 1 mile of 
one's home. Less than 25 percent of respondents are willing to accept a TSO installation within 1 O miles of 
their home. At 1 O miles from a TSO facility, negative externalities are negligible. Only at a distance of 70+ . 
miles does willingness surpass 50 percent. This figure of 70 miles exceeds the average distance between 
major municipalities in the contiguous United States. Patterns of community mobilization and resistance to 
hazardous waste facility siting, testify to the determination of communities to act on attitudes revealed in the 
survey.5 In game theoretic terms, the problem of hazardous waste distribution is similar to a 
4 Time series on US production and sale of organic and inorganic synthetic chemicals and their raw material 
sources, as finished products and input commodities applied to the production of finished goods, reveal a J­
curve pattern of growth (Barnett 1 994; United States International Trade Commission 2002). An estimated 
70,000 synthetic chemicals are in commercial use, with approximately 1 ,000 added annually (Johns Hopkins 
School of Public Health 1 998). Of this total, thousands are potentially hazardous, and hundreds are 
potentially carcinogenic (United States Office of Technology 1 983). Reliable data on risks to human health 
from exposure to, or ingestion, inhalation, and assimilation of, synthetic chemicals are unavailable because 
the majority of synthetics have not been thoroughly tested for toxicity (National Academy of Sciences 1 984). 
5 Though TSOFs are massive, noisy, malodorous, cause damage to property and human health, cleave 
communities, induce residential instability, and are sources of catastrophic risk, Bohon and Humphrey 
(2000) have discovered that some communities actually court such facilities for economic gain. Courting 
communities are those experiencing economic decline, in dire need of local employment and taxable wealth, 
where opportunities for development are scarce. These communities are found in the rust belt of the 
American Mid-Atlantic and Mid-West, as well as the resource exhausted Appalachian South. In the South, 
courting communities have lower than average socio-economic status, and are committed ideologically to 
business and industry. 
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TABLE 1 .2 :  REVENUE O F  ENVIRONMENTAL INDUSTRY SEGMENTS, 1980-1999 I N  BILLION DOLLARS 
Industry Segment 1 980 1 990 1993 1 994 1 995 1 997 1998 1 999 Percent"' 
Change . 
.Analytical Services 0.4 1 .5 (6 1 .6 1 .2 1 .1 1 . 1 1 .1 + 175 
Wastewater Treatment 10.9 20.4 23.4 25.7 23.4 24.4 . 25.6 26.3 + 1 41 
Solid Waste Management 1 1 .2 26. 1  29.4 31 .0 32.5 34.9 36. 1  36.9 + 229 
Hazardous Waste 0.6 6.3 6.5 6.4 6.2 5.8 5.7 5.5 + 817 
Management 
Remediation and Industrial 2.4 1 1 .1  8.4 8.6 1 1 . 1 1 1 .2 1 1 .0 1 1 .6 + 383 
Services 
Consulting arid Englneerln$1 1 .7 1 2.5 1 4.6 1 5.3 1 5.5 15.3 1 5.8 15.9 + 835 
Water Equipment and 6.9 1 3.5 1 5.0 1 5.6 1 6.5 18.2 1 9.1  20.0 + 1 90 
Chemicals 
Instrument Manufacturing 0.2 2.0 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.5 + 1 050 
Air Pollution Control 3.3 1 3.1 1 1 .5 1 1 .7 1 4.8 15.7 16.5 17.1 + 41 8  
Equipment 
Waste Management 3.5 8.7 10.9 1 1 .2 9.9 9.8 9.5 9.7 + 1 n 
Equipment 
Process and Prevention 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1 .0 1 .1 + 1 000 
Technology 
Water Util ities 1 1 .9 1 9.8 23. 1  24.2 25.3 27.6 28.8 29.4 + 1 47 
Resource Recovery 4.4 1 3.1 13.3 1 5.4 1 6.9 1 5.3 13.3 16.4 + 273 
Environmental Energy 1 .5 1 .8 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.1 + 1 07 
Sources 
Industry Total 59.0 150.3 1 63 1 72.5 1 79.5 1 86 1 89.8 197.7 + 235 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau,  Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1 999-2000 
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non-cooperative Prisoner's Dilemma with rational egoists incapable of cooperation for mutual gain. How this 
dilemma is managed is of great concern to social scientists, environmental activists, TSDF operators, and 
public officials alike. By examination of cross-sectional data, and application of statistical methodologies, 
one can infer carefully the social forces involved in location outcomes for commercial treatment, storage, 
and disposal installations. 
STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
TSO installations are environmentally risky and locally unwanted technologies. In neighborhoods 
sited for TSO installations, there is real and perceived decline in physical and psychological well-being, 
housing market instability, and increasing social currents of dread and impending catastrophe. Debate 
swirls on the issue of equitable distribution of TSDF associated environmental risks. Government reports 
(GAO 1 983), social scientific studies (Bullard 1 983; Boer, Pastor, Sadd, and Snyder 1997), and statements 
by environmental activists (Commission of Racial Justice 1 987) suggest that treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities are located systematically in poor and/or minority communities. The words of 
Congressman John Lewis (D.GA) capture the seriousness this accusation (Lewis, in Bullard 1994: vii-viii): 
The signs are gone, but the residuals of Jim Crow housing and unfair industrial and land use 
policies are still with us. African Americans and other people of color are burdened with more than 
their share of toxic waste dumps, landfills, incinerators, lead smelters, dirty air and drinking waster, 
and other forms of pollution that threaten their health I their homes and workplace. . . . Just as 
African Americans and others mobilized to protest the evils of segregation and discrimination, they 
have now mobilized to protest unjust public policies, discriminatory facility siting practices, unequal 
protection, and other forms of environmental racism. 
Congressman Lewis is at the forefront of an environmental justice movement that calls for an end to 
disproportionate dumping of toxic waste by race and social class. The empirical questions this movement 
raises are: Where are commercial TSO installations located, and why? And, more generally, is there a 
correspondence between population distribution and environmental risk distribution? This dissertation takes 
on these questions. Four hypotheses are tested, distilled from four theories of human organization of space 
and location for risky technologies. 
The first hypothesis, economic rationality, examines the distribution of TSO installations from the 
standpoint of TSO commercial operators. TSO facility operators insist they select commercially suitable 
locations not areas with historically disadvantaged populations. Using period data, this dissertation infers 
from location outcomes economic motives by TSO facility operators. The second hypothesis, scientific 
rationality, examines the distribution issue from the standpoint of EPA geologists, hydrologists, and 
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engineers who insist siting outcomes are driven by clearly articulated scientific criteria. The third hypothesis, 
community social capital, analyzes the geographic unevenness of environmental health risks as an assumed 
function of the capacity of communities to resist the placement of a facility in their neighborhood by levels of 
trust, cohesion, and reciprocity that obtain. The fourth hypothesis, race and class inequality, examines the 
claim that inequitable siting of hazardous facilities is a projection of direct and indirect institutional racism 
and classism. By estimating the beliefs and intentions of different stakeholders in statistical modeling, this 
dissertation hopes to explain variation in commercial TSD installation siting outcomes. 
Before discussion of this study's organization and relevance, it is important to address the root 
causes of the hazardous waste problem. The root causes of the hazardous waste stream stem mainly from 
the defects of the modern capitalist state. The competing commitments of the state to capital accumulation 
and social harmony prevent it from acting purposefully on the hazardous waste question. This macro 
political economic context is key to understanding policy proposals discussed in Chapter V. 
POLITICAL ECONOMIC ROOTS OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM 
Environmental sociologists have produced a political economic framework for understanding the 
human dimension of environmental change. The framework concentrates on the production, consumption, 
exchange, and resource allocation practices of human societies. This framework has been used effectively 
to examine the social costs of private ownership of nature (Beckenbach 1 994), and the diminished capacity 
for economic growth by the degradation of la_nd, labor, and capital, and toxic contamination of human habitat 
(O'Connor 1 994; 1 998). 
Three scholars exemplify this political economy of the environment framework - Allan Schnaiberg 
( 1 980 and with Gould 1 994) , James O'Connor ( 1 973; 1 994; 1 998), and Sherry Cable ( 1 993; 1 995).  All 
regard the modern capitalist state as reducible analytically to two functions: capital accumulation and 
legitimization.6 These functions stabilize hierarchy by moving the site of class conflict from the shop floor to 
6 This structural conception of the state, according to Weberian theorists like Theda Skocpol ( 1 993), 
simplifies the totality of state functions. State bureaucracies have internal logic that radical political 
economists overlook. The state is not only an arbiter of class conflict, but also a network of administrative, 
policing and military organizations, coordinated loosely by executive, legislative and judicial apparatuses. 
This network of organizations is a resource that supplies the state with the potential to override narrow class 
interests, and concentrate energies on organizational preservation. According to Skocpol, the motive to 
maintain and perpetuate bureaucracy provides the state with the potential for autonomy. Recently, state 
theorizing has experienced rebirth in New Economic Sociology, and re-conceptualizations of the great 
structuralist versus instrumentalist debates of the 1 960s and 70s. I believe the structural framework 
presented here remains the most elegant of state theories, with concepts sufficiently flexible and abstract to 
adorn with specificity. 
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the halls of government. The capital accumulation function involves government protection of liberal 
economic interests by creating and sustaining conditions for private capital investment and economic 
growth. The legitimization function involves creating and maintaining conditions for social harmony by 
protection of democratic political interests through delivery of public and individual primary goods. These 
functions contradict each other on environmental matters. The hazardous waste stream in America is an 
outcropping of the unresolved tension between capital accumulation and legitimization. How did the mode� 
capitalist state arrive in this position of environmental ineffectiveness? These functions emerged as 
solutions to market underperformance and class antagonism, springing from the mind of British economist 
John Maynard Keynes. 
THE FIRST CONTRADICTION OF CAPITALISM 
Keynes built an economic risk insurance framework to correct macroeconomic instabilities arising 
from microeconomic decisions. Keynes saw the market economy as plagued by contradictions and capacity 
underutilization. Economic problems spring from the drive for profit maximization. To maximize profit, 
economic actors invest in cost minimization methods. A common method is to increase the ratio of fixed 
(machines) to variable (workers) capital in production. Use of machinery is rational at the level of economic 
agency. Market coordination problems arise when economic actors simultaneously cost minimize. Without 
regular income, laborers cannot buy goods and services (absent a deflation of prices). The outcome is 
underutilization of human labor, class antagonism, insufficient aggregate demand, and declining rates of 
accumulation. Keynes recognized that absent inter-firm coordination of profit taking methods, crises of 
aggregate demand and market failure will reoccur. Keynes theorized that government can steer the 
economy, and minimize human suffering from job loss. 
Keynes (1964) rejected the concept of an invisibly governed and smooth operating price system. 
He viewed the market economy as chronically sub-normal and cyclical.7 His risk management system 
called for stabilization of the market economy through fiscal levers of expenditure and taxation. The 
Keynesian formula for economic stability and maximization of productive output established the modem 
. 
7 In sorting out variations in rates of economic growth, unemployment, income, and patterns of inventory, 
economists of various theoretical persuasion have identified many cycles of various periodicity and 
amplitude, including long-swings of 40 to 60 years presumably governing the whole of capitalist 
development (see Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1994). Should these cycles actually exist, most economists 
presume they are self-correcting and governed endogenously (see Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995). 
Recently, scholars have turned attention to extra-economic institutions (or social structures of accumulation) 
to explain economic cycles (see Weisskopf 1994). 
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capitalist state and its politically expensive double commitment to private (capital accumulation) and public 
(social harmony) interests. The tension of this double commitment is evident in government budget disputes 
over the allocation of public resources and the enforcement of environmental regulations (see .Cable and 
Cable 1995). 
With knowledge of predictable economic phenomena like consumption propensities for population 
strata, and the multiplying effects of government expenditures under variable conditions (i.e., level �f 
unemployment), Keynes advocated a range of demand-side interventions to be funded by transfers of 
money capital in the economic system (Keynes 1964). These demand-side interventions perform the 
legitimization function by delivering the public good of social stability, and individual primary goods like 
"rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth" (Rawls 1971: 62). _ The commitment of 
the state to demand-side services to disadvantaged populations _fostered the belief ''that people could turn 
to the government to shield them from the insecuriti�s and hardships of an unrestrained market economy'' 
(Fox-Piven and Cloward 1982: ix). Management of the deleterious effects of economic cycles of varying 
periodicity and amplitude through transfers of money capital to disadvantaged populations, established the 
modern capitalist state as a mediator of class inequality, and planning agency for reproduction of capitalist 
relations (Block 19n). Legitimization measures neutralized the systemic dangers of class militancy and 
cyclical economic instability. 
On the capital accumulation side of the Keynesian risk insurance system, steady economic growth 
could be achieved by investments in capacity-building sectors of the private economy. By a basic 
calculation relating stock of capital to productive output, one can estimate unit increases in output by the 
size of investment in a particular sector of the economy (Heilbroner 1972). Investments to encourage 
economic output included: allowing accelerated depreciation of fixed capital investments; legal protection 
from foreign competition; price controls; infrastructure subsidies; technology transfers from the armaments 
economy; lowering levels of taxation; and provision of maintenance services like weather mapping, policing, 
and fire protection (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). 
These capital accumulation measures decrease the cost of business, directly benefiting producers 
by increasing the rate at which circuits of investment are realized (absent inflation). These measures also 
benefit consumers by depressing the real price of desirable goods and services (should sufficient 
competition exist). These capital accumulation measures offset potential li·quidity crises of capital, and 
stabilize macroeconomic output by encouraging the circulation of money capital, and boosting productive 
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capacity. These measures also perform a macro-psychological function of satisfying business confidence, 
and encouraging risk tolerant behavior (Block 1977). 
The Keynesian economic risk management system, with its high modem, order-maintaining 
mechanisms, temporarily offset the contradiction between forces and social relations of production in the 
economy, but profoundly politicized the budget process, and intensified debate about the proper relationship 
of the state to the economy in a private enterprise system. Whatever stability was achieved by these ideas 
(i.e., limiting periodic economic contractions, and buffering the structure of class dominancy), the Keynesian 
system ultimately failed. It failed because it weakened the link between income and employment, 
undermining a major pillar of the market economy; it could not effectively resolve the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation; it retarded information flow and price signaling, undermining the ability of 
producers and consumers to arrive at mutually beneficial transactions; it blurred the di_stinction between 
politics, administration, and the economy; it embroiled the state in Mafia tactics of taking protection money 
and picking winners, violating its constitutional neutrality; and it caused fiscal crises that handcuffed state 
action (O'Connor 1973). 
From an environmental standpoint, the Keynesian framework failed miserably, and set in motion an 
environmentally pernicious growth system of production and surplus extraction (Schnaiberg 1980). By 
trying to solve one problem, the modem capitalist state exacerbated another - the enduring conflict between 
the environment and society (Schnaiberg & Gould 1994). This conflict is termed the second contradiction of 
capitalism by James O'Connor (1994; 1998). Problems of hazardous waste mismanagement and 
geographic unevenness of environmental health risks are located in the second contradiction of capitalism. 
THE SECOND CONTRADICTION OF CAPITALISM 
The commitment of the modem capitalist state to democratic political and liberal economic interests 
is contradicted because it causes realization crises of capital (i.e:, falling and stagnant rates of profit) on the 
cost-side of economic production. Cost-side instabilities arise from patterns of environmental degradation. 
By commitment to economic growth as a societal stability model, the modem capitalist state accelerated the 
rate of environmental withdrawals and additions8 (Schnaiberg 1980). Environmental withdrawals and 
8 Human modification of the earth has led to unsustainable loss of functional landscape, desertification, 
deforestation, excessive exploitation of plant and animal species, famine and constraints on global food 
supplies, coastal and oceanic pollution, atmospheric turbidity, deterioration of marine ecosystems, crises of 
biodiversity, and a series of boomerang effects related to world health and polarization of the planet into 
politically unstable factions of vulgarly advantaged and raggedly poor peoples (Southwick 1 994). 
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additions degrade ecosystems and the physical conditions of economic production (i.e. , geophysical 
environment and human labor). Because of the thermodynamic law of entropic irreversibility, degradation of 
the factors of production gradually increases the cost of organizing the economy. Misuse of the conditions 
of production lower system-level productivity and long-term rates of profit taking (O'Connor 1 994). The 
reproductive capacity of the economic system is undermined, in the long-term, by resource exhaustion. 
Political economists of the environment (Cable and Cable 1 995) argue that patterns of 
environmental degradation are caused by the motivational underpinnings of capitalism - profit maximization 
and unabated economic growth. The modem capitalist state allows the externalization of the costs of 
environmental degradation to maintain engines of economic growth. Harmful additions to the environment 
degrade the conditions of human and wildlife habitat. The hazardous waste stream is caused by this 
shortsighted managerial time horizon. Controlling the hazardous waste stream means slowing the rates of 
environmental withdrawal and addition. Scientific evidence of the dangers of ecological disorganization and 
unfettered destruction of human habitat has increased public concern and action for environmental 
management (Dunlap and Mertig 1992). Concern for restoration and protection of the physical conditions of 
life has led to the passage of numerous environmental laws regulating the adaptation of nature to human 
needs (see Table 1 .3). 
By tightening rules on human use of nature, the modern capitalist state is responding to its 
legitimization function of sustaining the public good of environmental health. In the process, the state 
contradicts it capital accumulation function. The passage of environmental laws increases the transaction 
costs of enterprise. Environmental regulatory interventions cause system-level liquidity problems, and upset 
the societal stabilization program predicated on economic growth. 
Environmental laws are necessary to guarantee the long-term stability of the capitalist mode of 
production, but antagonize business confidence. These laws make production more expensive and 
undoubtedly discourage investment in production of socially desirable goods and services. These laws are 
challenged relentlessly (Austin 2002; Zahran and Zilney 2000), and their enforcement undermined by 
regulatory lethargy (Barnett 1 994)._ It seems the modern capitalist state will only act when prodded because 
its machinery and constituencies are married n:iore strongly to capital accumulation. Cable and Benson 
(1993), for example, argue that ecological problems at the local level stem from the miscarriage of . 
environmental regulations at the national level. Because environmental regulations are not enforced 
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Estuary Protection Act 
National Mining and Minerals Act 
Clean Air Act 
Occupational, Safety and Health Act 
Resource Recovery Act 
Pollution Prevention Packaging Act 
Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act 
Water Pollution Control Act 
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act · Coastal Zone Management Act · 
Home Control Act 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments 
Parks and Waterways Safety Act 
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
Ports and Safe.Waterway Act 
Clean Water Act 
Endangered Species Act 
Deep Water Port Act 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act 
Federal Non-Nuclear Research and Development Act 
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act 
Archeological and Historic Preservation Act 
Solar Energy Research, Development and .Demonstration Act 
Shoreline Erosion Control Demonstration Act 
Eastern Wilderness Act 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 
Toxic Substances Control Act 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Energy .Policy and Conservation Act 
Forest Management Act 
Clean Air Act Amendments 
Pure Water Act 
Surface Mining ·control and Reclamation Act 
Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act 
Endangered Species Act Amendments 
Energy Tax Act . 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act 
Uranium Mill-Tailings Radiation Control Act 
National Parks Service Act Amendments 
Archeological Resources Protection Act 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liabjlity Act 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
Non-game Wildlife Act 
Farm land Protection Policy Act 
Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act 
Sources: Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
National Park Service, National Forest Service, and Department of the Interior. 
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strongly, polluters not sanctioned negatively, and the costs of environmental damage carried by the public, 
Cable and Benson reason that the modern capitalist state is structurally committed more strongly to capital 
accumulation and liberal economic interests. Grassroots environmental justice groups emerge rationally in 
this context to push authorities to enforce the law and carry out their democratic function of maintaining the 
conditions of life equally for all persons under its juridical authority. Though government reluctance to 
enforce the law radicalizes aggrieved persons, and dramatically increases in the number of grassroots 
environmental organizations·, Cable and Benson doubt the possibility of '1egitimacy crisis" in which the 
interests of the public triumph over private interests. This doubt is based reasonably on the historically 
supported assumption that corporate actors ''will not simply acquiesce" to government rules increasing the 
transaction costs of conducting business (Cable and Benson 1 993: 474). 
Using this framework, environmental political economists exposed a cruel irony - to resolve the 
contradiction between forces and relations of production to achieve economic growth and social harmony, 
state managers unleashed a second contradiction with the same shocks to economic stability , plus the 
unsustainable exploitation and degradation of the natural world.9 
The problem of hazardous waste - its generation, management, and distribution on the population -
is rooted in the managerial defects of the modem capitalist state. The state is not organized sufficiently to 
match the systemic challenges of the second contradiction of capitalism. Government administrators are 
handcuffed into non-action by competing imperatives, and the hazardous waste stream persists. As more 
TSO installations appear in more neighborhoods, a change in consciousness is possible, and a political will 
to address the chemical-intensity of modern life may emerge. The problem of hazardous waste distribution 
is an opportunity to address deeper social cleavages in American life - class hierarchy, racial discrimination, 
and political power. The conclusion of this dissertation proposes a resolution to the hazardous waste 
distribution problem. The proposal coordinates the problem of commercial hazardous waste management 
with state legitimization and capital accumulation functions in mind. On the issue of equitable hazard waste 
distribution, a Keynesian optimism for systemic reform is possible. 
9 Degradation of the earth has led to unsustainable loss of functional landscape, desertification, 
deforestation, excessive exploitation of plant and animal species, famine and constraints on global food 
supplies, coastal and oceanic pollution, atmospheric turbidity, deterioration of marine ecosystems, crises of 
biodiversity, and a series of boomerang effects related to world health and polarization of the planet into 
politically unstable factions of vulgarly advantaged and raggedly poor peoples (Southwick 1 994) . 
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CONTRIBUTIONS ANO RELEVANCY OF THE STUDY 
This section discusses the theoretical and methodological contributions of this dissertation. Again, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the geographic distribution of commercial treatment, storage, 
and disposal facilities, theorize the social forces governing siting decisions and outcomes, and conduct 
statistical tests to objectively evaluate hypotheses. This dissertation is relevant for seven reasons. 
First, this dissertation is environmentally sociological. It rejects the epistemic assumption that 
human beings are separable from nature. It accepts the assumption that ecological laws cannot be 
repealed. It recognizes that human social organization is linked ontologically to geo-physical and bio­
chemical processes. Human management of the hazardous waste stream is an empirical target for 
understanding the dialectic between society and nature. In this dissertation, the hazardous waste stream is 
sized. The mode of production and government complacency are identified as root causes. Socio-cultural 
and geo-physical factors are identified as possible predictors of the distribution of commercial TSDF s in the 
Southeastern United States. As an environmental sociology dissertation, it contributes to the gradual reform 
of the social facts dictum. 
Second, the problems of space and location are under-theorized in sociology. These concepts are 
forfeited to geographers and urban planners.10 This dissertation wrestles the concepts of space and location 
into a sociological framework of power, stratification, and group behavior. Space and location are ideal 
concepts to mine the level of analysis problem in sociology. Location for TSDF operations is an agency and 
structure problem. It involves stakeholders with intentions that are structured by systemic imperatives. 
Stakeholder intentions conflict as a function of conflicting systemic imperatives. The patterning of 
stakeholder conflict reflects the resolution of systemic cross-purposes. Take for example, the decision of a 
company to locate a TSD facility in a poor community of color. The decision may be motivated by utility 
maximization, or conflict avoidance in permit acquisition. These motivations are systemically induced by 
market competition and regulatory norms. The location decision induces opposition from targeted 
communities. The actions of targeted communities force changes in the regulatory milieu, as public officials 
10 The notions of space and location were fundamental to the Chicago School of sociology. Sociologists 
developed a POET model of analysis that specified the reciprocal relations between population, social 
organization, environment, and technology. This model adapted spatial reasoning from the science of 
ecology. The Chicago School furnished sociology with spatial concepts and metaphors (i.e. ,  concentric 
zone, region, field, periphery and landscape), and articulated a brilliant model of co-evolution. Social 
theorists as early as lbn Khaldun (1332-1406) recognized the importance of location-specific factors as 
climate, the fecundity of soil, and levels of precipitation in determining forms of human society and 
trajectories of culture. This dissertation is a resuscitation of these theoretical traditions. 
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balance the will of the public and the private interests of capital (see Table 2.1 ). These changes cause 
TSDF operators to behave differently in their use of space and location. The patterning of this change in 
behavior constitutes a fluid resolution of systemic contradiction. Entering the agency-structure problem 
through an environmental sociological conception of space and location can yield creative ideas for 
purposeful resolution of systemic contradictions . 
. Third, this dissertation confronts moral philosophical notions of equity and justice. These ,concepts 
explicitly direct a large percentage of sociological research. The terms equity and justice are hotly contested 
in moral philosophy. Philosophical traditions (i.e., Kantian, Utilitarian, Liberal, Rawlsian, and 
Communitarian) can be sorted on a continuum of procedural and distributional justice. Sociologists 
generally emphasize distributional justice and de-emphasize procedural justice. In the political arena, this is 
a logical trap, given the American constitutional commitment to procedural fairness. This dissertation 
attempts to bend the continuum of distribution and procedure. It measures distributional outcomes 
objectively as an indication of justice, and reasons from outcomes procedural reforms that balance the 
interests of all parties. Balancing the interests of stakeholders is not easy, but the dissertation proposes a 
non-coercive solution to the distributional problem. This hazard allocation proposal is discussed in the 
conclusion. 
Fourth, this dissertation organizes the literature on distributional outcomes uniquely into four 
hypotheses: 1) business rationality; 2) scientific rationality; 3) social capital ; and 4) race and class 
discrimination. Although the environmental justice literature is interdisciplinary, researchers tend to use 
discipline-specific methodologies and hypotheses to explain variations in quality of life linked to 
environmental insults, and whether risks of exposure to different kinds of environmental hazards are 
patterned within and across statistical, geographic, and juridical units. This dissertation is consciously 
interdisciplinary, synthesizing economic geography, geology, environmental sociology, demography, political 
economy and juridical literatures. All reasonable hypotheses are tested objectively. 
Fifth, by virtue of its interdisciplinary character, this dissertation introduces numerous, never-before­
tested independent variables, linked carefully to never-before-tested theoretical propositions. Measurement 
theory mandates careful linkage between indicators/operations and abstract construct.s. Indicator selection 
is constrained by researcher bias, time and financial considerations, and availability of good data. Such 
constraints produce questionable measurement decisions, use of data driven hypotheses rather than 
hypothesis driven data collection, politically motivated variable selection and under-specified model fitting to 
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advance social agendas (see Chapter II). The environmental justice scholars routinely commit such 
mistakes. Indicators are used inadequately as proximate measures of fuzzy notions linked to poorly · 
articulated theories in a demolition of the logic of measurement. By carefully attending to the logic of 
measurement, this dissertation clarifies the linkage between theory and observation, enriching the pool of 
variables to predict patterns of environmental risk distribution, and attempting to provide a valid and reliable 
basis for public policy and elimination of regulatory complacency. 
Sixth, this dissertation makes numerous research design improvements to existing scientific 
literature to strengthen reliability and validity of knowledge claim,s. Improvements include: expanding the 
notion of hazardous exposure to include all populations within 1 and 1.5 miles of a TSD installation instead 
of locating such facilities squarely in statistical units; and enhancement of model specification to explain 
greater variation in the geographic variability of environmental hazards. 
Seventh, analysis of the distribution of commercial. treatment, storage, and disposal facilities is 
inherently relevant. Research evidence on distribution equity is contradictory. Results vary by research 
design, unit of analysis, variable selection, and object of analysis. Several gaps in the empirical literature 
undermine its credibility. The review of scientific literature in Chapter II identifies shortcomings and sets the 
table for analyses that follow. Also, commercial TSDFs are uniquely important because of the way they are 
· sited. As privately owned companies, commercial TSDFs are market maneuverable. They locate to areas 
on the basis of profit, unlike their public and onsite counterparts. The sociological study of economic action 
provides opportunity for structural analysis of market behavior and identification market underperformance 
on socially important measures of human well-being, in contrast to the neo-classical economic study of 
markets erected on questionable premises of rational actors and perfect information, and narrow concern for 
economic advancement. 
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter I problematizes the issue of hazardous 
waste treatment, storage, and disposal. The hazardous waste stream is sized, the political economic 
backdrop explained, the regulatory context is described, objectives of the dissertation are delineated, and 
reasons are given for the relevancy of such research. 
Chapter II is a comprehensive and critical review of scientific literature on the distribution of 
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities in the United States. The review is organized by methodology, 
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and studies are evaluated critically on their contribution to science. Articles are criticized on research design 
elements like sampling methodology, variable operations, measurement precision, conceptual clarity, and 
hypothesis validity. Such criticism guides design decisions and analyses in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Ill is a detailed discussion of the theories of TSDF site selection an� location. Each theory 
is distilled into a testable proposition or hypothesis. Variable operations and definition statements are 
presented, data sources are described and evaluated for validity and reliability, construction of the dataset is 
described, and reasons are ·given for object and unit of analysis selection and statistical tests to be used. 
Chapter IV presents results of statistical tests; Descriptive statistics on independent variables are 
used to sort and describe the data for the region as whole and individual states. Next, statistical tests of 
comparison (i.e., t-Test) between host and non-host neighborhoods are conducted. Results are presented 
in table format for the entire region, and two sub-regions - the South, and Deep South. Last, binary logistic 
regression results are presented. Regression coefficients are transformed from log odds to odds ratios for 
ease of interpretation and readability. 
Chapter V recapitulates hypotheses in relation to results. The implications of results are discussed. 
President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 on environmental justice is discussed. A hazard allocation 
system is proposed to achieve procedural and distributional justice. The mechanics and benefits of the 
hazard allocation system proposal are described and summarized in table format. 
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CHAPTER I I :  REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
The principal objective of this chapter is a comprehensive and critical review of treatment, storage, 
and disposal facility studies to set the table for analyses that follow. The review of scientific literature is 
organized methodologically into: 1 )  cross-sectional studies, and 2) longitudinal studies. The studies are 
presented in more-or-less chronological order, and critically evaluated on their contributions to scientific 
understanding of the geography of environmental health risks. 
TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITY CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES 
The generally acknowledged progenitor of environmental justice research is sociologist, Robert D. 
Bullard.1 In 1 983, Robert Bullard, at the urging of his wife Linda McKeever, conducted a case study of 
waste disposal practices in Houston, Texas. Bullard did not examine TSO installations specifical ly, but the 
logic and design of the study influenced investigations that followed. The stated purpose of the study was to 
see if blacks were more likely than whites to reside near waste disposal facilities. Houston was selected 
because of its racial diversity and hazardous waste disposal practices that seemingly targeted African­
American communities. Bullard's evidence pointed to a new and gruesome form of inequality - residential 
proximity to human and industrial waste. Bullard discovered that all 5 municipal landfills were located in 
black neighborhoods; of the city's 8 garbage incinerators, 4 were located in black communities, and 1 
located in a mostly Hispanic community; and all the city's mini-incinerators were located in majority b lack or 
Hispanic neighborhoods. In total, 21 of Houston's 25 hazardous waste facilities were located in 
predominantly minority communities. 
Bullard (1 983) theorized this environmental inequity as a failure of government. The federal 
government failed in its enforcement of environmental regulations, and Houston's municipal government 
failed miserably in its zoning practices. Bullard strongly rejected the argument that such inequity could be 
the product of residential choice, with minorities trading environmental quality for affordable housing. For 
1 More recently, researchers (Zahran, Zilney, and Hastings 2003) note numerous environmental justice 
studies that pre-date Bullard. For example, Myrick Freeman (1 972) observed that persons of low-income 
and minority status were exposed to higher levels of air pollution, and generally lived in communities of 
significantly lower environmental qual ity. Freeman argued this problem of disproportionate exposure to 
harmful air pollutants could be ameliorated by wealth re-distribution . Freeman's recognition and diagnosis of 
the problem anticipates whole debates in the environmental justice literature, from the explanatory power of 
race versus class, to the role of market forces in allocating environmental burdens unjustly. 
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Bullard, the evidence was an out-cropping of institutional racism. He concluded passionately that Houston 
typified an insidious national problem. 
Bullard's Houston case study has been very influential, frequently cited as proof of environmental 
racism. It is also credited with spawning a new line of social scientific inquiry, with 200+ environmental 
justice journal articles published from 1990 to 2001 (Zahran, Zilney, and Hastings 2003). Above all, the 
study's results energized civil rights and grassroots environmental justice activists, and stirred policy makers 
and elected officials to action (see Table 2.1 ). 
The study's political influence is not matched by its scientific merit. Vicki Been's (1994) replication 
of Bullard's study raised questions about its scientific credibility. Been discovered that Bullard inflated his 
sample by double-counting sites, counting abandoned sites, and sites erected in the 1920s, long before 
Houston turned into a racially diverse city. Bullard also provided no description of how neighborhoods were 
defined, how racial data were collected, and ignored cross-sectional controls like income or other potentially 
important factors that may render the observed relationship between race and environmental risk spurious. 
In 1990, Robert Bullard expanded his Houston case study with the publication of Dumping in Dixie: 
Race, Class, and Environmental Quality. Dumping in Dixie used the collective study method, examining the 
relationship between environmental distress, demography, and attitudes of black residents toward 
environmental quality. The study lumps commercial TSDFs with other locally undesirable land uses. 
Bullard used ethnographic methods, conducted in-depth interviews with community leaders, distributed and 
analyzed data obtained from a survey of African-American households, and analyzed archival and 
government documents to build an impressive case for environmental injustice. Based on a random sample 
of 120 African-American households in five communities, examining: popular responses to environmental 
hardships and justice concerns; tactics used to resolve environmental conflicts; the role of African-American 
organizations in remedying environmental inequity; the role of "outsiders" in activism; and the effects of 
negotiated compensation2 in siting of hazardous waste facilities (Bullard 1990). 
2 Negotiated compensation is an economic scheme to diffuse the concentrated external costs of a 
hazardous facility. Targeted communities are given a set of "offsetting benefits." Benefits may include, 
direct payments to affected residents; host fees paid to a general fund for community development; grants 
for local health care, parks, and recreational amenities; and distribution of abatement devices to greatly 
reduce the risk of exposure. Negotiated compensation, it is argued, can force the internalization of negative 
externalities, mediate the effects of residential instability, and "guarantee a socially optimal level of pollution" 
(Boerner and Lambert 1995: 95). Critics see negotiated compensation as a band-aid idea that undermines 
efforts to reduce the size of the hazardous .waste stream, and as a pornographic economic logic that 
requires already disadvantaged communities to make cruel trade-offs between health and wealth. 
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TABLE 2.1 : CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT AL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
Year Event 
1 971 Council of Environmental Quality reports link between racial discrimination and environmental quality. 
1 982 Warren County, North Carolina residents protest the siting of PCB landfill, focusing national attention on 
issue of environmental racism. 
1 983 Robert Bullard publishes groundbreaking case study of waste disposal practices in Houston Texas. 
1 983 General Accounting Office report discovers that 3 of 4 hazardous facilities in EP A's Region IV are in 
majority African American communities. 
1 987 United Church of Christ (UCC) Commission for Racial Justice issues report on the distribution of 
hazardous facilities nationwide. 
1 990 Conference at the University of Michigan releases report called Race and the Incidence of 
Environmental Hazards. 
1 990 Robert Bullard publishes influential text Dumping in Dixie. 
1 990 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) creates Environmental Equity Workgroup 
1 991 First National People of Color Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. crafts EJ Principles. 
1 992 EPA releases Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities. 
1 992 Environmental Justice Act of 1 992 introduced in Congress by Senator Albert Gore and Congressman 
John Lewis. 
1 992 EPA establishes Office of Environmental Equity. 
1 993 EPA establishes the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council. 
1 993 Environmental Equal Rights Act introduced to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Did not pass. 
1 993 Environmental Health Equity Information Act of 1 993 introduced to amend the Comprehensive 
· Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Did not pass. 
1 994 Federal agencies, including the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences hold symposium on 
environmental justice. 
1 994 President Clinton issues Executive Order 1 2898, "Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice in . 
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" 
1 994 EPA renames Office of Environmental Equity as the Office of Environmental Justice 
1 994 EPA creates Office of Civil Rights 
1 994 lnteragency Working Group on Environmental Justice is established. 
1 995 Social & Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) at the University of Massachusetts releases study 
indicating no racial inequities in the siting of hazardous waste facilities 
1 998 EPA issues Interim rules for Title VI Complaints Challenging Permits for public comment 
1 999 Environmental Justice Act of 1 999 is introduced into US Legislature. 
2001 Second National People of Color Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. 
2003 EPA establishes environmental justice bibliographic database 
Sources: Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental Equity; · and Clark Atlanta University's 
Environmental Justice Office. 
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Bullard examined five mostly African-American communities with histories of environmental 
distress. Whether a function of selection bias or not, each case fits a pattern of racial injustice and 
environmental inequity. Three of the five cases are discussed below. These cases specifically examine 
treatment, storage and disposal facilities. 
In West Dallas, TX, Bullard discovered.a history of disproportionate dumping and community 
radicalization. West Dallas is a segregated enclave outside Dallas city limits, home to a high perc�ntage of 
African-American residents. West Dallas is grossly impoverished, with very low levels of home ownership, 
high levels of public assistance, and the majority residents crammed into high-density housing projects. Just 
fifty feet from the housing project is a bullish lead treatment and smelting complex. For decades, lead 
particles were pumped routinely into the air, and swept by prevailing winds onto 'West Dallas streets, 
sidewalks, ballparks, and children's playgrounds" (Bullard 1990: _55). Because "city officials refused to 
enforce lead emission standards" (Bullard 1990: 56), residents suffered a high-percentage of lead-related 
health problems. Hit hardest were the elderly, pregnant women, and children. 
In 1981, a formal epidemiological survey of the area confirmed the obvious - health risks were 
distributed unevenly in Dallas by race. The report's findings were leaked to the Dallas Morning News. 
Newspaper coverage set off public outrage, and numerous class action lawsuits were filed. West Dallas 
residents agreed to an out-of-court settlement with lead smelters estimated at $20 million, among the largest 
lead-contamination settlements in the United States. Like residents of Northwood Manor in Houston, 
residents of West Dallas were radicalized by the experience. Quoting D. W. Nauss of the Dallas Times­
Herald (Bullard 1990: 60): "Once united only by poverty and powerlessness, the community has been 
brought together by the shared trauma of living with the lead smelter and the need to save what little they 
have. The pollution problem has awakened the community to other concerns, such as industrial 
development and housing re-development, and has made residents for the first time cast a hard, distrusting 
eye toward city plans for the area." 
West Dallas residents prevailed. They forced a capacity reduction, eventual closure of the facility, 
received financial compensation, and had the area's environmental problems significantly remedied. 
Bullard attributes the victory to tactical maneuvers like petition signing, protests, demonstrations, legal 
action, government lobbying, and enlistment of the popular press. Environmental justice activists herald the 
West Dallas case as a model of community mobilization and just compensation for environmental and public 
health degradation. 
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The story of Alsen, Louisiana is slightly different. Alsen is a small community of 1 , 1 00 .people, 98.9 
percent of whom were African-American, located just north of Baton Rouge. It is comparatively well off 
economically, with a poverty rate below the African-American national average, and higher than average 
rates of home ownership and family income. The inclusion of Alsen in the collective case study allows 
Bullard to mechanically control for the effects of economic class. 
Alsen sits on the periphery of an 85-mile industrial stretch that hugs the Mississippi River, dubbed 
cancer corridor, where 25 percent of the nation's petrochemicals are produced {Bullard 1 990). 
Carcinogens, mutagens, .and embryo-toxins saturate the area. _Millions of tons of hazardous waste are 
generated annually, with mostly all of it shipped to Rollins Environmental Services, a landfill and incinerator 
complex abutting Alsen. 
As the fourth largest handler of hazardous waste in the country, Rollins was a constant source of 
distress for community residents. In five years after it was built, the Rollins facility had been cited for more 
than 1 00 state and federal violations of environmental and occupational laws. In the late 1 980s, residents 
mobilized to end contamination of their community. Residents filed lawsuits, recorded complaints with the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality {LDEQ), and engaged in direct. action protests with the help 
of national environmental organizations. After considerable legal wrangling and backbiting, an out-of-court 
settlement was reached. Each plaintiff received a pitiful $3000 the day before Christmas. The dollar 
amount fractured the community into "money versus health factions" {Bullard 1 990: 68) , and the settlement 
shielded Rollins from future liability. In the end, environmental quality for Alsen residents improved only 
marginally, and the underlying cause of the problem, Louisiana's economic dependence on chemical­
intensive industry, remained in place. 
Last, Bullard's { 1 990) case study of Sumter County, Alabama probes the political economy of 
hazardous facility siting, and how an impoverished community is structurally coerced into a merciless trade­
off between economic survival and environmental quality. Sumter County is located in the interior of the 
Southern blackbelt. One-third of the county's population lives below the poverty line, 90 percent of which 
are African American. · Inside Sumter County is a small, rural settlement called Emelle. Emelle is home to 
626 residents, 90 percent of whom are African American. More than 40 percent live in poverty, with a 
sizable percentage living in mobile homes scattered unevenly on a winding system of dirt roads. 
Many residents are descendants of plantation slavery. With the dismantling of racial apartheid and 
the gradual disappearance of sharecropping arrangements, the community drifted economically. The lack 
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economic opportunity caused an out-migration (i.e., 40 percent of residents) that, in turn , caused a 
significant devaluation of property. Because of intensive farming practices in the past, the land was 
unsuitable for large-scale or subsistence agriculture. The area, it seemed, was too isolated for regular 
industrial production, but Bullard argues (1 990: 70), "these bleak economic conditions and cheap land made 
[Emelle] a likely candidate for polluting industries - especially waste disposal companies." 
In 1 978, Chemical Waste Management (Chemwaste) purchased 3200 acres of land in Sumter 
County, and erected the largest hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility in the country. 
Chemwaste is a subsidiary of Waste Management, Incorporated - a transnational corporation with a sizable 
share of the hazardous waste market. The sprawling facility was built on top of Emelle without political 
transparency or community input. It was a classic environmental justice scenario - a desperately poor, 
minority community bulldozed _politically by a profit-seeking conglomerate. 
To Bullard's· surprise, Emelle residents did not resist the placement of the TSO facility. Residents 
mistakenly assumed, or. were misled into assuming, that the facil_ity was relatively harmless and would 
generate employment. Chemwaste agreed to a waste tax of $5 dollar per ton, with monies spent on public 
services like schools, libraries, law enforcement and basic infrastructure. The company also sponsored 
local charities, youth groups, and other community enterprises. Most of these offsetting benefits went to 
white residents of Sumter County, and only 50 of the 400 jobs created went to Emelle residents. 
As residents learned of the hazardous materials transported to their community, and failed to get 
guarantees from the company about long-term protection of the water supply, a small group of local black 
activists and mostly white environmentalists from Tennessee and greater Alabama emerged. The group 
failed to wr_estle any concrete reforms from the company or local political figures, but for Bullard, the group 
symbolized a new and potentially powerful interracial alliance of civil rights activists and national 
environmental organizations. 
Bul lard's Dumping in Dixie (1 990) suggests that TSDF operators target socially disadvantaged 
communities. Targeted communities tend to be depressed economically, disproportionately minority, 
segregated residentially, and politically marginalized. Bullard argues that such communities are structurally 
vulnerable to toxic assault -because TSDF operators use a community's economic status and racial 
composition as indicators of a community's propensity to resist facility siting or seek legal redress of 
g rievances. 
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Bullard's proof is challengeable methodologically and theoretically. On methodology, Dumping in 
Dixie is unreliable. Bullard provides no objective reason for case selection. Anyone can scour the country 
for five examples of anything. Why select West Dallas and not Buffalo, New York? This criticism is not to 
suggest Bullard's cases are unreal. These communities have suffered immeasurably because of corporate 
negligence and government ineffectiveness. Bullard's rendering of their stories raises questions about 
social organization and environmental planning. Still, one cannot conclude a national or regional pattern of 
environmental injustice from the evidence presented, as Bullard does confidently. 
On theory, Bullard is deeply suspicious of economic explanations for site selection. For their part, 
TSDF operators insist their decision-making is color-blind, motivated strictly by scientific and commercial . 
considerations. They target areas, not populations. Site selection is based on proximate access to 
hazardous materials for processing, and the availability of cheap land for construction of a TSO installation. 
This argument is plausible. The case studies reveal that targeted communities are generally located near 
industrial parks where large quantities of hazardous waste are generated. Bullard downplays this fact - it 
does not fit with the underdog mythology of his narrative. 
In 1983, at the urging of Walter Fauntroy, Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO 1983) undertook an empirical study to examine the factors of race and economic 
class in the distribution of hazardous facilities in the EPA's Region IV. Researchers used secondary data 
from the US Census Bureau and the EPA, and conducted telephone interviews with various stakeholders. 
Results indicated that African-Americans were burdened disproportionately by hazardous waste. In 3 of the 
4 hazardous waste locations examined, African Americans constituted a demographic majority. The study 
also suggested that economic class played a role in the distribution of environmental burdens. As one 
moved closer to facilities, rates of poverty increased. In fact, the relationship appeared perfectly linear. 
Poverty levels ranged from 26 to 42 percent, almost 3 times the region's average. The study seemingly 
confirmed the rotten suspicion of environmental racism. 
Because of the small sample size and circumscribed geography, the results are non-generalizable 
nationally or regionally. The GAO study also made no attempt to establish why these locations were sited, 
population characteristics at the time of facility siting, how siting decisions affected the population, and relied 
on a simple analytic methodology. Ultimately, the study's relevance has less to do with its scientific merit, 
than with its political effect of advancing the environmental justice movement. 
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In 1987, the United Church of Christ's (UCC) Commission for Racial Justice (1987) published the 
first national, cross-sectional study of 415 commercial hazardous waste facilities in the United States. Zip 
code level population and housing data were obtained from the US Census Bureau, and data on commercial 
TSDFs were gathered from the Environmental Services Directory and the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data 
Management System (HWDMS). The study compared host and non-host communities to isolate the 
independent effects of race in siting decisions. Researchers found that communities with the high�st 
percentage of minorities had the highest concentration of hazardous facilities. This pattern of environmental 
racism obtained nationally. Statistical controls did not diminish the relationship between race and 
environmental risk. In fact, "race proved to be the most significant among variables tested in association 
with the location of commercial hazardous facilities (1987: xiii). According to researchers, the likelihood of 
this finding being a function of chance is "virtually impossible" (Mohai and Bryant 1995). 
The UCC study also noted the role of political economic factors in the location of hazardous 
facilities. Commercial operators are motivated by instrumental rationality. They seek inexpensive land, 
access to raw materials and skilled labor, and politically compliant neighborhoods. Such factors increase 
profitability and reduce potential transaction costs. These factors cluster in minority communities. The 
combination of institutional racism, and political economic disadvantage, make minority neighborhoods 
vulnerable to siting of environmentally suspect land uses. 
The UCC study is credited with raising important questions about the linkage between race and 
environmental risk, but has been criticized fiercely on methodological grounds. In William Bowen's (2001: 
140) words: ''there are several subtle but nevertheless grave reasons to doubt the accuracy of its 
conclusions." Majority of the criticism centers on the unit of analysis. The zip code unit is a poor 
approximation_ of community. They are too large, arbitrarily defined, and prone to erroneous inferences. 
What is true and valid at the zip code level may not be at smaller levels of analysis like the census tract. 
Other criticisms focus on the study's aggregated definition of minority, its incorrect usage of statistical 
analyses and diagnostic tests, questionable controlled comparisons, and lack of scientific peer review before 
publication. Though lacking in scientific merit, the United Church of Christ (1 987) study was 
groundbreaking. It attracted the attention of policy makers to potentially disproportionate siting made on the 
basis of race, and introduced the politically powerful concept of environmental racism. 3 
3 In 1994, Benjamin Goldman and Laura Fitton replicated the UCC study using updated data. They arrived 
at a similar conclusion - race prevailed as the most important predictor of the distribution of environmental 
hazards. 
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In 1992, Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant examined the geographic distribution of 14 commercial 
hazardous waste facilities in the Detroit metropolitan area (i.e. , Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne Counties). 
Mohai and Bryant (1994: 16) conducted their study "to determine whether race has a relationship with the 
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities that is independent of income." Population data were 
obtained from the University of Michigan's 1990 Detroit Area Study (DAS), and information on facility 
locations from the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. 
Mohai and Bryant performed a stratified probability sample of households within 1 and 1.5 miles of 
a hazardous facility, and of households outside these zones of exposure. The residential location of each 
respondent was graphically mapped and measured to the nearest 0.1 mile. In total, 793 individuals 
participated in the study, with 289 of them residing inside 1.5 miles of a hazardous facility. Analyses 
suggested race and poverty to be statistically significant predictors of hazardous waste siting. Of persons 
residing within one mile of a hazardous facility, 48 percent were minority and 29 percent lived below the 
poverty line; between 1 and 1.5 miles of a facility, 39 percent of residents were minority and 18 percent lived 
below the poverty line; and of those residing more than 1.5 miles of a commercial hazardous waste facility, 
18 percent were minority and only 10 percent lived below the poverty line. Mohai and Bryant discovered 
that the chance of a minority living within 1 mile of hazardous facility was 4 times greater than for a white 
individual. Of their findings, Mohai and Bryant (1 994: 20) conclude boldly: "results of our Detroit area study 
provide clear and unequivocal evidence that income and racial biases in the distribution of environmental 
hazards exist." 
Mohai and Bryant's study is uniquely designed. It is the first study to use geographic mapping 
technology to plot the relationship between environmental risk and race. This method more accurately 
measures exposure. For this reason, the study ought to be commended. However, their findings are far 
from unequivocal. . Mohai and Bryant committed computational errors, and misrepresented results. Their 
chi-square results are not reproducible because frequency distributions on race and poverty do not add to 
100 percent. Also, chi-square results for the sub-sample of Detroit residents suggest race and hazardous 
waste exposure are statistically independent. Even more damaging of their claim of unequivocal proof is 
their regression model. The adjusted A-square left much to be desired. Almost 95 percent of variation in 
their dependent variable is unexplained by the data. Mohai and Bryant provide no reason for under­
specification of their model (Bowen 2001 ). On balance, the study is insufficiently rigorous and too narrow 
geographically to be of much relevance to the macro question of environmental justice. 
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I n  1 992, Harvey White of the World Health Organization conducted a study of hazardous waste 
incineration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. White compared rates of incineration in the 1 O largest white and 
black communities in the area. No logic is provided for selection of communities apart from their size and 
racial composition . While the article found hazardous waste incineration facilities to be disproportionately 
located in minority communities, it failed to use statistical controls for other socio-economic variables that 
may influence siting decisions. Lack of statistical control, arbitrary selection of comparison groups, and 
statistical regression bias render the study scientifically marginal (Bowen 2001 ). At best, the results weakly 
hint toward environmental racism in selected communities in Baton Rouge. 
In 1 993, James Hamilton examined the role of collective action in thwarting expansion decisions by 
hazardous waste facilities. °The article was an empirical test of the Coase Theorem � the notion that 
voluntary bargaining among different users of an environment will lead to a Pareto-optimal allocation . 
Hamilton matched socio-demographic data from the 1 980 US Census with EPA data on treatment, storage, 
and disposal facilities scheduled for capacity expansion. Data were merged at the county level of analysis. 
Of the 1 56 counties examined, 72 had facilities scheduled for expansion. Hamilton included the following 
variables in his regression model: capacity surplus, hazardous waste generated, manufacturing value 
added, median housing value, percentage voter turnout in the 1 980 presidential election, percent college 
educated, population density, percent urban dwellers, and percentage non-white population. Voter turnout 
prevailed consistently as the only variable significant at the 1 percent alpha level. Hamilton discovered that 
the higher a community's voter turnout, the lower the likelihood it would be targeted for capacity expansion. 
The race variable behaved unexpectedly. The probability of capacity expansion decreased as percentage of 
minority increased. 
Hamilton's study is a significant contribution to the literature methodologically and theoretically. It is 
rigorously designed, the regression models fully specified, and variables linked logically to theoretical 
propositions. The study advances the literature in a sensible, mathematical direction and extricates it 
theoretically from a tired race versus class debate. We learn that the blackness of a community does not 
destine it for hazardous waste. Other attributes matter. This conclusion should not upset activists. On the 
contrary, it confirms their reason for being. Community action can thwart racial animus on the part of TSDF 
operators. One downside of the study is the level of analysis. The county level precludes any real 
discussion of public health effects or risk of exposure to environmental contaminants as a function of 
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proximity. Another problem is the use of voter turnout data to estimate community cohesion and political 
power. The act of voting is a political ritual that masks inequalities of influence.4 
In 1994, Douglas Anderton, Andy Anderson, John Michael Oakes, and Michael Fraser (1994) of the 
Social and Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst entered 
the environmental justice debate. Anderton et al dissect the literature objectively. The question of race and 
environmental risk is cut with analytical precision and methodological rigor. The article is a departure from 
the emotionally charged language of the literature. No political indictments or battle cries to upend the mode 
of production are made. They write (1994: 230): "Our interest �ere is not in the perception of injustice . . .  
but in the question of empirically demonstrable discrimination in the distribution of facilities across social 
groups." 
Anderton et al. examined the distribution of 408 commercial treatment, storage and disposal 
facilities in the 48 contiguous states (Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser 1994). Unlike the UCC study, 
analysis is conducted at the cen�us tract level. Anderton et al argue persuasively against the use of zip 
code or county level data. Such units invite errors of aggregation, misplaced concreteness, and fallacies of 
ecology. Moreover, because census tracts are delimited by local persons with knowledge of the physical 
and cultural makeup of a metropolis, they reasonably approximate of the sociological concept of 
neighborhood. In addition to methodological refinements, Anderton et al. introduce the hypothesis that 
market forces drive the allocation of facilities. Because management of hazardous waste is a business, 
operators of TSDFs are reasonably assumed as utility maximizing agents. They seek cheap land, labor, 
and access to materials. The population characteristics of a community are secondary, or so the argument 
goes. 
Anderton et al. focused their analysis on a specific class of TSDFs - privately owned and fully 
operational facilities that receive hazardous waste from other firms - what the EPA calls off-site handlers. 
This sample excludes TSDFs that are also large quantity generators of waste - what the EPA calls on-site 
handlers. Because publicly available data from the EPA do not distinguish between on-site and off-site 
handlers, nor include information on facility status or the date operations began, Anderton et al. rely on the 
Environmental lnstitute's Environmental Services Directory (ESD) on TSDFs to construct their frame. To 
4 Voter turnout data also underestimate the social and political influence of African-Americans on the 
American polity. Black voter turnout routinely lags behind the national average. Explanations range from 
African-American distrust of the electoral process, white intimidation of black voters, and barriers to African­
American voter registration. Because convicted criminals are stripped of their juridical status in the United 
States, the effects of incarceration play a growing role in African-American political disenfranchisement. 
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guarantee validity and reliability of ESD data, they conducted telephone interviews with operators. 
Anderton et al. use the following independent variables in their model: percentage Hispanic; percentage 
African American; percentage of families below the poverty line; percentage of families receiving public 
assistance; percentage male employment; percentage employment in manufacturing; and mean housing 
value. 
Statistical comparison of host and non-host tracts disconfirmed the racial discrimination hypothesis 
in TSDF siting. In fact, non-host tracts had higher percentages of African American and Hispanic persons 
than host tracts . .  Multivariate analyses indicated that areas with at least one TSO facility were mostly white, 
industrial, and working class. The percentage of the population employed in manufacturing was the most 
consistent and significant predictor of TSDF siting. Anderton et al. ( 1 994: 232) conclude: "no consistent 
national level association exists between the location of commercial hazardous waste TSDFs and the 
percentage of either minority or disadvantaged populations." EJ activists dismissed the study as politically 
motivated because the SADRI accepted research monies from Waste Management Incorporated. Funding 
source should not disqualify a study outright otherwise the pool of studies regarded as scientifically 
legitimate would be substantially smaller. The merger of advocacy and science is played on both sides of 
the issue. Like the UCC study, SADRI studies must be evaluated on merit. Overall, this study is carefully 
conceived and executed. 
In 1 995, James Hamilton published a revision of his TSDF capacity expansion study. Hamilton 
( 1 995) moved his analysis from the county to the zip code level of geography , .and broadened discussion of 
economic theories that may explain the unevenness of environmental health risks by race. Hamilton 
objectively .tested the following hypotheses: pure discrimination, the Coase theorem, and Mancur Olson's 
theory of collective action. The pure discrimination hypothesis holds that TSDF operators trade profits for 
prejudice. They derive utility from shouldering minorities with hazardous waste, so much so that they are 
willing to forfeit profits to achieve prejudicial ends. The Coase Theorem holds that hazardous facilities 
locate to areas with lowest transaction costs. TSDF operators are strapped by an economic logic that 
requires them to factor compensation demands and expected liabilities into siting decisions. If the Coase 
Theorem is correct, facilities will locate to areas with populations of low propensity to seek legal redress, and 
lower expectations on compensation agreements. The third hypothesis is a corollary to the Coase 
Theorem. The theory of collective action holds that communities vary in their capacity to thwart siting 
decisions by organized behavior. Socially organized co�munities have linkages to the political system, 
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place higher value on environmental amenities, and are more likely to force operators to internalize the 
external damages they cause. 
Hamilton (1 995) collected socio-demographic data on 207 zip code areas with fully operational 
TSDFs in 1 986. Of these facilities, 84 had expansion plans and 1 23 did not. T-tests indicated that 
communities with expanding TSDFs had higher nonwhite populations and higher rates of poverty. Logistic 
regression analyses performed differently. Statistical controls erased the significance of race as a predicto.r 
of TSDF expansion plans. Communities targeted for capacity expansion had lower rates of voter 
participation, lower median household income, smaller population size, and higher percentage of renters. 
Hamilton concluded the ability and/or willingness of communities to mobilize politically against noxious 
facilities is the most important predictor of facility expansion. Hamilton cautioned that his results do not 
exclude the possibility of racism. In his words (1 995: 1 29): "To the extent that racism in political markets or 
outcomes in housing, education and employment affect political participation, then these results should be 
consistent with claims that institutionalized racism affects the distribution of pollution." On this point, 
Hamilton is absolutely correct. Race, politics, and economy are tightly integrated, and related dialectically. 
This problem is solvable mathematically by inclusion of interaction terms in regression equations. This 
statistical solution escapes Hamilton. Nevertheless, the article is a decent theoretical and methodological 
contribution to the literature. 
In 1 997, J. Tom Boer, Manuel Pastor, James Sadd, and Lori Snyder analyzed the location of 82 
TSDFs operating in Los Angeles County, as listed by the California State Department of Toxic Substances 
Control (CSDTSC). TSDFs are divided into categories based on tonnage of hazardous waste ha.ndled. 
Boer et al. conducted their study at the census tract unit of geography. Census tracts are superior to zip 
code polygons for their compact size and homogeneity. Boer et al. begin with visual presentation. 
Cartographies of waste suggest facilities concentrate in the central business district near transportation 
routes, and minority communities of low-income. Bivariate data indicate TSDFs locate in largely Hispanic, 
working class communities that abut industrial areas. The probability of ethnic targeting increases with 
facility size. Facilities that process over 1 000 tons of hazardous waste are located overwhelming in Latino 
neighborhoods. 
Multivariate analyses behave similarly. Boer et al. created three measures of exposure - tracts 
with a TSDF; tracts within .5 miles of a TSDF; and tracts within 1 mile of a TSDF. On all measures of 
exposure, percentage Latino is statistically significant. Percentage African-American is insignificant. The 
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strongest predictor is the percentage of land devoted to industry. As the zone of exposure is expanded to 1 
mile, racial, economic, and political inequities harden. Percentage African American, household income, 
and percentage of voters registered become significant. 
Overall, the mixed behavior of the data deepens suspicion that results can be had either way, so 
long as one can rationalize a research design. The guard to full-blown advocacy, data tinkering, and aiming 
for a priori conclusions, is academic honesty. Boer et al fail to adequately defend radii selection. �hy 
select a 1 mile radius as a zone of exposure, and not a 2mile radius? Other concerns include: the study 
excludes c_ensus tracts with no industrial land, providing no sensible reason for doing so; the object of 
analysis is too small for nomothetic purposes; and failure to report residual analyses raises suspicion about 
spatial clustering and problems of auto-regression. 
In 1997, William Markham and Eric Rufa examined the hazardous waste trade in the United States. 
They classified neighborhoods as generators and/or recipients of hazardous waste, and compared their 
population attributes. Neighborhoods receiving waste, Markham and Rufa hypothesized, are poorer, less 
educated, and disproportionately minority. It is the first and only study to link generators _and handlers of 
hazardous waste, and attempt to unravel patterns of hazardous waste trade between neighborhoods. 
Markham and Ruf a randomly selected 49 US cities with populations greater than 1 00,000, and 
containing a waste disposal facility, sewage treatment plant, or hazardous waste incinerator. They 
contacted city planners and zoning administrators to assemble their sampling frame. They conducted a mail 
survey of facility operators to validate government records. Results indicated that tracts receiving waste had 
higher incomes, and lower percentage of minorities than tracts that generated waste. Only the relationship 
between education and hazardous waste behaved in the direction researchers expected. These regularities 
obtained across facility type and region. The environmental racism and classism hypotheses were 
disconfirmed. 
The findings raise questions. EJ researchers emphasize the disorganizing effects of facility siting, 
and assume a pattern of waste transfer from privileged to disadvantaged communities. EJ activists argue 
that hazardous facilities are public health and environmental burdens, and ought to be distributed evenly on 
the population without regard to race or income. Markham and Rufa's results suggest that positive effects 
may accompany facilities, leading to a different kind of inequity. These facilities create jobs, and facility 
operators increasingly work with local officials to offset environmental burdens with risk substitution and 
compensation agreements that increase economic welfare of the host community. Markham and Rufa's 
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results could mean that communities court such facilities as an economic growth strategy, and their benefits 
accruing disproportionately to white, working class communities. 
The capital intensity of TSDF operations obviates this explanation. As case studies indicate, job 
creation is minimal, and the benefits, no matter how sweet, are outweighed by the harm done. 
A more likely explanation is that Markham and Rufa inadvertently confirmed the industrial location 
hypothesis that generators and handlers cluster spatially. Meaning, LOGs and TSDFs target similar 
communities, and in some cases, the same community. Close examination of summary tables reveals that 
both generating and receiving neighborhoods had higher percentages of African-American persons and 
rates of poverty, and lower rates of home ownership and household income than the nation at large. Small 
differences obtain on measures of educational attainment. This point is lost on Markham and Rufa. Last, 
the study failed to use statistical controls, leaving one to wonder if their results are illusory and worth the 
attention given it. 
In 1 997, Ann Bowman and Kelly Crews-Meyer examined the distribution of AGRA-regulated 
facilities in the Southeastern United States. Bowman and Crews-Meyer measure environmental risk as the 
sum of TSDFs and LQGs in a jurisdiction - a slight deviation from the typical dichotomous presence­
absence measure used in the literature. According to Bowman and Crews-Meyer, inclusion of LQGs "more 
accurately captures the fundamental issue of risk of exposure than does the more narrow focus on TSO 
facilities" (Bowman and Crew-Meyer 1 997: 1 1 2). No explanation is given. Population data are collected at 
the county level of analysis - a peculiar, and internally inconsistent decision given their emphasis on ''the 
fundamental issue of risk of exposure." Counties may have social and political meaning, but they are simply 
too large for exposure analysis. Bowman and Crews-Meyer focus on the Southeast because of its growing 
reputation as an environmental "sacrifice zone" and dumping ground for the nation's toxic detritus. 
OLS regression models produced mixed results. The stripped down model of percent black and 
per capita income insinuates a pattern of environmental racism. As Bowman and Crews-Meyer add a 
population size variable and a race-class interaction term to their model, the race effect disappears. 
Population size is the strongest predictor of hazardous waste exposure at the county level, explaining 47 
percent of the variance in number of Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs). Bowman and Crews-Mayer 
(1 997: 1 1 6) conclude that: "on balance, race and class characteristics . . .  add little to the explanation" of 
facility siting in the Southeast. 
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There are problems with this study. OLS regression models are under-specified, intercepts are 
statistically insignificant, and model explanatory power inflated artificially by the unit of analysis. Also, the 
decision to create a LULU measure as the sum of AGRA-regulated hazardous facilities is logically weak. 
LQGs and TSDFs are qualitatively different enterprises, even if regulated by the same government agency 
under the same laws. A typical LOG is an automotive assembly facility - hardly a locally undesirable land 
use. Cities aggressively court such facilities for economic growth. Jobs are created directly as the 
assembly plant is fully operational, and indirectly as suppliers gravitate to the area, as wages and salaries 
are spent in the retail sector, and as regulators spend tax receipts on desirable public goods. The 
economic multiplier effect of such industry is unmatched.5 The same cannot be said of a capital-intensive 
hazardous waste incinerator. This conceptual mistake with technical problems mentioned above render the 
study minimally relevant. 
Cross-sectional studies are superior to case studies in controlling for non-spuriousness, but 
inadequately address the temporal order condition of establishing a genuine statistical relationship between 
community-level characteristics and siting of a hazardous waste facility. Single snapshot studies with good 
theory and statistical controls reveal co-variation, but gloss over neighborhood dynamics that may cause 
concentration of environmental risks in minority and low-income neighborhoods. The mere existence of 
unequal distribution of environmental burdens is an insufficient basis for nomothetic claims of racial 
discrimination in siting decisions and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. Such claims are 
refutable legally because the sequence of events is unknown. The next section discusses longitudinal 
studies. 
TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITY LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 
The question of what came first, the hazardous waste facility or the disadvantaged group, is unanswerable 
using a cross-sectional design. It is theoretically possible that siting decisions are procedurally fair with 
regard to race and income, with discriminatory outcomes a function of time-sensitive push and pull factors 
that operate differently on groups of people. Longitudinal studies with before and after snapshots can ferret 
5 In a study commissioned by Mississippi Development Authority called ''The Economic Impact of Nissan in 
Mississippi," economists estimate that 25,000+ jobs are created indirectly from 4000 jobs created on the 
shop floor. An estimated $81 0  million dollars in personal income is generated in 10 years. In seven years, 
every government dollar invested to attract the facility is recouped in tax receipts. In 20 years, the typical 
lifespan of such a facility, $990 million dollars are had in taxes. Whatever governments do with such 
revenue - hire people, invest in public goods - the economic effects multiply positively. 
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out these factors, identifying race and income-specific migratory patterns and residential dynamics 
stemming from the placement of a hazardous facility. 
The first study to explore the dynamics of environmental inequality diachronically was conducted by 
Vicki Been in 1994. Been revisited data from the General Accounting Office's Siting of Hazardous Waste 
Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (1983) and 
Robert Bullard's Houston study (1983). Recall, the highly publicized GAO study concluded that host 
communities were disproportionately black and poor, and Bullard's Houston study found that hazardous 
waste landfills were located overwhelmingly in predominately minority communities. Both studies, Been 
noted, failed to examine the socio-demographic composition of communities at the time facilities were sited. 
Been acknowledged the correlation between race and environmental risk discovered by the two studies, but 
suggested market forces and migratory patterns may have caused this uneven distribution. For example, 
negative externalities associated with hazardous facilities often significantly alter property values (Karaouni 
1997)6, decreasing the desirability of homes in the host community for upper-income households, "pushing" 
them to leave for cleaner neighborhoods, and "pulling" low-income, disproportionately minority households · 
to the environmental nuisance. Such market coordination produces disparate outcomes by race and 
income, but is legally permissible in liberal societies where geographic mobility and resident.ial choices· are 
not centrally coordinated. 
To test the market forces hypothesis, Been gathered census· tract-level data on population and 
housing characteristics from the US Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Because census tract 
boundaries change from decade to decade in response to population growth and patterns of migration, Been 
reconciled tract boundaries across decades to guarantee appropriateness of comparisons. Been compared 
the socio-demographic composition of host neighborhoods to counties, metropolitan areas and states, 
before and after the placement of the locally undesirable land use (LULU). Bean's study produced mixed 
results. For the GAO study, the market forces hypothesis was disconfirmed. Of the four sites examined by 
GAO, host communities at the time of placement had a significantly higher percentage African-Americans as 
compared to state population levels. 
For Bullard's (1983) Houston study, Been found evidence of African-American in-migration as 
· property values decreased following the LULU siting. Been arrived at this finding by making important 
6 Alia Karaouni (1997), in a nationwide study of the impact of noxious facilities on property values, 
discovered that homes in host neighborhoods, over a ten-year period, declined 4 percent as other 
comparably priced homes appreciated in value, keeping pace or acceding the rate of inflation. 
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corrections to Bullard's research design. She discovered that Bullard had double-counted sites, and 
included waste sites that were inoperative. These corrections brought the universe to 1 O sites from Bullard's 
original 25. Of these sites, 7 were landfills, and 3 were mini-incinerators. Of the landfills examined, 4 had a 
percentage of African-Americans equal to or lower than the city as a whole. Of the 3 communities hosting a 
mini-incinerator, one was inhabited almost exclusively by whites. Bullard's snapshot in the 1980s 
overlooked a decades long process of neighborhood racial turnover. Been found that in less than two 
decades following the placement of the LULU, neighborhoods in the surrounding area had become 
overwhelmingly African-American, in one case increasing by 233 percent, compared to the 7 percent 
increase for Houston entirely. From the data, Been concluded, "considerable support [exists] for the theory 
that market dynamics contribute to the disproportionate burden LULU's impose on people of color and the 
poor" (Been 1994: 1405). 
Been's study is not without flaws. Because it was limited to TSDFs in selected geographic regions 
and analyzed only a limited number of neighborhood characteristics, substantive findings are non­
generalizable. Also, the study did not include tests of statistical significance, leaving one to wonder if her 
results were a function of chance rather than post-siting dynamics. Last, and perhaps most devastating to 
Been's argument, it is unclear if the racial changeover resulted from the undesirable land use, or a cascade 
of white flight from a modest increase in black in-rnigration.7 These criticisms notwithstanding, Been's 
revision of GAO and Bullard's classic Houston study is a lesson in social scientific replication, and raised 
serious questions about the "price mechanism" as the possible culprit of environmental injustice. · 
In 1994, . two national level longitudinal studies by the Social and Demographic Research Institute 
(SADRI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (Anderson et al. 1994; Anderton et al. 1994b) were 
conducted. With tract level, population and housing census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990, SADRI 
researchers used a quasi-panel design to analyze the spatial relationship between environmental risk and 
neighborhood characteristics, taking statistical snapshots before and after commercial TSO facility 
7 Thomas Schelling argues that turnover in racial composition of a residential neighborhood is caused by 
racial intolerance and anti-black prejudice. Racial segregation is the inevitable macro level outcome of 
. micro level variations in preferences for racial integration. Because whites generally prefer lower levels of 
integration than blacks, a domino dynamic arises when black families move into majority white . 
neighborhoods. Massey and Denton (1993: 96) explain: ''[W]hen a black family moves into a formerly all­
white neighborhood, at least one white family's tolerance threshold is exceeded, causing it to leave. Given 
strong black preferences for integrated housing, this departing white family is likely to be replaced by a black 
family, pushing the black percentage higher and thereby exceeding some other family's tolerance limit, 
causing it to leave and be replaced by another black family, which violates yet another white family's 
preferences, causing it to exit, and so on.'' 
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operations commenced. Independent variables in logistic regression models included: percentage industrial 
employment, percentage black population, percentage Hispanic population, percentage of families under the 
official poverty line, percentage of households receiving public assistance, percentage of homes built before 
1960, mean value of owner occupied homes, and percentage of males employed. No clearly articulated 
reasons were given for the selection of independent variables. 
Results indicated no statistical support for claims of environmental inequity by race. Racial 
differences between host and non-host neighborhoods were insignificant statistically. Instead, TSO facilities 
were located predominately in working class communities, with a high percentage of neighborhood residents 
employed in industrial occupations. Results suggest commercial TSDF operators use a bottom-line 
rationality in making facility placement decisions, seeking cheap property; abundant and affordable labor 
supply; and proximate access to hazardous materials for profit maximization. Previous studies, Anderton et 
al. reasoned, arrived at different conclusions because of methodological errors, including use of zip-code 
measures of neighborhood instead of census tracts, causing problems of aggregation bias; and failure to 
include statistical controls, resulting in spurious discoveries of unequal distribution of environmental risks by 
race. The industrial working class, not African-Americans, is burdened disproportionately by hazardous 
waste, Anderton et al. concluded. 
Environmental justice advocates lambasted SADRI studies as inaugurating an anti-justice, counter­
assault designed to blunt movement momentum and social systemic reform. SADRI researchers were 
accused of bias by accepting research monies from Waste Management Incorporated and the Institute for 
Chemical Waste Management to conduct their studies (see Goldman 1996). Laura Pulido (1996) blamed 
SADRI researchers for "muddying" the debate by raising the question of economic class. The SADRl's 
studies stirred a classic, and somewhat tired, social scientific debate on the explanatory power of race 
versus class. The race versus class debate emerged, Pulido argued, as a backlash of sorts, as scholars, 
organizers, and political types recognized the "potentially threatening implications" of environmental justice 
claims to ''white political hegemony and capital accumulation" (Pulido 1996: 146). Pulido (1996) and Bullard 
( 1 997) , separately attacked SADRI researchers for adherence to methodological rigor and positivist 
epistemology, obscuring how racism intersects with "relations of production and regimes of accumulation, to 
create highly oppressive circumstances" (Pulido 1996: 148), and for implicitly denying the racist nature of 
American society by attributing environmental inequities to the class hierarchy and a cool business 
rationality. Statistical studies, environmental justice advocates insist, cannot separate class and race effects 
38 
cleanly because all factors of life, the social division of labor, poverty, and class inequities are thoroughly 
racialized. Therefore, such studies are designed to derail claims of environ_mental racism with the specter of 
scientific uncertainty, not to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms of environmental risk distribution 
(see Morello-Frosch, Pastor, Sadd 2001 ).  
· Such critics are right to raise questions about sources of funding and scholarly integrity since 
countless empirical studies have demonstrated "funding effects" on method selection, theoretical s!ant, and 
interpretation of findings.8 Still, dodging important, and widely accepted analytical distinctions between race 
and class, and attributing the worst intentions to researchers for raising a diachronic question is counter­
productive. Also, dismissal of a whole line of argumentation on epistemological grounds is too convenient 
and intellectually disabling. Instead, one can critique the SADRI studies methodologically. Both studies 
failed to reconcile tract geography from decade to decade, violating basic rules of historical comparison. 
Both studies failed to account for changing definitions of race as measured by the US Census Bureau, 
invalidating racial comparisons over time. SADRI researchers wrongly assumed census tracts are superior 
to zip code units of analysis as measures of community - each possessing certain advantages and 
disadvantages (see Liu 2001 ). Lastly, both studies rely on occupational data to estimat� neighborhood 
industrial activity, assuming wrongly that laborers reside and work in the same neighborhood, 9 to advance a 
clumsily operationalized business rationality thesis. 
Such flaws raise questions about the validity of findings, but I agree generally with Bowen's (2001: 
1 65) characterization of these studies as: " . . .  systematic, controlled, empirical, and critical investigations 
of the spatial relationship between environmental hazards and the locations of minority and low-income 
neighborhoods." One can disagree sensibly with the theoretical thrust of their data interpretation, and 
identify methodological flaws that undermine the validity of their findings, but SADRI researchers must be 
commended for elevating the environmental justice debate by "bringing in" a regard for technical precision in 
evaluation of truth claims. 
8 Knowing funding effects exist, scientific (i.e., Nature) and medical journals (i.e., Journal of the American 
Medical Association) have adopted strict financial disclosure guidelines as a powerful disinfectant against 
researcher bias. 
9 On this issue, SADRI researchers ought to have known better. According to US census data, the average 
commute from home to work was 22.4 minutes in 1 990. This figure rose 1 3.8 percent to 25.5 minutes in 
2000. In major metropolitan areas like New York, Atlanta and Chicago, the average commute to work is 35 
minutes. Average commute data are drawn from responses to the •1ong form" version of the 2000 and _ 1 990 
Censuses, and are arithmetic means for workers who do not work at home. 
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In 1995, Eric J. Kreig (1995) examined the distribution of toxic waste sites, and toxic waste facilities 
in the greater Boston area, including Boston itself, and 43 neighboring municipalities. Kreig refers to his 
study as a historical analysis of the political economy of place, which he distinguishes from spatial-temporal 
analyses of disposal facilities. Greater Boston's unique history of simultaneous industrial and suburban 
development, and substantial ethnic/racial diversity, "allows for a reliable empirical analysis of race and 
class associations with waste sites" (Kreig 1995: 3). Kreig's study is cross-sectional, but analytically 
longitudinal by his division of cases into time-based categories. Kreig divides greater Boston into two 
categories: 1) Boston, consisting of 19 historically industrialized towns; and 2) Region 128, consisting of 25 
newly industrialized towns. Of the 171 waste sites examined, 100 appear in region 128, and 71 in the 
Boston area. 
Descriptive data and inferential statistics suggest that minority and low-income groups are 
concentrated in older industrialized areas, with the race variable accounting for 53 percent of siting variance. 
Kreig's inflated partial correlation. is likely a function of aggregation bias (i.e., the unit of geography was the 
town), and a small universe of 44 cases. This study is of minimal empirical importance because of very 
serious methodological flaws, but raises important theoretical questions by linking the distribution of hazards 
to historical patterns of industrialization, suburbanization, and residential segregation by income and race. 
In 1996, Tracy Yandle and Dudley Burton (1996) analyzed hazardous waste landfill siting patterns 
in metropolitan Texas. Data were drawn from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC). Landfills located in rural areas, landfills sited before 1944, 
and landfills for which census-tract level data was unavailable were excluded from the study. These 
parameters yielded a universe of 72 historic sites, and 69 currently operational sites. Demographic data 
were obtained from the census period closest in time to the date of facility placement, and from the 1990 
census to trace demographic shifts. To measure the effects of race and income, Yandle and Burton used a 
quartile ranking method. This method is commonly used for studying series data that are unevenly 
distributed. Both host and non-host communities were divided into relatively evenly sized quartiles, and chi­
square tests of statistical independence were conducted. Comparisons on racial and income characteristics 
revealed no racial inequity, with hazardous waste landfills more likely to be sited in white, working class 
communities. The authors also discovered significant demographic turnover in host communities. By 1990, 
host communities had become predominantly African-American and disproportionately poor. 
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Yandle and Burton's study has been harshly, but justifiably criticized (see Anderton 1 996; Mohai 
1 996) on methodological grounds for model under-specification; using non-reconciled units of analysis, 
neglecting changes to tract and metropolitan area delineations 10; failure to conduct controlled comparisons; 
inadequate defense of unit selection; and use of suspect statistical techniques. Despite these criticisms, this 
study is generally acknowledged as ventilating the environmental justice debate (Bowen 2001 ). 
The. first national, tract-level study, using reconciled US Census data from 1 970, 1 980, and 1 990, 
was conducted by SADRI researchers, John Michael Oakes, Douglas Anderton, and Andy Anderson in 
1 996. Oakes et al. examined the distribution of 476 commercial TSDFs operating in 1 992. Data were 
obtained from two sources, supplemented by a telephone survey to determine the time facility operations 
began: 1 )  the Resource Conservation and Recovery Information System (RCRIS) and 2) the Environmental 
lnstitute's (El) Environmental Services Directory (EDI). Oakes et al. examined an array of community 
characteristics, before and after facility siting, including: percentage African American, percentage Hispanic, 
percentage of families below or at the poverty level, percentage of households on public assistance, 
percentage of males in the civilian labor force, percentage employed in industrial and manufacturing 
occupations, percentage unemployed, mean value of housing stock, and total neighborhood population. 
Results from ''before and after'' t-tests, and logistic regression models indicated commercial TSDFs were 
located primarily in disproportionately white, working class, and industrialized communities. Oakes et al. 
(1 996) found no evidence of bias siting by race, or a pattern of minority move-in exceeding the pattern for 
areas of similar industrial activity. In their words: "[The study found] no support for claims of stark national 
patterns of systematic bias in the siting of commercial TSDFs" (Oakes et al. 1 996: 1 46). The discriminatory 
siting and minority move-in hypotheses were not supported. 
The main accomplishment of this SADRI study is methodological. Oakes et al. partially solved the 
national census tract incompatibility problem by conducting a 4-group stratified random sample of all non­
host tracts within 1 ,  2, 3, and above 3 miles from the nearest host tract. These tracts, and all TSDF tracts 
were tediously spilt, merged, and slightly adjusted to correspond with tracts of previous censuses until all 
tract boundaries were similar across decades. Such attention to methodological detail increases reliability of 
measurement, but may decrease the validity of results. 
10  The US Census Bureau estimates approximately 1 8  percent of all census tracts changed borders 
significantly from 1 970 and 1 980, and around 21 percent of all tracts changed from 1 980 to 1 990 (Been and 
Gupta 1 997). 
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The relationship between validity and reliability is a complex matter to be left to philosophers of 
science, but it is generally recognized that a trade-off exists between the two, with attempts to increase one, 
diminishing the other. SADRI researchers have been criticized of measurement fetishism, failing to balance · 
this tension between reliability and validity. Their study is high on reliability, but possibly invalid because of 
strict and questionable measurement criteria. For example, their definition of non-host (unaffected) tracts 
includes· tracts within relatively short distances of commercial facilities. Hedonic price studies on property 
values before and after facility siting reveal that the "collateral damage" to surrounding homes extends for 
miles beyond the facility.1 1  Such misunderstanding of the "effects of proximity'' invalidates their controlled · 
comparisons. Their discovery of non-difference is a logical outcome of comparing like objects. 
Other problems exist. Because the US Census Bureau only tracted localities inside Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) 12 in 1970 and 1980, the stratified sample conducted by the authors 
had an urban bias, confounding the relationship between race and siting decisions. What conclusions about 
environmental risk can one draw from studying such a methodologically circumscribed universe? Like other 
researchers, Oakes et al. also failed to account for changing racial categories, nullifying racial comparisons 
over time. 
Three years after raising the longitudinal/market forces question, Vicki Been, with graduate student 
Francis Gupta (1997), examined the location of 554 commercial TSDFs operating in the continental United 
States in 1994. Been and Gupta painstakingly complied their list of facilities by cross-referencing several 
sources: 1) EPA's RCRIS; 2) the 1994 ESD; and 3) thousands of telephone calls to trade organizations and 
regulatory authorities. Been and Gupta opted for the census tract as their unit of analysis . . They provide a 
series of sensible justifications for this decision, including data availability, the relative stability of tract 
boundaries over time, the general conformity of tract boundaries to physical boundaries like transportation 
1 1  Hedonic price studies consistently indicate that zones of negative impact extend for up to two miles 
around a noxious facility. The distance function is non-linear, with acutely negative price effects within a 
quarter mile of the facility. Studies indicate that negative price effects disappear between 2.25 and 6.19 
miles of the hazardous facility (Liu 2001: 78-80). 
12 A metropolitan area is an agglomeration of socially and economically integrated residences and 
commercial districts that intersect the boundaries of central cities, counties, and suburbs. The Census 
Bureau's definition reads: "A large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities which have a 
high degree of economic and social integration." Each SMSA has "one or more central counties containing 
the area's main population concentration: an urbanized area with at least 50,000 in habitants [and] . . .  
outlying counties which have close economic and social relationships with central counties, . . .  a specified 
level of commuting to the central counties; and . . .  also meet certain standards regarding metropolitan 
density, urban population, and population growth" (US Department of Commerce, 1980 Census of the 
Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics 1983: 2). 
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networks and waterways, and the cost prohibitions of applying superior Geographic Information System 
(GIS) technologies to_ three decennial censuses. 
To validly analyze neighborhood demographic change over time, Been and Gupta laboriously fixed 
the tract boundaries of every "host community" from decade to decade using tract comparability tables. For 
non-host tracts, they randomly drew five one-pe.rcent samples for each decade and similarly reconciled 
these tracts by hand. Again, because rural areas and communities outside SMSAs were not cove�ed by the 
1970 and 1980 censuses, many facilities were omitted from the study, giving it an urban bias. Such a bias 
may contaminate the actual relationship between race and population density with facility location . 
. Been and Gupta conducted various statistical analyses for host and non-host tracts, including: 1) 
measures of centrality; 2) comparisons of means for theoretically relevant variables; 3) logistic estimations to 
control variable correlations; 4) and longitudinal comparisons using logistic regression coefficients. Results 
suggest that environmental health risks are concentrated in communities with higher percentages of poverty, 
unemployment, and blue-collar laborers, with strikingly lower median housing values, and modestly lower 
family incomes. On the variables of race and ethnicity, Been and Gupta (1997: 19) conclude: .. Our analysis 
finds no substantial evidence that the siting process was systematically flawed as to African-Americans 
during any of the three decades at issue. There is stronger evidence that the percentage of Hispanics in a 
tract was correlated with the probability that the tract was chosen to host a facility." Results from t-tests 
validate this assertion, but Logit estimations behave differently. In both 1970 and 1990, percentage African­
American was positively and significantly related to facility presence at the 90 and 99 percent confidence 
levels respectively. Such inconsistency across statistical tests raises questions. Did the authors violate 
logistic regression test assumptions? Or more serious, did they deliberately downplay certain findings in 
favor of others? Whatever questions one may have, data presented in the study are too ambiguous and 
incomplete to draw any conclusions. For example, Been and Gupta provide averages for community 
characteristics, but do not provide measures dispersion, nor do they provide residuals of their analyses. The 
study falls short on other grounds. Like others, Been and Gupta failed to account for racial formation, 
undercounted the number TSDFs, and inadequately connected indicators to theories. For all its careful 
methodology and organization, the study's findings, in Bowen's (2001: 161) words "are not believable." 
In 2001, Manuel Pastor, Jim Sadd, and John Hipp published a nicely designed longitudinal study of 
environmental health risks in Los Angeles County. The study tackles a central issue in the environmental 
justice literature: what came first, the toxic facility or the minority group? The study is conceptually weaves 
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notions of community efficacy, housing discrimination, market coordination, ethnic migration and racial 
churning. Methodologically, the authors use GIS technology and a circular buffer method to pinpoint 
affected tracts , including adjacent residential populations, instead of simply tagging facilities to single tracts. 
Statistically, Pastor et al introduce a "simultaneous two-stage least squares model" to estimate the 
entangled effects of minority move-in and disproportionate siting practices. 
The authors match data from 1 970, 1 980, and 1 990 US censuses with EPA data on high capacity13 
TSDFs. Statistical models included the following variables: percentage minority, percentage African­
American, percentage Latino, household income, home value, median rent, percentage college educated, 
percentage single family housing, population density,· percentage blue-collar workers, and percentage 
manufacturing employment. Results suggest TSDFs are concentrated in predominately poor and minority 
communities. This pattern obtains for all decades examined. In their words (Pastor et al 2001 : 1 9): 
"Demographics reflecting political weakness - including a higher presence of minorities, a lower presence of 
home owners, or significant degree of ethnic churning - seem to be the real attractors of TSDFs." Pastor et 
al find no evidence for the minority move-in hypothesis, discovering that ethnic churning and white 
avoidance of minority neighbors, not price signals and property devaluations from TSDF siting, determine 
residential patterns. 
Like other longitudinal studies, the authors failed to address changing government definitions and 
measures of race. This compromises their findings. The focus on Los Angeles County renders their study 
non-generalizable. The authors provide no theoretical justification for usage of ¼ mile and 1 mile impact · 
zones. Also, their regression models perform terribly, explaining between two and six percent of the 
variation in TSDF site selection using population characteristics. This model under-specification is not 
addressed. Last, the conclusion does not follow from the evidence. Pastor et al talk about political 
weakness and social capital as determinants of residential organization and environmental injustice, but do 
not measure or address these concepts in statistical models. They conflate both terms with community 
demography and economics. Social capital may be reflected in economic measures, but not necessarily. 
Social capital is a measure of community trust, reciprocity, and cohesion. It is reflected in norms of 
cooperation. It is conceptually incorrect to assume that minority or income status equals low social capital 
13 High capacity TSDFs, Pastor et al correctly note, process nearly all the hazardous waste stream in the 
United States. Facilities are classified as high capacity if they handle more than 50 tons of hazards 
annually. In fact, the hazardous waste industry is evolving into an oligopoly, with large, self-regulating, and 
publicly traded corporations controlling the trade in hazardous substances (Freeman 1 989). 
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and political weakness. One must measure these phenomena, not assume their presence or absence from 
demographic indicators. 
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 
What conclusions can be drawn for this heterogeneous body of empirical research? On the 
question of race and environmental risk, a majority of studies hint (25 of 32), but do not demonstrate 
conclusively, that African-American and Hispanic communities are exposed disproportionately to TSO 
installations. The same may be said of economic class, and other measures of community organization 
(see Table 2.2). TSO installations seem to locate in working class communities with residents concentrated 
in industrial occupations (1 1 of 32 studies). The profit motive and post-siting dynamics have equally modest 
explanatory power. Studies hint that TSO operators are utility maximizing actors, siting installations in areas 
with affordable land and access to hazardous materials for processing. Contrary to popular opinion, 
population, housing, post-siting, and economic variables predict a small percentage of variation in siting of 
TSO installations. There does not appear any consistent, statistically significant pattern of discrimination in 
location of hazardous facilities. To the extent that any meaningful patterns of environmental inequity are 
discernible from the studies examined, they occur sub-nationally. I venture this claim: In some areas, in 
some instances, some disadvantaged population group resides closer to some environmental hazard. Why 
such a boring statement about the literature? Why not venture something bolder? 
The literature is in its infancy. With few exceptions, it is methodologically below average, and 
conceptually underdeveloped. Concepts are poorly measured, the range of hypotheses limited, analytic 
possibilities tapered by researcher lethargy and bias, the unavailability of reliable and sufficiently clean data, 
a general failure among researchers to recognize the difference between cross-sectional correlation and 
causation, and a strong tendency to overstate the relevance of results. Most destructive to the literature's 
evolution is the ideological puffery and stakeholder intransigence. No reasonable proposal tied to 
scientifically valid statements about environmental justice has emerged. In short, our state of knowledge is 
uncertain. In Bowen's (2001 : 1 84) words: "Until the research needed to sufficiently reduce this uncertainty 
is completed, whether or to what extent minorities, low-income, and otherwise disadvantaged and 
susceptible populations disproportionately experience exposure to environmental hazards, and therefore 
face greater health problems, is a question that will remain largely unanswered." The flaws identified in this 
literature review are correctable. 
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TABLE 2.2: SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY STUDIES EXAMINING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES 
Author (s) Universe Unit of Analysis Analytic Methods Race Inequity Class Inequity Market Forces Other Factors 
Anderton, Anderson, National Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes No Yes Yr. House Built 
Oakes, Fraser, Weber, 25 Largest SMA Hispanic Industrial Labor 
and Calabrese (1 994) Housing Value 
Male ·Employment 
Anderton, Anderson, National Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes 
Oakes, and Fraser 25 Largest SMA Hispanic Industrial Labor 
(1 994) Housing Value 
Anderson, Anderton, National Census Tract Cross-sectional No Yes Yes 
and Oakes (1 994) Longitudinal Industrial Labor 
� Male Employment 
°' 
Baden and Coursey Chicago Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes Density 
(2002) Longitudinal Hispanic Transport access Water proximity 
Been (1 994) Houston, TX Census Tract Cross-sectional NoNes Yes Yes 
EPA Region IV Longitudinal African-American Pop. In-migration 
Been (1 995) I National Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes 
African-American Housing value 
Hispanic Industrial labor 
Unemployment 
Been and Gupta (1 997) I - Natic>nal Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes · .  Pop. Density 
Longitudinal . Hispanic Industrial labor 
TABLE 2.2: CONTINUED 
Author (s) Universe Unit of Analysis Analytlc Methods Race Inequity Class Inequity Market Forces Other Factors 
Boer. Pastor, Sadd, Los Angeles Census Tract Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes Zoning 
and Snyder (1 997) County African-American Industrial Labor 
Hispanic 
Bowman and Crews- EPA Region IV County Cross-sectional No No * Population size 
Meyer (1 997) 
Bullard (1 990) Houston, TX Neighborhood Case Study Yes Yes Yes Politics 
West Dallas, TX County Cross-Tabulation African-American 




Bullard (1 983) I Houston, TX Census Tract and Case Study Yes * * Politics 
Census Block Cross-Tabulation African-American 
Clarke and Ger1ak Southern Arizona GIS-Defined Cross-sectional Yes - Yes 
(1 998) Survey Hispanic 
Cole and Foster (2001) Chester, PA Neighborhood Case Study Yes Yes Yes Politics 
African-American 
· Collin and Harris (1993) I King-Queen, VA County Case Study Yes Yes 
* Politics 
Halifax, VA African-American 
Davidson and Anderton I National 
Census Tract Cross-sectional No Yes Yes Education 
(2000) Industrial Labor Male Employment 
Housing Value 
TABLE 2.2: CONTINUED 
Author (s) Universe Unit of Analysis Analytic Methods Race Inequity Class Inequity Market Forces Other Factors 
General Accounting EPA Region IV Zip Code Cross-Tabulation Yes Yes 
Office (1 983) Correlation African-American 
Goetz and Kemlage National County Cross-sectional Yes Yes Yes Education 
(1 996) African-American Transport access 
Asian-American Rail access 
Native-American Industrial proximity 
Hamilton (1 993) I 1 56 Counties County Cross-sectional No Yes * Voter Turnout 
Hamilton (1 995) I Capacity Zip Code Cross-sectional Yes No No Population size 
Expansions African-American Education 
Voter Turnout 
I 
Hite (2000) I Franklin County, Census Block Cross-sectional Yes No 
OH Survey African-American 
Krieg (1 998) I 44 Towns Town Cross-sectional Yes No Yes 
Non-White Commercial Taxes 
Kreig (1 995) I Greater Boston Town Cross-sectional Yes Yes 
African-American 
Markham and Ruta 49 Cities Census Tract Cross-sectional No No No Education 
(1 997) Pop. 1 00,000+ 
Maher ( 1 998) Indiana County Cross-sectional Yes No No 
African-American 
Hispanic 
TABLE 2.2: CONTINUED 
Author (s) Universe Unit of Analysis 
Mohai and Bryant . Detroit Area, Ml . Neighborhood 
(1 992) . _ (�tric) 
Oakes, Anderton, and I Nati�al Census Tract Anderson (1 996) 
Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp . · 1 Los Angeles Census· Tract 
(2001) :County Circular buffers 
Ringquist (2000) 
I 
Chicago, IL Neighborhood 
� Kettleman, CA Reservation 
St. Regis, NY 
: UCC, Commission of National Zip Code 
'. Racial Justice (1 987) · 
Warriner, McSpurren, Detroit, Ml Neighborhood 
and Nabalamba (2001 ) .  Toronto, ON County 
Kitchener, ON 
Elmlra, ON 
White (.1992) I Baton Rou�, LA· . · ' .Community ; 
Yandle and Burton I Texas Census Tract 
(1 996) 
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Longitudinal Hispanic 
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Case Study Vas 
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CHAPTER I l l :  HYPOTHESES, DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE OPERATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The research design is a framework for investigation. Decisions are made on the unit of analysis, 
what data to collect, variables to observe, control and measure, and appropriate statistical tests to solve 
research problems. Decisions are guided by analytic economy. The following res�arch design elements are 
discussed: hypotheses, variable operations and definition statements, data sources, logic of unit selection, 
object of study, and statistical methods. 
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES OF TSDF LOCATION 
Empirically driven environmental justice researchers are concerned with two questions: where is 
hazardous waste treated, stored, and disposed of, and why? The first question is descriptive and easy to 
answer. It involves gathering data from various governmental and non-governmental sources on TSD 
facility type, location, and date operations commenced. The second question is analytical and significantly 
more difficult. It requires not only a careful reading of the scientific literature for theoretical tips, but an 
interdisciplinary adventure into public health, environmental science, political economy, economic geography 
and environmental sociology. All these disciplines provide unique insight into how and why land, labor, and 
capital is used. Because management of hazardous waste is a risky enterprise, with potentially catastrophic 
consequences for persons involved directly in facility _operations, persons residing near the facility, and 
. persons governing the facility permit process, the decision about where to place such a TSD facility is full of 
stakeholders with contradictory claims and interests. Understanding this fundamental point about competing 
stakeholders is the first step to unr�veling the regional patterning of environmental health risks. 
In mapping the spatial distribution of commercial TSD installations, environmental justice 
researchers notoriously reduce the number of stakeholders to two parties - facility operators and targeted 
communities - and oversimplify the motives and capacities of each player ( for alternative see Cable, 
Hastings, and Mix. 2002). As the review of literature shows, TSDF operators are assumed as negligent, 
racial!� discriminatory, and imperialist in their pursuit of low-income minority communities to site operations. 
Targeted communities are uniformly characterized as dreadfully poor and politically marginalized, but valiant 
and dignified in their resistance (see Bullard 1994, Unequal Protection). This recurrent and slightly 
embellished story of big versus small captures an important fault line in how siting decisions unfold, and 
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explains a modest level of variation in siting outcomes. Most of the empirical literature is underwritten by 
this underdog story. To advance the empirical literature on TSDF site selection, one must account for the 
totality of actors, estimate and measure their interests, and treat outcomes as the balance sheet of power. 
By accounting for all stakeholders, and objectively distilling their discourses to measurable phenomena, may 
one deal reasonably the question of equity, and devise policy that properly balances the interests of all 
parties to guarantee fair and just outcomes in the future. 
With this in mind, tliis dissertation examines four hypotheses linked to four separate discourses on 
commercial TSO installation locations: 1) economic rationality; 2) scientific rationality; 3) neighborhood social 
capital; and 4) race and class inequity. What follows is a brief discussion of each discourse, and a 
distillation each story into a testable statement on TSDF siting. At the end of the theoretical discussion, 
variable operations are clearly_ delineated and a diagrammatic model of the argument is presented. 
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY HYPOTHESIS 
The management of hazardous substances in the United States is a commercial enterprise. The 
decision on where to locate an environmentally risky enterprise is admittedly more complicated 
bureaucratically than finding a place for a convenience store, it is none the less governed by a business 
rationality. Economic success in business decision-making is partially a function of location. The question 
of location is intriguing because it empirically_ saddles microeconomic action and macroeconomic· 
circumstances. Inappropriate location is costly for freight bills, unavailability of affordable and sufficiently 
skilled labor, time lost by traffic congestion, complicated access to input commodities for production, or 
difficulty in reacting to market vagaries. The perils of poor location haunt the entrepreneurial spirit and 
undermine the productivity of labor and capital in the economy. From a purely economic standpoint, TSDF 
operators, like all economic actors, must utility maximize or perish. 
In 1909, Alfred Weber (1929), the lesser-known brother of Max Weber, articulated a simple, but 
elegant theory of industrial location: to optimize the value of a location decision, capital must minimize 
transport and production costs. Transport costs are a curvilinear function of distance traveled. Transport 
costs flatten with increasing economies of scale, but the distance function is a powerful constraint. TSDF 
operators must calculate loading, carrier, journey and unloading costs to figure the variable of transport. 
Material inputs with lower transport costs per unit of weight and distance pull TSDF operators. More 
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specific, commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities are more likely to locate to areas with 
hazardous waste generators to reduce transport costs and risks associated with hazardous waste transport. 
To minimize costs, TSDF operators must fully consider the characteristics of place, with labor cost 
being the most important. Despite the increasing mobility of labor, it is an immobile input because the cost 
of labor varies by location. Labor cost is a function of location specific variables like housing and living 
expenses, and levels of labor competition, unemployment, unionization, occupational structure, and human 
capital. Low-wage locations pull TSDF operations, all else equal. In Weber's cost reduction theory, low­
wage locations that are proximate and connected to manufacturing inputs are more enticing.1 To estimate 
the cost and availability of appropriately skilled labor, industrial and technical-managerial labor rates are 
created. To estimate the cost of productive property, aggregate housing and rental prices are evaluated, as 
well as the percentage of housing units built before 1960 and 1970. To estimate proximate access to 
manufacturing inputs and transport costs, the number of Large Quantity Generators of hazardous waste in a 
delimited area is counted. With all this in mind, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis I: TSDF location is driven by cost minimization. TSDF operators locate 
to areas with appropriately skilled labor, and low property and transport costs. 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY HYPOTHESIS 
The treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste are technical and scientific enterprises. 
Such facilities include acid neutralization laboratories, biological treatment units, and long-term storage 
areas like landfills and incinerators. TSO installations are brilliantly engineered to handle hydrocarbons, 
insecticides, fungicides, soil fumigants, primary explosives, industrial intermediates, polychlorinated 
biphenyls, and metals and inorganic non-metals. These facilities regularly absorb 250 million tons of 
1 Weber's cost reduction theory has been extended to include other location specific costs like property 
prices, municipal taxes, public utility services and fees, and the effects of agglomeration. Agglomeration 
effects are difficult to measure and estimate. Benefits accrue from proximity to similar businesses. 
Companies can share specialized infrastructure and a skilled labor pool, and collectively bargain for 
municipal, state, and federal dollars. 
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hazardous waste annually ( see Table 1.1 ), and serious accidents occur rarely. Technical requirements for 
landfills and incinerators have successfully reduced risk of catastrophic failure to random error (>Matts 1998). 
According to William Bowen (2001 ), environmental justice researchers exaggerate the risks_ involved, and 
are generally poorly informed of the scientific complexity of TSOF activities. TSO installations are without 
question the most stringently regulated commercial enterprises in the country. The Resource Conservation 
and Recover Act on hazardous waste management is, itself, gigantic and menacingly complex. Permit 
applications regularly exceed 2000 pages in length, roughly 20 doctoral dissertations in size. 
Just as there are strict rules on facility operations, the EPA has delineated technical criteria for 
commercial TSO installation location. A potential site must be environmentally sound. Environmental 
factors include topography and land contouring, surface soils and subsurface geology, hydrology and 
subsurface water characteristics. The EPA's publication on Sensitive Environments and the Siting of 
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities (2002) strongly discourages the placement of TSO installations in 
floodplains, wetlands and other productive ecosystems, earthquake zones, areas with unfavorable weather 
conditions, high-value groundwater areas, and on unstable terrains like limestone, gypsum, and dolomite. 
The purpose of site selection restrictions is to reduce the risk of contaminant migration and toxic exposure to 
human beings and the environment. 
In 20 years of environmental justice research on TSOF location outcomes, hydrologic and geologic 
factors have never been empirically examined, yet scientists·, engineers and EPA officials insist adamantly 
these factors matter. The geological and hydrological characteristics must be understood to optimize 
suitability of intended land uses, all things equal. To estimate the geological suitability of a site, earthquake 
hazard data are collected. The seismology measure of peak ground acceleration (PGA) is used. PGA is 
expressed as _a 10 percent probability of occurring in 50 years. Each census tract in the Southeastern 
United States is assigned a PGA figure. 
To estimate the hydrological suitability of a site, hydrologic data .are assembled from the US 
Geological Survey. The hydrology measure is less precise. Because census tract data and hydrologic data 
are collected at different levels of analysis, some mathematical manipulation is required. To measure the 
hydrological soundness of an area, the percentage of a Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) encased in a census 
tract, weighted by the size of the land area (square km} is used. Two other measures are used to estimate 
physical suitability: land and water areas in square kilometers. Thus, the following testable hypothesis is 
proposed: 
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Hypothesis II: TSDF location outcomes are driven by scientific criteria. TSDF 
operators locate to areas with suitable geological and hydrological features. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL HYPOTHE�ES 
The social world is ordered by capital. Its volume, distribution, and accessibility shape social 
relationships and the nature of social hierarchies. Capital has been defined historically by its economic 
function as an input commodity or financial asset in the production, consumption, and exchange activities of 
individuals and firms (Castle 2002). Recently, social scientists have shown strong interest in non-economic 
forms of capital. Non-economic forms of capital have been discovered at the individual and group levels of 
analysis (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000), as well as linkages between non-economic forms of capital and 
socially important outcomes like rates of democratic participation, crime and juvenile delinquency, health 
and life expectancy, and education�:ll attainment. The most popular of these new forms of non-economic 
capital is social capital. 
Social capital consists in networks of social relations characterized by norms of trust, reciprocity, 
and morality that create expectations for predictable behavior (Putnam. 2000). According to James Coleman 
(1990), social capital "inheres in the structure of social relations between persons and among persons." 
Social capital enables social order. It functions as a bonding agent that enables groups of people to 
cooperate for mutual benefit and solve problems they share commonly. In practical terms, social capital can 
be understood as an intangible resource for collective action. Researchers locate social capital in civil 
society. It is reflected in voluntary associations and nonprofit organizations. 
The presence of voluntary association and non-profit organizations is associated with healthy 
democracy, and their absence symptomatic of autocracy and centralized power. Conservative political 
philosophers like Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville argued that voluntary associations function as 
linchpins between government and the individual. A civil society of many organizations with sufficient 
resources to participate effectively in public debate could buffer systemic tendencies toward state 
totalitarianism, tyrannical majority rule, and grandiose schemes to engineer the human condition. Liberal 
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philosophers like John Locke railed against the notion of absolute government sovereignty for the 
maintenance of social order. Order, rationality, and morality, Locke and Rousseau reasoned, could spring 
from civil society in a social contract based in cooperation, mutual protection and peace. The radical 
philosophers Antonio Gramsci and Jurgen Habermas had similarly strong views of civil society and voluntary 
associations. Gramsci viewed civil society as a terrain of conflict between voluntary associations for the 
intellectual and moral levers of society. Voluntary associations, Gramsci argued, anchor a society's culture, 
produce accounts of the world that define what is politically thinkable, and provide the crucial link between 
structure and agency in the creation of social order. For Habermas, civil society is the site of public 
deliberation and nourishment of the human life-world. Voluntary associations, Habermas insisted, protect 
the life-world from the onrush of systemic power. 
Whatever the political philosophy, voluntary associations and non-profit organizations are 
normatively desirable. They provide social order and smoothen social interaction. They provide group 
members a sense of purpose and help crystallize identity. Voluntary associations teach trust and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. They are proximal indicators of social capital (Putnam 2000). All things 
equal, the more organizations one finds in a delimited area, the greater the level of social capital, and the 
greater the likelihood population groups of that area can work together for common ends. 
What do voluntary associations and non-profit organizations have to do with the regional patterning 
of environmental health risks? Environmental justice researchers know that population groups vary in their 
capacity to resist the placement of a hazardous facility in their neighborhood (see Hamilton 1 993; 1 995) . 
Hazardous facilities are undesirable land uses. People oppose the siting of a TSDF in their neighborhood 
because they assume costs and risks are too high relative to the benefits. Public opposition to TSDF siting 
is so great it is given the status of a public malady - the N IMBY (Not-in-my-backyard) Syndrome (Dunlap 
and Mertig 1 992) . The NIMBY Syndrome is an example of citizens exercising their constitutional right to 
participate in governmental decisions, leading to a perversion of justice and equity in distribution of 
hazardous facilities by race and economic class. Because TSDFs are generally locally unwanted land uses, 
operators and regulators rationally take the path of least resistance. It is cost effective to avoid public 
conflict and gridlock. TSDF operators use this logic in site selection.2 It is not the only element in decision-
2 Environmental justice researchers discovered a secret study commissioned by the California State Waste 
Management Board that recommended explicitly the targeting of politically disenfranchised and socially 
disorganized communities for placement of trash-to-steam plants. For many it is the smoking gun - definitive 
proof of the siting logic of hazardous waste operators and regulators. 
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making , but a crucial element in the decision-making matrix. The publicly deliberate .permit process 
engenders this logic (see Chapter V). 
EJ researchers assume that TSDF operators demographically profile neighborhoods (Pulido 1996). 
TSDF operators presumably use a community's economic status and racial composition as indicators of a 
community's propensity to resist facility siting or capacity expansion. This reasoning is discriminatory 
because operators knowingly exploit the marginal political status of poor communities of color. Statistical 
models indicate purely demographic factors as modest predictors of facility siting (see Chapter I I ) .  Perhaps, 
EJ researchers wrongly assume demography is destiny, or forget the actions of TSDF operators are 
responded to by regulators and targeted communities, with outcomes a function of the dialectical interplay 
between these stakeholders. 
To advance the scientific literature on commercial TSDF location outcomes, one must understand 
the layer of social life between demographic structure and behavior. Civil society is that layer. There is a 
correspondence between community demography and community social organization, but not always. Poor 
communities of color, as the EJ movement literature has discovered, can mobilize effectively to block the 
placement of a hazardous facility in their community. Mobil ization effectiveness depends on community 
integration, coherence, and vitality. By measuring a neighborhood's level of social capital, one can estimate 
the robustness of its civil society, and its potential for organized and deliberate behavior. 
To estimate resistance capacity, data on nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations are 
collected from the National Center for Charitable Statistics and the People of Color Environmental Groups 
Di rectory. Each census tract is assigned a social capital assets score, and a social capital rate, measured 
as total nonprofit organization assets divided by population size.3 An environmental capital assets score 
and environmental capital rate are also calculated for each neighborhood. For this , nonprofit organizations 
with an environmental focus, as specified in the national taxonomy of exempt entities system, are counted. 
Population density, youth dependency and old dependency ratios are used - all are regarded as estimates 
of structural potential for social capital (Putnam 2000; Fukuyama 1995). Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
3 The assumption of consensus arising from community social capital is justifiable. Granted, more groups 
may mean more conflict, but in the case of environmentally risky technologies we have uniformity of opinion. 
Recall, public opinion survey in Chapter I , revealed consistent and widespread opposition to the siting of a 
TSD installation in ones neighborhood. 
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Hypothesis I l l :  TSDF location is driven by the capacity of targeted populations to 
resist the placen:1ent of a facility in their community. This capacity is a function of 
community social capital. 
RACIAL AND CLASS INEQUITY HYPOTHESIS 
As the review of empirical literature in Chapter II shows, the two most tested hypotheses focus on 
the uneven distribution of environmental hazards by race and socio-economic status. Very seldom is a 
smoking gun found revealing the rationale behind TSDF siting, but patterned outcomes suggest poor 
communities of color bear a disproportionate burden of negative environmental externalities.4 The precise 
reason for this is conceptually underdeveloped. Some researchers explain disproportionate outcomes as 
flowing from race and class hierarchies. These hierarchies constrain individual opportunity and influence life 
chances. The stratification system influences the allocation of desirable and undesirable goods. The 
question of intentionality is generally unimportant. The vertical organization of society is the culprit of 
environmental inequality, not the people that inherit positions in the social system (see Pellow 2000) . 
Unequal outcomes can result from institutional webbing and cumulative disadvantage, with a person or 
community intentionally discriminated against in one social milieu, rippling unintentionally into other domains 
of life.5 This is standard sociology. This explanation of discrimination by race and socio-economic status is 
4 The problem of negative externalities arises when goods people desire are not bought and sold as 
commodities because there is no market available, or the good is difficult to price. A simple example may 
involve loud and terribly annoying music being played by neighbor as one tries to complete a dissertation. 
What is the price of quiet if no functioning market is available? Minimally, two parties are involved in the 
price distortion - a benefactor and a loser. On the issue of environmental justice, benefactors are non-host 
communities. The societal benefit of proper hazardous waste management is imposed as a direct burden 
on host communities. 
5 According to Feagin and Feagin (1978), indirect institutional discrimination refers to current practices that 
have a negative impact on members of a subordinate group even though organizational rules were 
established with . no intent to harm members of subordinate groups (i .e. , the use of certain hiring practices 
that require educational standards that systematically handicap subordinate groups, even though they are 
not designed to do so) . Indirect institutional discrimination occurs because of institutional overlap. Groups 
disadvantaged intentionally or unintentionally in one institutional domain (i.e., housing), may be 
disadvantaged unintentionally in another (i.e., education) . It is common for a subordinate group in a formal 
· democratic system to deal with indirect institutional discrimination, and for 
individuals of that subordinate group to deal with direct isolate, and small-group discrimination. The various 
types of discrimination are overlapping and mutually reinforcing , and occur in various community and 
organizational settings. 
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persuasive in the abstract. Life trajectories are explainable as a function of social place and inherited 
status, but what about the concrete thoughts and behaviors of people involved in the determination of land 
uses? Two attempts have been made to link thoughts and behaviors to inequitable environmental outcomes 
by race and social class. Both are inadequate. 
First, the pure discrimination hypothesis holds that TSDF operators are motivated by racial animus, 
and derive utility from harming minorities (see Hamilton 1995). They target historically disadvantaged 
groups because of racial and class hatred. This explanation is probably wrong, but possible given 
America's history of white supremacy and class domination. The explanation is inconsistent with the min­
max logic of economic practice. Operators use racial and class prejudice at their economic peril. The other 
popular explanation suggests that TSDF operators select poor communities of color because of lower 
anticipated liability costs. Again, the liability argument is inconsistent with business rationality. The liability 
argument is undermined by risk transfer insurance that all TSDF operators take. TSDF operators reduce 
legal exposure and risk of catastrophic financial loss by purchasing pollution liability protection, remediation 
cost protection, and contract default protection. Liability insurance costs vary imperceptible by community 
racial and class attributes. 
A more likely explanation has to do with the permit process and TSDF operator avoidance of · 
transaction and opportunity costs. Facility siting is a risky investment. Proposals are regularly rejected.6 
Commercial operators hire scientific and political consultants to navigate the regulatory thicket. Site 
selection must pass strict environmental guidelines. This compliance process is expensive and time 
consuming. Public input is required at two separate stages of the permit process. This input can derail 
plans. TSDF operators target poor communities of color because they are less likely to derail the process, 
or so it is assumed. 
Another plausible explanation is that TSDF operators calculate compensation costs in siting 
decisions. By offering direct payments, donations, and agreeing to tonnage taxes, TSDF operators can 
scuffle proposal acceptance from regulators and targeted communities. To minimize these costs, operators 
target poor communities of color because relatively educated, white, and affluent residents presumably 
place higher value on environmental amenities (see Jones 1998 for refutation) . 
6 In 1987, a national study of rejection rates conducted the New York Legislative Commission found only six 
of eighty-one TSDF applications were accepted. Public opposition was identified as responsible for half of 
proposal rejections. 
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These explanations are better at connecting thoughts and behavior to outcomes, but obviously 
ignore historical trends that residentially isolate Americans from each other on the basis of race and social 
class. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to explore the historical effects of racial and economic 
apartheid, nor explain the gradual disappearance of manufacturing jobs that helped create the American 
underclass, but these effects are assumed as determinative of the parameters of contemporary land use 
decision-making and outcomes. 
Whatever the explanation for the outcome, environmental justice advocates insist strongly that 
uneven distribution of environmental risks must end. Federal legislation has been advanced to achieve such 
an end. Various measures are used to estimate the racial and socio-economic status of a community, 
including: educational attainment, poverty rates, percent of persons on public assistance, percent African 
American, percent Hispanic, percent American Indian, percent female headed households with children, 
percent Black female headed households, and percent housing unit under rental contract. All variables are 
defined in Table 3. 1 and organized diagrammatically in Figure 3.1 . All demographic data are derived from 
the US Census Bureau's population and housing data files. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis IV: TSDFs are sited disproportionately in communities with lower than 
average socio-economic status, and higher than average percentages of minority 
residents. 
WHY STUDY THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES? 
The empirical target or object of analysis of this dissertation is the EPA's Region IV. Region IV 
· encompasses the following states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee. As the annual waste stream decreased nationally, the amount of hazardous 
·waste generated in the Southeastern United States (EPA Region IV) increased by 600+ percent from 1 1  
million tons in 1 991 to 81 mil lion tons in 1 999. 
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Industrial Labor Rate 
Average Price of 
Housing 
Gross Rental Value 
Large Quantity 
Generators 
Percentage of Homes 
Bui lt Before 1 960 
Percentage of Homes 






Number of workers in managerial and technical occupations, divided by 
the total number laborers, as defined by the Standard Occupational 
Classification system, residing in the census tract area. 
Number of machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors; 
transportation and material moving occupations; and handlers, 
equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers, divided by the total number 
laborers, as defined by the Standard Occupational Classification system, 
residing in the census tract area. 
Aggregate price of specified owner-occupied housing units, divided by 
the total number of owner-occupied housing units in the census tract 
area. Price is based on the respondent's estimate the property's (house 
and lot, mobile home and lot, or condominium unit) market worth. 
Gross rent is the contract rent plus the estimated average monthly cost 
of utilities paid for by the renter. 
Number of large quantity generators of waste per census tract area. A 
facility is classified as a large quantity generator if it: generates or 
imports greater than or equal to 1 ,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) of 
hazardous waste in a calendar month; generates or accumulates at any 
time, more than 1 kilogram of acute hazardous waste in a calendar 
month; or more than 1 00 kilograms of residue, contaminated soil, waste, 
or other debris resulting from the clean-up of a spill of acute hazardous 
waste. 
Number of housing units constructed before 1 960, divided by the total 
number of housing units in census tract. 
Number of housing units constructed before 1 970, divided by the total 
number of housing units in census tract. 
Maximum acceleration experienced by an object during the course of 
earthquake motion estimated for each census tract centroid. 
Acceleration estimates are calculated at the 1 O percent probability of 
being exceeded in 50 years, and expressed as %g. 
Percentage of the Hydrologic Unit Code encased in the census tract, 
weighted by the size of the land area (square km). 
Land Area Square Km Total land area in square kilometers. 
Water Area Square 
Km 









TABLE 3.1 : CONTINUED 
Variable Definition 
Social Capital Assets Total assets of all non-profit organizations as inventoried by the National 
Center of Charitable Statistics in a census tract area. 
Social Capital Rate Total assets of non-profit organizations as inventoried by the National 
Center of Charitable Statistics in a census tract area, divided by the total 
number of persons in a census tract area. 
Environmental Capital Total assets of non-profit organizations with a specified environmental 
Assets focus in a census tract area as inventoried by the National Center of 
Charitable Statistics 
Environmental Capital Total assets of non-profit organizations with a specified environmental 
Rate focus in a census tract area as inventoried by the National Center of 
Charitable Statistics, divided by the total number of persons residing in 
the census tract area. 
Population Density Number of persons per square kilometer, calculated by the total number 
of persons residing in the census tract area, divided by the total land 





The ratio of the number of young persons of an age (under 15) when 
they are generally economically inactive, to the number of persons of 
working age (15 to 64). 
The ratio of the number of elderly persons of an age (over 65) when they 
are generally economically inactive, to the number of persons of working 
age ( 1 5  to 64). 
Direction 
+ 
Percent Hispanic Number of persons identifying themselves as Mexican, Puerto Rican, + 
Cuban, or other Hispanic, divided by the total number of persons residing 
in the census tract area. 
Percent Non-Hispanic Total number of persons identifying themselves as non-Hispanic Black + 
White divided by the total number of persons. 
Percent Non-Hispanic Total number of persons identifying themselves as non-Hispanic White 
Black divided by the total number of persons. 
Percent American 
lndlan 
Percent of Families 
Below the Poverty 
Line 
Total number of persons identifying themselves as American Indian 
divided by the total number of persons. 
Total number of families with income less than 1 989 poverty level 
($1 2,675, defined by 1991 Statistical Abstract of the United States),  




TABLE 3.1 : CONTINUED 
Variable 
Percent of Famil ies at 
50% Below the 
Poverty Line 




Percent 18 + without 
High School 
Education 
Percent 1 8+ with 1 + 











Total number of families with income less than 50 percent the 1989 
poverty level ($1 2,675, defined by 1 991 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States), divided by the total number of families. 
Total households receiving public assistance income in 1989 divided by 
the total number of households. Public assistance income includes 1 )  
federal and state supplementary security income payments, 2) AFDC, 
and 3) general assistance. 
Total number of renter occupied housing units, divided by the total of 
housing units in a census tract. 
Total number of persons 1 8  years of age and older without a high school 
diploma, divided by the total number of persons 1 8  tears of age and 
older. 
Total number of persons 18 years of age and older with at least one year 
of college education, divided by the total number of persons 1 8  tears of 
age and older. 
Number of female-headed households divided by the number of 
households in a census tract area. 
Total number of persons 
Measured dichotomously as presence or absence of a facility in a 
census tract area. Adjacent tracts -within 1 and 1 .5 miles of facility will be 










FIGURE 3.1 : MODEL OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 
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Only Region VI , encompassing the states of Texas and Louisiana, produced more hazardous waste. The 
amount of waste handled and managed by EPA Region IV has increased correspondi�gly.
7 The Southeast 
has become the largest handler of waste in the United States, treating, storing, and disposing over 85 
mil lions tons annually (see Table 3.2 and 3.3). The increasing concentration of toxic waste in the Southeast 
should not surprise environmental justice researchers. 
Environmental justice advocates would undoubtedly note the region's high concentration of Africa�­
Americans, seemingly validating their argument that siting decisions are motivated by racial prejudice. 
Region IV encompasses the "Black Belr of the United States - a socio-demographic crescent of 
Southeastern geography. The Black Belt is characterized by depressed quality of life, with higher than 
average rates of poverty and unemployment, and lower levels of educational attainment (Wimbertey and 
Morris 1997) . It has a history of racial hierarchy, residential segregation, and economic underdevelopment, 
with benefits and burdens accruing from the structure of white privilege. The concentration of environmental 
health burdens in the Black Belt is consistent with the EJ narrative of disparate risk outcomes by race and 
social class. Hazardous waste generators and handlers, EJ advocates would argue, have taken the path of 
least resistance; cynicaliy exploiting the region's economic desperation and patterned history of quiescence 
and deference to economic power (Gaventa 1980). 
Conversely, environmental justice skeptics would likely note the region's re-industrialization. In the 
last two decades, various chemical-intensive industries have located to the Southeast. Auto manufacturers 
in Alabama and Tennessee (i.e., BMW,  Saturn, Nissan), automotive suppliers in Georgia and Kentucky (i.e. ,  
DESA International) logistics and transport industries in Mississippi (i.e., Union Pacific), computer hardware 
ma.nufacturers in South Carolina and Tennessee (i.e., Dell Computers), and pharmaceutical and 
bioengineering industries in North Carolina and Georgia (i.e., Theragenics Corporation) have all gravitated 
to the Southeast. Such manufacturers note the competitive advantages: lower average hourly 
manufacturing wages (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003); lower levels of private-sector unionization (Bureau 
7 Though a very strong correlation (.973, p-value .000) exits between the amount of hazardous waste 
generated and the amount of hazardous waste managed at the regional level for the period of 1 991 to 1 999, 
in recent years we have witnessed a gradual increase in inter-state and inter-regional trade in hazardous 
waste. At the state level , Montana, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Wyoming exported all the non­
aqueous waste generated in their territories. In 1 999, total state-level exports exceeded 8 mi llion tons, 
representing a 30 percent increase in export activity as compared to 1 997 totals. At the regional level, 
1 4.28 percent (5.7 million tons) of non-aqueous waste was exported out of region. Approximately 3.7 million 
tons of this waste was absorbed inter-regionally, with the difference (2 mill ion tons) presumably transported 
out of country. This gradual separation of the sites of waste generation from waste management is market 
coordinated, with generators and handlers responding to price signals and opportunities for reduction in unit 
costs, leading to an absurdly rational inter-regional division of labor in dangerous substances . 
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Table 3.2: Total Tonnage of Hazardous Waste Handled by Environmental Protection Agency Region 
EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 Region 9 Region 10 
1 991 390337 51 033570 9105896 1 1 847776 53068621 137423123 4009857 1440228 12308044 13809857 
1 993 145707 19953849 17703960 39145810 41912210 86102783 .38941 1 2  1442585 12899741 1 1 663277 
1 995 1 93603 12325904 14964908 42394321 21 068208 94461025 2325076 31 42881 14295594 3096424 
1 997 1 82651 4561 975 941 4588 51 1 39606 21 704186 101689277 21 29651 5642971 29989482 7263355 
1 999 70885 51 14049 6852104 81 838575 201061 88 49831652 2981 253 2508640 1 1430095 4143419  
Table 3.3: Total Tonnage of Hazardous Waste Generated by Large Quantity Generators by Environmental Protection Agency Region 
EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA EPA 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Reglon 7 Region 8 Region 9 Region 10  
1 991 2416332 50648243 9505997 1 2948706 54312901 1 37402630" 4063618  2078526 13098837 1 9233091 
1993 1376647 20851 1 1 1  1 8341 172 38889905 4351 5867 97268534 3922966 3107508 14123755 1 7051 536 
1 995 97661 6 13552560 1 5506970 44201 147 30501562 87683092 2370374 31 27590 1 1796670 4369946 
1997 403267 1 2247536 9135627 63025029 30026983 109085856 1 950161 2795366 1 0675603 7384069 
1999 292691 5 · 1 9272810 10177054 " 85235502 32764294 90964304 2384705 2546324 6868418 6332905 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency's National Biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Reports, 1 99 1 -1 999. 
Note: - The 1 997 and 1 999 Biennial Reports eliminated the Process System Form that required on-site and off-site facilities to indicate the tonnage of aqueous 
wastes (wastewaters) generated and handled. Data are based on estimates using a simple ratio of aqueous to non-aqueous waste. 
of National Affairs Inc. 2001 ); right-to-work labor laws; lower levels of workers compensation (Actuarial and 
Technical Solutions Inc. 2001 ), significantly cheaper industrial property for sale, lease and rental both inside 
and outside central business districts, and a panoply of sweeteners, from tax breaks to publicly financed 
inputs for production. The emergence of this "Southern industrial corridor'' has brought with waste products 
of production, and therefore a systemic need and market opportunities for treatment, storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste. The high presence of racial minorities in the region ,  EJ skeptics would argue, is purely 
coincidental with re-industrialization. 
Both lines of argumentation are at their logical best in the Southeastern United States, making it an 
excellent testing ground for the various theories of environmental risk distribution. In addition to its 
distinction as the nation's leading handler of dangerous substances, other factors make Region IV ideal for 
environmental equity research. This dissertation also divides the eight states of the Southeast into 
Southern and Deep South sub-regions. Sub-regional analysis may prove fruitful given emerging patterns of 
uneven industrial development in the South, and higher than average concentration of African-Americans in 
the Deep South . 
Region IV (see Figure 3.2) has been studied extensively since the inception of the environmental 
justice movement. In 1 983, the General Accounting Office produced the first government report of the 
relationship between population characteristics and the distribution environmental health risks. The report 
examined the location of off-site landfills in Region IV. Three of the four landfills examined were located in 
majority African-American neighborhoods, intimating a form of environmental racism. The need for a new 
study is obvious - the hazardous waste situation in the Southeast has changed qualitatively since the early 
1980s . This scientific literature on the region provides opportunity for critical reflection and comparison. 
Region IV is also the birthplace and epicenter of the environmental justice movement. The most 
high profile environmental justice conflicts have taken place in the Southeast. Warren County, North 
Carolina was the first nationally significant conflict over hazardous waste and race. Warren County is a 
story of corporate negligence, government ineffectiveness, and popular uprising. It is the origin story of the 
grassroots envir�nmental justice movement. Warren County had all the characteristics researchers have 
come to associate with a vulnerable community. It was sparsely populated and rural, with no known history 
of political agitation; it was the poorest county in North Carolina, with a per capita income of $5,000 dollars in 
1980; and 65 percent of residents were African American (Geiser and Waneck 1 994: 50). 
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FIGURE 3.2: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGIONS 
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Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and District of Columbia. 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. 
Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, and the territories of Guam and American Samoa. 
Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency 2003 
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In the fall of 1 982, after months of unsuccessful political and legal struggle to block the sit ing of a 
hazardous landfi l l in their community, residents took to the streets in a campaign of non-cooperation and 
civi l disobedience. Protesters from around the country, including members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus, joined locals to form human battlements to physically prevent the dumping of 6000 truckloads of 
PCB-laden soil in Warren County (Geiser and Waneck 1 994: 43). Hundreds of arrests were made. The 
images of African American bodies dragged from the streets by armed police were painfully reminiscent of 
the civil rights struggle for racial equality. The event drew national attention, and led immediately to a 
formal government inquiry into the spatial distribution of hazardous faci lities. One can reasonably assume 
from the Warren County case, and many others like _ it, that the region's people have greater literacy in 
matters of racial equity and environmental distress. 
DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET 
The data set is a match of records on operational hazardous waste treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities and large quantity generators of hazardous waste from the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Social and Demographic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, population 
and housing data at the census tract level from the US Census Bureau, nonprofit organization data from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics and the People of Color Environmental Groups Directory, and 
seismic hazard and hydrologic data from the US Geological Survey. 
Secondary data analysis is fraught with managerial and technical challenges. Locating and 
acquiring usable data are laborious and expensive. Time is spent tracking and downloading data 
electronically from public data providers, sifting through gigantic datasets for theoretically relevant variables , 
translating impenetrable codebooks for variable definition statements and value labels, purchasing high 
priced data from private data agencies, signing numerous copyright and data agreement forms, devising 
validity and reliabil ity tests for data quality, merging data sources collected at different levels and units of 
analysis, and adjusting and re-adjusting hypotheses to match analytic possibilities presented by the data. 
The end product is a highly developed and comprehensive dataset on commercial hazardous waste facilities 
. in Southeastern United States, and concomitant geophysical, economic, and socio-demographic predictors. 
What follows is a discussion of data sources and database construction. 
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DATA ON COMMERCIAL TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES, 1998 
Quality data on handlers of hazardous waste in the Southeastern United States are not readily 
available. Following the events of September 1 1 th , complete data on hazardous waste treatment, storage, 
and disposal facilities, and large quantity generators of hazardous waste were closed to the public for 
national _security reasons. The decision to close access followed a Justice Department memorand�m urging 
federal agencies to exercise caution in release of information to the public under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) . The Environmental Protection Agency advised all regional offices to identify potentially 
"sensitive" information, especially "resources which provide information on chemicals, and/or location, and/or 
amounts, and/or impacts on the environment or human health." In March 2002, the EPA announced that it 
would close direct access to Envirofacts databases.8 In an email to Direct Connect Users, EPA stated that 
• As part of our continuing efforts to respond to Homeland Security issues . . .  starting April 1 ,  2002, Direct 
Connect access will no longer be available to the general public. Direct Connect access to Envi rofacts will 
only be available to U.S. EPA employees, U.S. EPA Contractors, the Military, Federal Government, and 
State Agency employees• (www.ombwatch.org). 
Because of data availability problems, data on commercial treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities9 had to be assembled tediously from numerous EPA sources, and data provided by Dr. John 
Michael Oakes of the Social and Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) of the University of 
Massachusetts. Oakes ( 1 998) constructed a database of commercial TSDFs from two primary sources: 1 )  
the EPA's Biennial Reporting System and 2) the Environmental lnstitute's Environmental Services Directory. 
The dataset is a work of art. SADRI researchers tirelessly verified every TSDF record with phone surveys, 
conducted installation visits, cross-referenced different data sources, and filed Freedom of Information 
petitions to acquire dates facility operations started. 
The SADRI dataset was trimmed to include only the Southeastern United States. The regional set 
yielded a total of 1 00 commercial TSDFs operating in EPA Region IV. Variable columns were created for 
measures of hydrology, seismology, social capital assets and rates, environmental capital assets and rates, 
8 For more info�ation on federal government initiatives limiting public access to sensitive materials visit: 
http://www.ombwatch.org/ 
9 A commercial operator is in the business of hazardous waste management, receiving hazardous waste 
generated by other firms for profit. Commercial facilities are typically classified as off-site handlers by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, in the sense of being physically separate from the site of waste 
generation. 
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zones of environmental impact of 1 and 1.5 miles from a TSDF, large quantity generator concentration, and 
other population and housing variables excluded from the original database. A private geo-coding firm was 
consulted to press zip code records to the census tract level and append longitude and latitude coordinates 
for geographic analysis. 
LARGE QUANTITY GENERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, 1992 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and amendments authorize the 
Environmental Protection Agency to safeguard human health and the natural environment from improper 
management and disposal of hazardous wastes. RCRA requires all hazardous wastes be tested, recorded, 
and traced from their origin to their final disposal or destruction. This cradle-to-grave system requires 
commercial and non-commercial generators, transporters, and handlers of hazardous substances keep 
detailed records of their activities. Generators of hazardous waste are the first link in the cradle-to-grave 
management system. Section 260.1 O of RCRA defines a generator of hazardous waste as: •any person, by . 
site, whose act or process produces hazardous waste identified or listed in Part 261 or whose act first 
causes a hazardous waste to become subject to regulation." (PAGE CITATION) This definition 
encompasses the generator of waste and all those involved in subsequent handling and/or removal. 
The term by site refers to the location of hazardous waste generation. The EPA tracks hazardous 
waste generation by site. A company operating three laboratories at one location is issued one EPA ID 
number. If this same company operates these same three laboratories at three different sites, each 
laboratory is defined as a separate generator and required to obtain an individual EPA ID number. A person 
is defined broadly as: "an individua�, trust, firm, joint stock company, federal agency, corporation (including a 
government corporation) ,  partnership, association, state, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a 
state, or any interstate body." The element of act or process is tricky. A generator is the person whose act 
or process causes a hazardous waste to become subject to regulation. Situations arise where the generator 
of hazardous waste may not be the actual producer. For example, if a cleaning service is hired to remove 
residues from a storage tank excluded under section 261.4(c), the cleaning service is considered the first 
person causing the waste to become subject to regulation rather than the owner of the tank or the individual 
that actually produced the hazardous material. 
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Congress separates generators into three categories: large quantity generators (LQGs), small 
quantity generators (SQGs), and conditionally exempt small quantity generators (CESQGs). Categorization 
is based on the quantity of waste produced per calendar month (see Table 3.4). Facilities may change their 
status monthly as the amount of waste generated fluctuates. This dissertation is concerned only with large 
quantity generators of waste operating in the Southeastern United States. 
In gathering data on LQGs, the following publicly available sources were examined: the 6iennial 
Reporting System (BAS) data files; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) online database; 
the Hazardous Waste Query Form; the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database; 
Office of Solid Waste reports and memos, and the Environmental Justice Geographic Assessment Tool 
(EJGA). The ECHO database was used as the primary search engine because of its simple architecture 
and user-friendliness, up-to-date information on generators of hazardous waste, flexible search functions, 
ease of data transportability into Excel and SPSS analytical software, and completeness of facility records, 
including EPA ID number, firm name, address, telephone number, type of facility. The ECHO database was 
temporarily open to the public in direct violation of Homeland Security admonitions. Other EPA sources, 
such as the Hazardous Waste Query Form, EJGA, and BAS files were used to cross-reference and 
externally verify ECHO records. 
US CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION AND HOUSING DATA, 1990 
Article I, Section II of the US Constitution mandates full enumeration of the US population every ten 
years. It states: "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which 
may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers . . .  The actual enumeration shall be 
made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States and within every 
subsequent ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct." Census data are used for allotment of 
congressional seats among states, to draw legislative districts at various levels of government, and 
allocation of federal funds (approximately $200 billion) to lower levels of government for delivery of social 
services on education, health, and transportation. The US Bureau of the Census is responsible for 
physically counting the US population. 
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TABLE 3.4: TYPES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS 
Facil ity Type 
Large Qu�ntity Generator 
Small Quantity Generator 
Conditionally Exempt Small 
Quantity Generator 
Legal Definition 
A generator is a large quantity generator if: 
( 1 )  That person generates 2,200 pounds (1 ,000 kilograms) or more of hazardous 
waste in a calendar month; or 
(2) That person generates 2.2 pounds (1 kilogram) or more of acutely hazardous 
waste in a calendar month; or 
(3) That person generates 220 pounds (100 kilograms) or more of any residue or 
contaminated soil, waste, or other debris resulting from the cleanup of a 
discharge of any acutely hazardous waste in a calendar month; or 
(4) The quantity of hazardous waste accumulated on-site exceeds 13,200 pounds 
(6,000 kilograms) at any one time; or 
(5) The quantity of acutely hazardous waste accumulated on-site equals or 
exceeds 2.2 pounds (1 kilograms) at any one time; or 
(6) The quantity of any residue or contaminated soil, waste, or other debris 
resulting from the cleanup of a discharge of any acutely hazardous waste, 
accumulated onsite equals or exceeds 220 pounds (100 kilograms) at any one 
time. 
A generator is a small quantity generator if: 
(1 ) That person generates greater than or equal to 220 pounds ( 100 kilograms) 
but less than 2,200 pounds (1 ,000 kilograms) of hazardous waste in a calendar 
month; and 
(2) The quantity of hazardous waste accumulated on-site never exceeds 1 3,200 
pounds (6,000 kilograms). 
A generator is a conditionally exempt generator if that person generates less 
than: 
( 1 )  220 pounds (100 kilograms) of hazardous waste in a calendar month; and 
(2) 2.2 pounds (1 kilogram) of acutely hazardous waste in a calendar month; and 
(3) 220 pounds (100 kilograms) of any residue or contaminated soil, waste, or 
other debris resulting from the cleanup of a discharge of any acutely hazardous 
waste in a calendar month; and has accumulated less than 2,200 pounds (1 000 
kilograms) of hazardous waste, 2.2 pounds (one kilogram) of acutely hazardous 
waste, or 220 pounds ( 100 kilograms) of any residue or contaminated soil, waste, 
or other debris resulting from the cleanup of a discharge of any acutely 
hazardous waste at any time. 
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Before 1 970, door-to-door enumerators (i.e., US Marshals and Census Agents) conducted 
population counts. Since · then, census questionnaires have been mailed to all known residential 
households, with enumerators sent door-to-door to collect information from non-respondents - approximately 
25 percent in 1 990.1° For reasons of economy, two survey instruments are used: 1 )  a short-form on 7 
population and housing topics is administered to a majority of US households; and 2) a long-form on 30+ 
population and housing topics is sent to a sample of 1 in 6 housing units. The decennial census is the most 
comprehensive and important source of socio-economic data in the United States. It is used by social 
scientists, policy makers, and advocacy groups for evaluation of government expenditures tied to census 
data formulas, and analyses of general population and housing trends. 
In theory, a census is a complete enumeration of the population. In reality, content and coverage 
errors crawl into the enumeration process. Content errors occur when respondents fail to answer specific 
questions, inaccurately answer certain questions because of misunderstanding or unwillingness to provide 
correct information, or when bureau statisticians incorrectly process census forms (i.e., coding, data entry, 
cleaning). According to John R. Weeks (1 999: 54): 11ln comparison with other censuses, the United Nations 
rates the American census as highly accurate [on content], especially with respect to recording age, one of 
the most important demographic characteristics. By and large, content error is not a problem in the US 
census, although the data are certainly not 1 00 percent accurate." Coverage errors are more serious. 
Post-census analyses reveal that millions of American citizens and permanent residents are 
uncounted or double-counted. Undercounts have decreased from 5.4 percent in 1 940 to 1 . 1 percent of the 
population in 2000. Undercounted populations are disproportionately minority and poor. The 1 990 Census 
missed 4.4% of African Americans, 5% of Hispanics, 2.3% of Asians and Pacific Islanders, and 1 2% of 
American Indians living on reservations. The consistent undercount of disadvantaged populations has 
caused a political conflict over census methodology because many communities are shortchanged on 
federal funding distributed by population. Billions of dollars are lost for much needed social programs with 
an estimated $2,91 3 dollars lost per undercount for the fiscal period of 2002-201 (Ericksen 2001 : 2). 
10 This 200 year old methodology of physical counting, according to the American Statistical Association 
(ASA) and the National Research Council (NRC), is too costly and unrealistic. Both organizations call for 
modernization of the US Census, recommending increased use of surveys and statistical estimation to 
reduce the scale, time, and tax dollars spent tracking non-respondents, and to increase the accuracy of 
population measurement (AMSTAT News 1 997). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the use of scientific 
sampling in a 5-4 decision (Department of Commerce v United States House of Representatives). 
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From a social scientific standpoint the undercount of minorities introduces a coverage error that 
may reduce the quality of studies that use census data. The undercount of minorities is important to 
environmental justice researchers that routinely rely on census data to link population characteristics to 
environmental burdens. Coverage biases may affect this study's validity. To bias the results of this study, 
coverage error must be significantly different in observed neighborhoods with and without hazardous 
facilities. Evidence to suggest that coverage errors behave differently across comparison groups in this 
study. Coverage errors may undermine the validity of results. 
From 1990 US Census Bureau data, the following subset of population and housing variables are 
used: managerial-technical labor rate; industrial labor rate; average price of housing; average rental price; 
population density; percent college educated; percent without high school education; percent African 
American; percent Hispanic; percent American Indian; percent White; youth dependency ratio; old 
dependency ratio; percent housing units built before 1960 and 1970; percent households on public 
assistance; percent families at or below the poverty line; percent of families at 50 percent the poverty line; 
land area in square kilometers; water area in square kilometers; percent housing units rented; percent Black 
female headed households; and percent female-headed households with children. 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS CORE DATA, 1 990 
Non-profit organizations perform many positive functions. They enrich civic life by providing 
individuals and social movements with organizational resources to affect social change, and fill systemic 
gaps in the delivery of public and primary social goods as capital markets under-perform and governments 
abandon their historical function as social service providers (DiMaggio, Weiss, and Clotfelter 2002). Their 
presence is associated with democracy and norms of reciprocity, and their general absence symptomatic of 
autocracy and centralized power. 
The non-profit sector in the United States has expanded significantly in the last 30 years. Scholars 
estimate that 25,000+ nonprofit organizations are created annually (Gronbjerg 2002). Approximately 1 .6 
million nonprofit organizations currently operate in the United States. Their share of gross domestic product 
is a remarkable 8 percent (Hammack 2002). This percentage is greater than the automotive, textile, and 
transportation industries combined (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2003). The nonprofit sector employs 
about 11 million people (Lampkin and Boris 2002: 1675) accounting for 1 0 percent of non-agricultural 
employment. 
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The growth of the non-profit sector in the United States is shaped by two factors: 1 )  the gradual 
withdrawal of government from the delivery of social services, and 2) an increase in charitable giving by the 
American bourgeoisie. On the first factor, social scientists have identified an inverse relationship between 
government expenditure and the size of the non-profit sector. This crowding out of voluntary activity obtains 
in countries with centralized governments like France, Japan, and Russia (Schafer and Fourcade­
Gourinchas 2001 ). In the United States, the nonprofit sector increased in size as the federal goverriment 
reduced expenditures on social programs. On the second factor, inflation-adjusted net income for the 
highest quintile in the United States increased 43 percent from 1 977 to 1 999 . For the top 1 percent, after­
tax income increased by 1 1 5 percent (Congressional Budget Office 2002). For the same period, the top fifth 
of Americans more than doubled their net worth, dramatically increasing their share of overall wealth. This 
top-heavy accumulation of income and wealth has an age dimen_sion. Most of it has pooled at the top end of 
the age structure. As the American bourgeoisie ages, charity increases. In 2002 alone, Americans supplied 
the non-profit sector with $250 billion dollars ( Internal Revenue Service 2002). According to the National 
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP) ,  this figure could reach $10  trillion dolla�s as wealth is 
· passed from one generation to the next. 1 1  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manages the non-profit sector. Non-profit organizations o f  tax­
exempt status with $25,000 dollars in gross receipts are required to file Form 990 with the IRS.  Form 990 is 
the only comprehensive source of financial information on nonprofits. Form 990 includes statistics on 
· revenues, expenses, net and gross assets, balance sheets, program information, and data on lobbying and 
other political activities. These forms are publicly available. 
The IRS complies information from 990 forms into three cumulative files: 1 )  the Business Master 
File (BMF); 2) _the Return Transaction File (RTF); and 3) the Statistics of Income (SOI) file. The BMF 
contains basic financial data on an organization's assets and gross receipts, as well as descriptive 
information on an organization's name, address, exemption status, and leadership. The RTF contains 
information on 1 20 financial variables, and no identifying information except an organization's Federal 
Employer Identification Number (FEIN) . The SOI file has information on larger organizations with $30 million 
1 1  How this money is spent will indelibly stamp the political economy of American society. For example, 
ideologically conservative foundations (i.e., Olin, Coors, Mellon, and Scaife) have used charitable dollars to 
build a network of organizations and think tanks with distinctly conservative policy agendas of state 
minimalism, privatization of government services, deep reductions in federal anti-poverty spending, 
commercial deregulation, and transfer of responsibility for public welfare to lower levels of government and 
the nonprofit sector. 
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or more in assets, a third of organizations with $10 million to $30 million in assets, and a stratified sample of 
smaller organizations weighted by asset ownership. The SOI files include 300 financial and programmatic 
variables {Salamon and Dewees 2002). 
The National Center for Charitable Statistics {NCCS) has painstakingly computerized and merged 
these IRS files into a comprehensive database called the NCCS Core File. The mission of NCCS "is to 
develop and disseminate high quality data on non-profit organizations and their activities for use in research 
on the relationship between the non-profit sector, government, the commercial sector, and the broader civil 
society." The Core File merges descriptive information from the .BMF, and financial information from the 
RTF and SOI file. Because IRS files are for internal administration, and data entry methods geared for 
speed, they contain errors that undermine their use for research purposes. The NCCS conducts 
. standardized checks on all information. Mistakes are flagged and corrected, making the Core File "the most 
complete and highest quality data source ever available on �onprofit organizations" (Lampkin and Boris 
2002: 1683). To enhance the database, the NCCS adds Federal Information Processing Systems (FIPS) 
data at the zip code, county and state levels, and classifies each organization according to the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTTE) system. 
The Core File has flaws stemming from the data sources on which it is built. Limitations include: 1) 
there are no data on organizations with less than $5000 in annual gross receipts because such 
organizations are not legally required to register as tax-exempt; 2) there is no financial, geographic, or 
programmatic data on organizations with annual gross receipts of less than $25,000; 3) data on religious . 
organizations, regardless of size, are incomplete because such entities are not required to register with the 
IRS; and 4) because data are collected at the organization level, subsidiary enterprises are missed. 
Complex organizations are required to fill out only one Form 990, even if it is comprised of many enterprises 
and affiliated advocacy groups. This means ttiat organizations with multiple locations may file under one 
consolidated Form 990. Nobody knows the extent of consolidated reporting (Salamon and Dewees 2002). 
PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS DIRECTORY, 1 996 
The Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, a private and historically 
African American college, created a directory entitled The Peopl.e of Color Environmental Groups Directory 
{PCEGD). The directory lists more than 400 groups from 40 different states, as well as 49 groups in 
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Canada, and 24 groups in Mexico. The goal of the directory is to provide resources and support to 
grassroots groups, and to help both public and private decision-makers in reaching stakeholder groups and 
community residents. The formation of the directory fit nicely with the commitment of Clark Atlanta 
University to participatory research and community engagement. Founded in 1 994, the Environmental 
Justice Resource Center is involved in community activism, policy analysis, research to benefit the larger 
community, the collection of databases and information, and well as training, and conference planning. The 
directory of groups was created through assembling names of organizations in the U.S., Mexico and Canada 
known to be working on environmental justice issues, and later expanded using a snowball technique. The 
purpose of the directory is to act as a planning, organizing, and networking tool to empower communities 
and link grassroots movements that are often isolated and therefore less effective in advocating change. As 
well, the directory has served to involve underrepresented stakeholders in the planning of summits, 
conferences and workshops. 
US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SEISMIC HAZARD DATA AND GRID VALUES, 1 990 
The US Geological Survey (USGS), a bureau of the US Department of the Interior, recently 
launched the National Seismic Hazard Mapping Project (NSHMP) to estimate ground motion hazard values 
that have a specified probability of being exceeded in 50 years. These ground motion values inform 
earthquake resistance strategies, and seismic risk assessments for economic and safety decisions on land 
uses: The NSHMP online database generates ground motion values expressed as percentages of the 
acceleration of gravity (o/og) for each longitude and latitude point to three decimal points for the contiguous 
United States.12 Earthquake estimates can also be generated for each Zip Code. For each Zip Code or 
longitude-latitude entry, sE:veral estimates of ground motion are returned, including: Peak Ground 
Acceleration (PGA); and 0.2, 0.3, and 1 .0 second period Spectral Acceleration (SA), for 1 0, 5, and 2 percent 
probability of being exceeded (PE), in 50 years. 
A strong correlation obtains between estimates of peak ground and spectral acceleration, but they 
measure slightly different phenomena. PGA and SA measure what an object experiences during irregular 
12 The average of the northern and southern m·ost latitudes and the average of the eastern and western 
most longitudes are used to estimate the latitude and longitude values of each Zip Code unit. Such 
· estimates may not conform to Census Bureau generated Zip Code centroid estimates. Zip Code location 
ground motion values are the nearest point on a grid of points 1 /1 0  of a degree apart from ground motions 
calculated for the 48 adjacent states. 
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earth motion. The irregular movement of this object can be measured on its changing position, velocity, or 
acceleration as a function of time. Because building codes stipulate how much horizontal force a building 
must endure during earthquake motion, acceleration is the preferred measured. Peak acceleration is the 
maximum acceleration experienced by an object during earthquake motion. PGA is a good hazard measure 
for shorter buildings of 7 stories or less. SA is an approximation of what is experienced by larger buildings. 
Ground motion estimates are preferable because TSDFs are generally horizontally designed. · 
For a given site, the computer calculates the ground motion effect for all earthquake locations and 
magnitudes believed possible in the vicinity. Each of these magnitude-location pairs is believed to occur at 
some average probability per year. Small ground motions are relatively probable, and large ground motions 
are relatively improbable. All probabilities are given for a specific period of time. 
US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY HYDROLOGIC UNIT CODE DATA, 1 990 
In 1 972, U.S. Geological Survey began systematic collection of hydrologic data. The project was -
spearheaded by the U.S. Geological Survey's Office of Water Data Coordination and financially supported 
by the Survey's Resource Planning Analysis Office. The goal was a standard geographical framework ·to 
provide detailed water and land resource planning. Prior to construction of these data, planners used 
inconsistent criteria to name and code basins and delineate hydrologic boundaries. To create consistency 
and aid in organization and dissemination of data, the U.S. Geological Survey Hydrologic data are reported 
for regions, sub-regions, accounting units, and cataloging units. Units are arranged from smallest · 
(cataloging units) to largest (regions). 
Each hydrologic unit is identified by a 2 to 8 digit hydrologic unit code (HUC) based on the four 
levels of classification in the hydrologic unit system. The first level of classification divides the U.S. into 21 
geographic areas, or regions based on surface topography, with each region containing either the drainage 
area of a major river, or the combined drainage areas of a series of smaller rivers. The second level of 
classification divides the 21 regions into 222 sub-regions that include an area drained by a river system, 
tributaries in that feed into closed basins, or a group of streams forming a coastal drainage area. The third 
level of classification subdivides many of the sub-regions into 352 units that nest within, or are equivalent to, 
sub-regions. The fourth and smallest level of classification is the cataloging unit, sometimes called .a 
watershed, which is a geographic area representing part or all of a surface drainage basin, a combination of 
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basins, a distinct hydrologic feature, or an area of land that catches precipitation and drains or seeps into a 
marsh, stream, river, lake· or groundwater. Cataloging units subdivide sub-regions and accounting units into · 
approximately 21 50 smaller areas. The Geological Survey's National Water Data Exchange (NAWDEX) 
system as well as federal agencies, state, county, and local agencies use the hydrologic units for codifying 
and displaying data collected at both a local and national level. 
This dissertation collects hydrologic data at the watershed (cataloging) level of analysis. To merge 
watershed data from the us· Geological Survey with census tract level population and housing data from the 
US Bureau, I visited the Office of Social and Economic Data Analysis at the University of Missouri website 
and used their geographic correspondence engine (www.oseda.missouri.edul). This engine enables users 
to estimate the percentage of a hydrologic unit code encased in a census tract. Estimation is a relatively 
straightforward procedure of overlapping maps. It is similar to lining up transparencies, and calculating the 
percentage of overlap, weighted by population size or area in square kilometers. 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The proper unit of analysis is a controversial topic in environmental justice research. 13 At the 
center of this debate is the operational definition of community using data constructs. The US Census 
Bureau collects data directly at household and individual levels. To protect the privacy of respondents, data 
are aggregated to higher legal, administrative, and statistical levels (see Figure 3.3). Data are arranged in a 
geographic hierarchy. The two most popular data constructs used by environmental justice researchers are 
zip code areas and census tracts. 
The zip code area is part of the US Postal Service's mail delivery system. The rationale for using 
zip code areas as indicators of community is that data are widely available at the-level; zip code areas are 
commonly used in marketing studies to estimate consumer preferences; they are easy integrate with EPA 
data on hazardous facilities insofar as facilities receive mail at the site of operation; they represent a useful 
way to geographically partition the country; and people regularly use zip code areas to roughly estimate the 
quality of a residential area (Williams 1 999). Most scholars reject zip code areas because they vary 
significantly in size and encompass too much area to adequately capture the sociological meaning of 
13 According to Zimmerman ( 1 993:652), unit selection is "often dictated by expediency, determined by how 
existing databases are aggregated and which level of aggregation provides the most data at the smallest 
geographic scale." 
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AIANHH: Amerlcwl Indian Area/Alaska Native Areal 
Hawaiian Home Land 
ANRC: Alaska Native Regional Corporation 
SLD: Stale Legislative District (upper & lower 
chambers) 
TAZ: Traffic Analysls Zone 
UGA: Oregon Urben Growth Area 
ZCTA"' : ZIP Code� Tabulation Area 
Source: Standard Hierarchy of Census Geographic Entities (from Census 2000 Summary File 1 Technical 
Documentation, prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 , p. A-25) 
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community or be of much relevance to exposure analysis; they are prone to aggregation errors; they 
intersect political boundaries like cities, counties, and states, frustrating regional analyses; and they are too 
heterogeneous demographically, with racially distinct neighborhoods incased in the zip code area. 
The census tract is more widely used data construct estimate of community. It is an observational 
unit delimited by the US Census Bureau. Census tracts are statistical subdivisions of a county. Local 
census committees, staffed by professionals with intimate knowledge of the cultural, economic, ar:id 
demographic history of a metropolitan area or densely populated county, delineate tract boundaries. 
Census committees are required to carefully follow Census Bureau guidelines in making subdivisions. 
Subdivisions are to be as homogenous as possible on population and housing characteristics at the time of 
their creation. Population size should range from 2,500 to 8,000 inhabitants, with a preferred average of 
4,000. Census tracts are relatively small neighborhood areas with a national median of .74 square miles. 
Census tracts in central business districts, major commercial and industrial areas, and areas containing 
residential settlements in multi-story, high-density buildings have populations that generally exceed this 
range. Census tracts must also conform to recognizable physical boundaries, street extensions, utility and 
transport easements, and property lines, without intersecting political and administrative boundaries. 
Census tracts are superior to zip code areas for many reasons, including: they are relatively 
permanent and homogeneous demographically, enabling isolation and statistical comparison of relevant 
variables; census tracts conform to political and physical boundaries allowing for regional analysis; they are 
regularly used in American courts as the proper unit of analysis for neighborhood approximation; they are 
designed sociologically and capture cultural dimensions of community; and they vary less significantly than 
zip code areas in size allowing for unfettered statistical analysis (Liu 2001 ). 
The major drawback of census tracts in environmental justice research is that hazardous facilities 
may be sited at the edge of a census tract. The environmental risks associated with the facility extend 
beyond the borders of the census tract in which it located. Residents in adjace·nt tracts are equally affected 
by the land use. This boundary effect undermines the census tract as a stand-alone analytical unit for 
assuming the effects of proximity. Creation of composite zones can minimize this methodological problem. 
The burdens generated by TSDFs are inversely related to distance. As one moves closer to a TSDF, the 
burdens increase. No consensus on the precise distance the environmental burdens of a TSDF dissipate. 
Estimates vary from one to five miles. Complications stem from cumulative burdens, varying TSDF size, 
and spatial effects like undulating topography that block the reach of TSDF burdens. 
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The most commonly used zones of impact are 1 and 1.5 miles from the TSDF (see Mohai and 
Bryant 1994; and Boer, Pastor, Sadd, and Snyder 1997). Evidence from risk perception, price hedonic, and 
contaminant studies confirm these distances as conservative zones of potential impact. This dissertation 
adopts these distances. Distances are measured from the centroid of a census tract to the centroid of the 
nearest TSDF tract. The dependent variable will include all tracts containing a TSDF, and all adjacent tracts 
with 1 and 1.5 miles of the suspect land use. 
STATISTICAL TESTS AND METHODS 
This section describes the statistical methods to be used. The objective is not to educate the 
reader on the technical aspects of tests or methods, but to substantively justify and discuss the procedures 
to be used. The linkages between population and housing characteristics, geological and hydrological 
phenomena, and environmental risk are variable and uncertain. One must select statistical methodologies 
that match the phenomena studied, the precision with which phenomena are measured, and the research 
questions to be answered. This dissertation relies on relatively simple and straightforward methods for 
evaluating comparisons. Affected and unaffected tracts are compared using bivariate and multivariate tests. 
Bivariate hypothesis testing involves comparison of averages on theoretically relevant variables 
between TSDF and non-TSDF tracts. The bivariate null hypothesis is that affected and unaffected tracts are 
equal on selected characteristics. Rejecting the null hypothesis of equal variances supports the plausibility 
of claims on commercial TSDF location outcomes. Bivariate hypothesis testing is substantively important 
because theories of environmental justice hold that no differences should obtain between host and non-host 
tracts on racial and socio-economic features of a community. The t-test is used for evaluation of the 
bivariate null. 
The t-test is the most widely used analysis of means. The main assumption of the t-test is that 
observations are normally distributed (Fink 1995). Violation of this assumption does not invalidate test 
results necessarily. The t-test is sufficiently robust to handle skewed data if sample sizes are large. 14 The 
main advantage of the t-test is interpretive simplicity. Non-statisticians have no trouble understanding its 
purpose or results. 
14 An alternative to the t-test is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, also known as the Mann-Whitney statistic. It is 
a non-parametric test of median difference. Because the median measure of centrality is less affected by 
skew, the test is extremely robust under circumstances of skew. 
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The second type of hypothesis testing is multivariate. Multivariate tests are superior to b ivariate 
tests because of the exercise of statistical control. The abil ity to hold variables statistically constant 
approaches controlled experimentation . Bivariate comparisons may obscure relationships. Relationships 
behave differently under conditions of statistical control. Multivariate tests may render significant bivariate 
relationships spurious, or may reveal a substantive relationship actually exists. A fundamental issue in 
multivariate hypothesis testing is model specification, or the logic behind variable inclusion in the regression 
equation. Analytic economy and theoretical understanding guide model construction. Because different 
variable sets give rise to different results, temptation to statistically fiddle is minimized by the deductive 
approach of this dissertation. The multivariate test to be used is binary logistic regression. 
Binary logistic regression is part of the statistical family of General Linear Modeling. This test is 
appropriate when the dependent variable, in this case presence of absence of a TSDF, is discrete or 
dichotomous. logistic regression is a non-linear transformation of linear regression .  It is an S-shaped 
distribution function. The interpretation of logistic coefficients for dichotomous variables is intuitively simple 
when log odds are expressed as an odds ratio. Instead of the slope coefficients being the rate of change in 
the dependent variable as independent variables change, as is the case in  simple linear regression, the 
slope coefficient is interpreted as the rate of change in log odds as independent variables change. The 
conversion to an odds ratio allows one to state results meaningfully to non-statisticians. A unit increase in 
an independent variable can be expressed as an increase or decrease in the probability that a census tract 
hosts or does not host a TSDF. 
For each test, interpretation will rely almost exclusively on mathematical sign and significance. 
This is deep enough for hypothesis testing. Reported p-values reflect two-tailed tests of significance. 
Directionality is unimport�nt because the objective is to measure differences in kind and degree. Readers 
can simply divide two-tailed p-values by two to figure one-tail estimates. 
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CHAPTER IV : STATISTICAL RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter evaluates results of statistical tests. The chapter is organized as follows. First, 
descriptive statistics on independent variables are used to sort and describe the data for the region as whole 
and the sub-regions of the South and Deep South. Next, statistical tests of comparison (t-Tests) between 
host and non-host neighborhoods (i.e., census tracts) are presented and interpreted. Measures of spatial 
risk radiate from census tract, to 1 mile from the nearest hazard, to 1.5 miles from the nearest hazard. 
Results are presented in table format for the entire region and sub-regions. Last, binary logistic regression 
results are presented with measures of spatial risk the same. Regression coefficients are transformed from 
log odds to odds ratios for ease of interpretation and readability, but interpretive emphasis is ·placed on 
relationship directionality and statistical significance for reduced models. 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS ANO BASIC DESCRIPTION 
The dataset contains 10, 1 15  statistically valid neighborhoods (i.e., census tract divisions) for the 
Southeastern United States. Compared to the nation as whole, the Southeast region is characterized by 
higher than average African-American population (22 percent versus 13 percent), rate of poverty (19 percent 
versus 15 percent), and percent high school dropout (32 percent versus 26 percent). On other economic, 
demographic, and geo-physical characteristics, EPA Region IV has a social capital rate of $1686 dollars, an 
environmental capital rate of $306 dollars, a lower the average population density (628 persons/ per km), an 
industrial labor rate of 32 percent, with half the active labor force in petit bourgeois (i.e., managerial 
technical) occupations. The average price of an owner-occupied home is $73,335 dollars, with 40 percent of 
such units built before 1970. The national average for value of owner-occupied home is $104,530, a full 
thirty thousand dollar difference. Risk of seismological activity is low. The Peak Ground Acceleration 
(PGA) average is 4.5%g. The US Geological Survey has a 10 percent PGA threshold for likely destruction 
of physical property (see Table 4. 1 ). 
Following Mary Rogge's (1996) example, if we sub-divide EPA Region IV into South (Florida, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee) and Deep South (i.e., Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina), notable sub-regional variation emerges. Compared to the Region as whole, the Deep South (see 
Table 4.2) has lower social capital assets ($3,441,863 dollars), a lower social capital asset rate ($1 ,473), a 
dismally low environmental capital average of $5.53 per person, a higher rate of industrial labor, a greater 
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TABLE 4.1 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR EPA REGION IV 
N Minimum Maximum Mean · Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 10115 -131231 1736539201 3890675.13 28473413.39 
. Social Capital Rate 10115 -15.44 2414954.11 1686.2850 28704.3544 
Environmental Capital Assets 10115 .00 48101437.00 40693.4220 1023446.6953 
Environmental Capital Rate 10115 .00 3006339.81 306.0710 29892.4785 
Population Density 10115 .00 12120.18 628.6058 924.1274 
Young Dependency Ratio 10115 .00 1.46 .3464 .1132 
Old Dependency Ratio 10115 .00 12.73 .2476 .3025 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 10115 .00 13.00 .2030 . .6632 
% Industrial Labor 10115 .00 100.00 32."1996 13.9766 
% Managerial Technical Labor 10115 .00 100.00 50.6774 16.7367 
Mean Value of Household 10115 9000.00 600000.00 73355.6140 48064.0521 
Median Gross Rent 10115 .0 1001.0 368.070 155.525 
% Units Built Before 1960 10115 .00 100.00 31.9898 21.7290 
% Units Built before 1970 10115 .00 100.00 49.4120 23.2807 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 10115 .00 2857.04 94.5769 162.0969 
Water Area Sq Km 10115 .00 2794.48 6.1011 49.2324 
Peak Ground Acceleration 10115 .5000000 23.8058500 4.468188782 3.683263255 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 10115 .0000000 2.0483100 3.993124E-02 9.895685E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 10115 .00 100.00 76.1751 27.2461 
% Black Persons 10115 .00 100.00 22.0844 27.3127 
% Hispanic Persons 10115 .00 100.00 2.9512 9.3725 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 10115 .00 100.00 73.9755 27.8787 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 10115 .00 100.00 21.9277 27.2045 
% American Indian 10115 .00 88.93 .4236 2.4616 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 10115 .00 100.00 8.0345 7.9051 
% Families at or Below Poverty 10115 .00 100.00 19.2333 13.7000 
% Public Assistance in 1989 10115 .00 100.00 8.9292 7.6232 
% Female Households w/ Kids 10115 .00 100.00 7.3644 5.4483 
% Black Female Households 10115 .00 100.00 25.7420 16.9140 
% Renter Occupied Units 10115 .00 100.00 32.3289 20.0432 
% 18+ Without High School 10115 .00 100.00 31.9848 15.0358 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 10115 .00 100.00 37.7926 18.2178 
Total Persons 10115 .00 71872.00 4419.9472 2755.0495 
Valid N 10115 
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percentage of housing units constructed before 1970, lower population density (454 persons/sq km), more 
than one-fifth of the population below the official poverty line, a higher percentage of persons on public 
. assistance (10 percent), substantially higher percentage of African-Americans (30 percent) and a sizably 
larger average of land area in sq km (121). These economic and demographic disadvantages in the Deep 
South render it especially susceptible to TSDF siting, should the racial and economic inequality hypothesis 
hold true (see Table 4.2). The one factor in favor of the Deep South is the lower percent of large quantity 
generator activity, making it commercially unsuitable as the cost-reduction thesis suggests. 
As evidenced in Table 4.3 , the Southern States of Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee, are comparatively better off than the Deep South. Southern states contain more statistical 
neighborhoods (N=6148 versus N=3967) . On social capital variables, the South has an enormous 
advantage in assets. Neighborhoods in the South have, on average, a $1 .5 million dollar advantage in 
social capital assets. The environmental capital rate in the. South is $499. In fact , almost all non-profit 
organizations with a declared environmental focus are located in the sub-region of the South. The South is 
also significantly older population, with an old age dependency ratio of 27 percent. Compared to the Deep 
South, data on economic variables reveal a $13,000 dollar difference in average price of owner-occupied 
housing, a higher percentage of the workforce in technical-managerial occupations, and a lower percentage 
of workers in blue-collar jobs. The South has a slightly higher than average percentage of large quantity 
generator activity. The slight mismatch between higher LOG activity and lower industrial labor rate may be 
explainable by the relative capital intensity of LOG production in the South. The most pronounced 
differences between sub-regions are on demographic variables. The South has almost 50 percent less 
African-Americans (1 6.4 percent versus 30.9 percent), considerably more Hispanic identified persons (4 
percent) , a lower rate of poverty, a lower percentage of persons in extreme poverty (7 .3 percent versus 8. 1 ), 
and a higher percentage of adults with at least 1 year of college training. Overall, conditions in the South 
are mixed. The higher than average concentraUon of LOG operations make the South vulnerable to 
commercial TSDF siting, but higher scores on social, economic, and human capital ought to shield Southern 
residents from environmentally risky technologies like commercial TSO installations. 
As Table 4.4 indicates, state level distribution of TSO installations deviates slightly from census 
tract totals, with installations unevenly spread across EPA Region IV. First, let us examine the total of 
statistical neighborhoods by state, then the allocation of TSO facilities. More than 24 percent (N=2448) of 
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TABLE 4.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR DEEP SOUTH STATES OF ALABAMA, 
GEORGIA, MISSISSIPPI, AND SOUTH CAROLINA 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 3967 -4919 1736539201 3441863.88 34981073.25 
Social Capital Rate 3967 -2.49 986744.69 1472.6187 20931.8130 
Environm_ental Capital Assets 3967 .00 40681228.00 26716.8563 7 45850.6952 
Environmental Capital Rate 3967 .00 6292.53 5.5365 126.9527 
Population Density 3967 .00 11261.26 454.9715 722.2404 
Young Dependency Ratio 3967 .00 1.46 .3750 .1142 
Old Dependency Ratio 3967 .00 2.20 .2040 .1158 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 3967 .00 9.00 .1986 .6355 
% Industrial Labor 3967 .00 100.00 34.4087 13.9501 
% Managerial Technical Labor 3967 .00 100.00 49.0445 16.8206 
Mean Value of Household 3967 12500.00 461719.59 65586.9937 38810.9175 
Median Gross Rent 3967 .0 1001.0 336.285 145.838 
% Units Built Before 1960 3967 .00 100.00 32.7336 20.5121 
% Units Built before 1970 3967 .00 100.00 50.4365 21.6339 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY · 
Land Area Sq Km 3967 .00 1338.47 121.2369 171.7325 
Water Area Sq Km 3967 .00 480.31 4.2317 23.0716 
Peak Ground Acceleration 3967 1.3589930 18.9090300 5.022093510 3.197330161 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 3967 .0000000 2.0483100 4.842939E-02 .109698754 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 3967 .00 100.00 67.8015 28.5313 
% Black Persons 3967· .00 .100.00 30.8982 28.7977 
% Hispanic Persons 3967 .00 100.00 1.0091 2.8131 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 3967 .00 100.00 67.2243 28.4126 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 3967 .00 100.00 30.7888 28.7287 
% American Indian 3967 .00 88.93 .3254 1.6742 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 3967 .00 100.00 9.1694 8.7087 
% Families at or Below Poverty 3967 .00 100.00 21.1081 14.4444 
% Public Assistance in 1989 3967 .00 70.51 10.3358 8.2846 
% Female Households w/ Kids 3967 .00 100.00 8.3851 6.1026 
% Black Female Households 3967 .00 100.00 27.6821 14.9430 
% Renter Occupied Units 3967 .00 100.00 32.0336 20.1478 
% 18+ Without High School 3967 .00 100.00 33.7144 14.9TT1 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 3967 .00 100.00 36.4681 18.3924 
Total Persons 3967 .00 18081.00 4179.1586 2394.3225 
Valid N 3967 
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TABLE 4.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR SOUTHERN STATES OF FLORIDA, 
KENTUCKY, NORTH CAROLINA, AND TENNESSEE 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 6148 -131231 806594674 4180270.80 23328678.53 
Social Capital Rate 6148 -15.44 2414954.11 1824.1533 32755.7684 
Environmental Capital Assets 6148 .00 48101437.00 49711.8079 1168029.3148 
Environmental Capital Rate 6148 .00 3006339.81 499.9911 38342.1174 
Population Density 6148 .00 ,12120.18 740.6434 1018.1299 
Young Dependency Ratio 6148 .00 1.26 .3279 .1086 
Old Dependency Ratio 6148 .00 12.73 .2758 .3740 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 6148 .00 13.00 .2058 .6805 
% Industrial Labor 6148 .00 100.00 30.7742 13.8084 
% Managerial Technical Labor 6148 .00 100.00 51.7310 16.5987 
Mean Value of Household 6148 9000.00 600000.00 78368.3200 52584.1980 
Median Gross Rent 6148 .0 1001.0 388.579 158.123 
% Units Built Before 1960 6148 .00 100.00 31.5099 22.4679 
% Units Built before 1970 6148 .00 100.00 48.7510 24.2629 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 6148 .00 2857.04 77.3744 153.1329 
Water Area Sq Km 6148 .00 2794.48 7.3073 60.3400 
Peak Ground Acceleration 6148 .5000000 23.8058500 4.110781485 3.924293553 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 6148 .0000000 1.4148080 3.444780E-02 9 .094649E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 6148 .00 100.00 81.5781 24.9354 
% Black Persons 6148 .00 100.00 16.3974 24.6955 
% Hispanic Persons 6148 .00 100.00 4.2044 11.6372 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 6148 .00 100.00 78.3317 26.6377 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 6148 .00 100.00 16.2100 24.5323 
% American Indian 6148 .00 86.39 .4870 2.8550 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 6148 .00 100.00 7.3022 . 7.2470 
% Families at or Below Poverty 6148 .00 100.00 18.0236 13.0565 
% Public Assistance in 1989 6148 .00 100.00 8.0215 7.0166 
% Female Households w/ Kids 6148 .00 41.60 6.7058 4.8689 
% Black Female Households 6148 .00 100.00 24.4901 17.9623 
% Renter Occupied Units 6148 .00 100.00 32.5194 19.9747 
% 18+ Without High School 6148 .00 100.00 30.8687 14.9690 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 6148 .00 100.00 38.6472 18.0543 
Total Persons 6148 .00 71872.00 4575.3162 2954.3915 
Valid N 6148 
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TABLE 4.4: CROSS-TABULATION OF STATE BY ZONES OF TSDF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
1 .5 Miles 1 Mile TSDF Total 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
1 038 24 1 045 1 7  1 050 1 2  1 062 
Alabama 
1 0.5% 9.2% 1 0.5% 1 1 .3% 1 0.5% 1 2.0% 1 0.5% 
2420 28 2431 17  2436 1 2  2448 
Florida 
24.6% 1 0.8% 24.4% 1 1 .3% 24.3% 12 .0% 24.2% 
1447 23 1 454 16  1 457 1 3  1 470 
Georgia 
1 4.7% 8.8% 14.6% 1 0.6% 1 4.5% 1 3.0% 14.5% 
955 42 974 23 986 1 1  997 
Kentucky 
9.7% 1 6.2% 9 .8% 1 5.2% 9 .8% 1 1 .0% 9.9% 
570 1 1  577 4 577 4 581 
Mississippi 
5.8% 4.2% 5.8% 2.6% 5.8% 4.0% 5.7% 
1 428 54 1 455 27 1 467 1 5  1 482 
North ,Caronna 
14.5% 20.8% 1 4.6% 1 7.9% 1 4.6% 1 5.0% 1 4.7% 
828 26 836 1 8  838 1 6  854 
South Carolina 
8.4% 1 0.0% 8.4% 1 1 .9% 8.4% 1 6.0% 8.4% 
1 1 69 52 1 1 92 29 1 204 1 7  1 221 
Tennessee 
1 1 .9% 20.0% 12.0% 1 9.2% 1 2.0% 1 7.0% 12 . 1% 
Total 9855 260 9964 1 51 1 001 5 1 00 1 01 1 5  
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census tracts are located in Florida. After Florida, in rank order from highest to lowest: North Carolina 
(N=1482), Georgia (N=1470), Tennessee (N=1221), Alabama (N=1062), Kentucky (N=997), South Carolina 
(N=854), and Mississippi (N=581). Of the 100 commercial TSO installations in EPA Region IV, 1 7  are 
located in Tennessee, followed by South Carolina (N=16), North Carolina (N=15), Georgia (N=13), Florida 
(N=12), Alabama (N=12), Kentucky (N=11), and Mississippi (N=4). 
What may account for Florida's proportionally lower presence of TSO installations? Florida has 
about a quarter of regional neighborhoods available for TSO facility siting, and hosts only 12 percent of fully 
operational TSDFs in the region. Consistent with hypotheses delineated in Chapter Ill, Florida ranks 
second regionally in average social capital assets ($4,683,983), first in average environmental capital 
assets, average value of owner-occupied housing, population density, percentage white persons, percent 
college educated, percent of workers in managerial-technical occupations, and percentage water area in 
square miles. Also, Florida has the lowest regional poverty rate, percent renter occupied units, industrial 
labor rate, percent African-Americans, and activity of large quantity generators of hazardous waste (see 
Appendix for complete state by state descriptive statistics). Conversely, what may explain Tennessee's 
proportionally higher presence of commercial TSO installations? The high presence of TSDFs in Tennessee 
corresponds with the highest regional average of LQG operations (.3415). No other theoretically relevant 
characteristic distinguishes Tennessee from the rest of the region, except it is second to Kentucky on 
hydrologic suitability (i.e., water area in sq km, 1.97). 
If we expand the zone of potentially catastrophic environment risk to 1 Mile, state level data behave 
similarly, but differences are more amplified (see Table 4.4). Again, Tennessee leads all states with 29 
affected neighborhoods or 19 percent of the regional total, followed by North Carolina (N=27), Kentucky 
(N=23), South Carolina (N=18), Alabama (N=17), Florida (N=17), Georgia (N=16), and finally Mississippi 
(N=4). For Deep South states, the number of affected communities increases marginally. In Mississippi, 
the expanded zone of impact is inconsequential. In South Carolina, the number of affected neighborhoods 
increases slightly from 16 to 18 .  This pattern of marginal difference is explainable by the average size of 
neighborhoods in the Deep South (121 square Km). Florida's share of the region's environmental burdens 
remains proportionally low at 11 .3 percent. 
At 1.5 miles to the nearest TSD installation, North Carolina surpasses Tennessee as the most 
burdened state in EPA Region IV, with 54 affected neighborhoods. Combined, North Carolina and 
Tennessee have about 40 percent of the Region's environmentally affected neighborhoods. Following 
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North Carolina, in descending order of burden, are Tennessee (N=52), Kentucky (N=42), Florida (N=28), 
South Carolina (N=26), Alabama (N=24), Georgia (N=23), and Mississippi_ (N=11 ). At the impact zone of 
1.5 miles, Southern states finish in the top four slots. This is explainable by the higher average population 
density in Southern states. By expanding the zone of environmental risk from 1 to 1.5 miles, the number of 
affected neighborhoods increases from 151 to 260. The increase in affected neighborhoods from in-tract 
(N=100) to 1 mile (N=151) to 1.5 miles (N=260) to 2 miles (N=398), conforms coincidentally with t�e 
Fibonacci sequence used in theoretical mathematics in which each term is the sum of the two preceding 
terms. Overall, the distribution of commercial TSO installations in EPA Region IV, at whatever spatial 
measure of environmental risk, are more concentrated in the Southern sub-region states of Tennessee, 
Kentucky and North Carolina. As noted in Chapter 1 1 1, these Southern states have emerged as nascent 
centers of routine production activities. The generally higher average of LOG activity creates a need for 
proper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. As production gravitates further South, 
distribution patterns of commercial TSO installations ought to change correspondingly. 
DIFFERENCES IN MEANS AND INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T· TESTS 
In this section, bivariate comparisons for neighborhoods with and without TSO installations, across 
theoretically relevant demographic, economic, and geo-physical characteristics are presented and 
discussed. As stated in Chapter Ill, this section uses the t-test statistical methodology. The t-test requires 
interval-ratio data that are relatively normally distributed. The t-test is used to detect differences between 
means obtaining for independent groups. Three elements of statistical output are emphasized in the 
interpretation: 1) mathematical sign; 2) the p-value (i.e., Sig.), estimating '1he probability of obtaining the 
results of a statistical test by chance" (Fink 1995: 45); and 3) mean differences. 
Before moving to the data, for analytic clarity, let us recapitulate the four hypotheses tested. 
Hypothesis I, economic rationality, maintains that TSO facility operators, like regular economic actors, are 
utility maximizing agents. They use a cost-reduction rationale for site selection, searching for areas with 
adequately skilled labor supply (i.e., industrial proletariat, and technical managerial labor) affordable land, 
and accessibility to hazardous waste for processing. Seven variables are examined to approximate the 
economic rationality argument: the number of large quantity generators; percent industrial labor; percent 
managerial-technical labor; mean value of owner occupied household; median gross rent; percent of 
housing units built before 1960; and percent of housing units built before 1970 (see Table 3.1 for variable 
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definition statements). Examination of economically relevant neighborhood data allow for logical inferences 
on TSDF operator decision-making. 
Hypothesis I I ,  scientific rationality, examines the TSDF location dilemma from the standpoint of 
physical science. The Environmental Protection Agency has produced clear guidelines for TSDF siting 
based on geological and hydrological criteria. TSO installation operators are encouraged strongly to avoid 
earthquake zones and watershed areas. To approximate the influence of these criteria on TSO installation 
outcomes, the following variables are examined: census tract land area in square Km; water area in square 
Km; peak ground acceleration; and the percent of hydrologic unit code overlap with census tract (see Table 
3.1 for variable definition statements). Examination of the physical characteristics of a neighborhood allows 
one to comment on TSDF conformity with EPA siting guidelines. 
Hypothesis 1 1 1 ,  neighborhood social capital, holds that siting outcomes are a function of 
neighborhood capacity to organize and repel undesirable land uses. Neighborhoods with a vibrant civic life 
and substantial social capital, characterized by norms of social reciprocity and trust , are more able than 
civically starved neighborhoods to mobilize for collective action . Presence of nonprofit organizations and 
voluntary associations, high population density, and dependent strata of the population to be assisted 
characterize vibrant civic life. To estimate neighborhood social capital, the following variables are examined: 
social capital assets; social capital rate; environmental capital assets; environmental capital rate; population 
density; youth dependency ratio; and old dependency ratio. Single measures on neighborhood social capital 
and TSDF location outcomes enable logical inferences on phenomena relations synchronically. 
Finally, hypothesis IV, race, class, and gender inequality, holds that distribution of commercial 
treatment, storage, and disposal installations is non-random, with social disadvantaged neighborhoods 
burdened disproportionately by such environmentally risky technologies. According to environmental justice 
scholars, discriminatory outcomes by race, class, and gender are systemically caused (Stretesky and Hogan 
1998; Bullard 1990; and Pulido 1 996). Socio-economic forces like institutional discrimination, social 
stratification, residential segregation by race and class, and market allocation of goods and services 
intertwine to shape life chances and destinies. Like goods of educational access, income, and life 
expectancy, environmental ''bads" are distributed unevenly. Population strata occupying lower rungs in the 
American stratification system are more susceptible to toxic exposure, insofar as "bads" flow downward in 
the system. The following twelve neighborhood variables are measured to test the inequality argument: 
percent Hispanic persons; percent non-Hispanic White persons; percent non-Hispanic Black persons; 
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percent American Indian persons; percent families at 50 percent below the official poverty line; percent 
families at or below the official poverty line; percent persons on public assistance; percent female headed 
households; percent renter occupied housing units; percent adults without a high school diploma; and 
percent adults with college education (see Table 3.1 for variable definition statements). 
BIVARIATE RESULTS FOR EPA REGION IV 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6.detail statistical differences between TSDF host and non-host neighborhoods 
for EPA Region IV as a whole. On social capital variables, mean differences between host and non-host 
neighborhoods are sizable. Host neighborhoods have lower social capital assets ($191,194 versus 
$3,927,614), a lower social capital rate ($49 versus $ 1702), lower environmental capital assets ($956 versus 
$41,090), and a lower environmental capital rate (18 cents versus $309). None of these differences 
supercede statistical chance. Only the youth dependency ratio is positively significant (t= 2.758, p=.006) 
with TSDF presence. There is minimal statistical support for the social capital argument at this level of 
analysis and spatial conception of environmental risk, using the bivariate comparison methodology . .  
All economic rationality variables, but median gross rent, are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Host neighborhoods have significantly more LOG activity (t=14.19) ,  a larger industrial labor force (t=2.86), 
lower petit bourgeois labor (t= -2.83), cheaper private property ($14,489 dollars lower than non-host 
neighborhoods), and a greater percentage of housing units built decades ago. The economic rationality 
argument as whole receives strong statistical confirmation. On scientific rationality measures, two variables 
are statistically significant, with both variables behaving unexpectedly. TSDF host neighborhoods have 
smaller land area in square kilometers (67.1km versus 94.9km), and have higher peak ground acceleration 
figures (6.1 %g versus 4.5�/og) . Though seismological activity is the Southeastern United States is 
comparatively low, it is surprising to discover TSD installations, on average, located in significantly higher 
earthquake risk zones. On hydrology measures, as expected, host communities have lower water area in 
square km (1.6km versus 6.2km), and a lower percentage of watersheds encased in neighborhoods (3.1 % 
versus 4.0 percent) . These mean differences are statistically insignificant. 
Examination of demographic inequality variables reveals that host neighborhoods have a 
significantly higher percentage of African-Americans (34 percent versus 22 percent; t= -4.26, p=.000), a 
greater percentage of families living in extreme poverty (t=2.03, p=.042) and at or below the official poverty 
line (t= 1.71, p=.088), and a larger percentage of households on public assistance (t=2.72, p=.007). 
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Table 4.5: Mean Comparisons of Variables for TSDF Host and Non-Host Tracts for EPA Region IV 
· : ,;. ·, : , ,  . 
. .  
Social Capital Assets Yes 100 191 1 94.58 409713.87 40971 .39 
No 10015 3927614.52 2861 2787.24 28591 3.52 
Social Capital Rate Yes 100 49.2327 131 .2371 13.1 237 
No 10015 1702.6310 28846.8481 288.2524 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 100 956.0400 9560.4000 956.0400 
No 10015 41090.2007 1028535.8993 102n.6536 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 100 . 1747 1 .7468 . 1 747 
No 10015 309. 1254 30041 .3455 300.1 884 
Population Density Yes 100 513.4280 580.9228 58.0923 
No 10015 629.7558 926.8600 9.261 7 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 100 .3774 .1051 1 .051 E-02 
No 10015 .3461 . 1 1 32 1 . 131 E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 100 .2000 . 1339 1 .339E-02 
No 10015 .2481 .3037 3.034E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 100 1 . 1300 1 .5677 . 1 568 
No 10015 .1 937 .6413 6.408E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 1 00  36.2239 10.8513 1 .0851 
No 10015 32. 1594 13.9988 . 1 399 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 100 45.9589 13. 1 395 1 .3140 
No 10015 50.7245 16.7625 . 1 675 
Mean Value of Household Yes 100 59009.2044 25021 . 1735 2502. 1 1 73 
No 10015 73498.8632 48217.8098 481 .8 169 
Median Gross Rent Yes 100 347.250 1 1 8.966 1 1 .897 
No 10015 368.278 155.837 1 .557 
% Units Built Before 1960 Yes 100 37.4157 22.8121 2.281 2 
No 10015 31 .9357 21 .71 23 .2170 
% Units Built before 1970 Yes 100 55.2976 23.4910 2.3491 
No 1001 5 49.3533 23.2723 .2325 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 100 67. 1 188 127.5593 12.7559 
No 10015 94.8510 162.3864 1 .6226 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 100 1 .6474 5.2302 .5230 
No 10015 6. 1456 49.4728 .4944 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 1 00  6. 122902433 4.463682588 .446368259 
No 1 0015 4.451 666429 3.671 145721 3.66839546E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 100 3.06281 E-02 7.30055E-02 7.30055E-03 
No 10015 4.00241 E-02 9.91 8005E-02 9.910575E-04 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 100 2.0146 5.9859 .5986 
No 1 001 5 2.9606 9.3999 9.393E-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 100 62. 1600 31 .5375 . 3. 1 537 
No 10015 74.0935 27.81 62 .2780 . 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 100 34.3577 32. 1 967 3.21 97 
No 10015 21 .8035 27.1 233 .2710 
% American Indian Yes 1 00 .5919 2.2318 .2232 
No 10015 .4219  2.4638 2.462E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 1 00  9.6334 8.4342 .8434 
No 10015 8.0185 7.8984 7.893E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 1 00 21 .5617 1 3.5391 1 .3539 
No 10015 1 9.2101 1 3.7003 . 1369 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 100 10.9926 8.3700 .8370 
No 10015  8.9086 7.6 130 7.607E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 100 1 0. 1 983 6.0938 .6094 
No 10015 7.3361 5.4343 5.430E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 100 28.71 1 5  1 5.0685 1 .5069 
No 10015 25.7123 16.9294 · .1 692 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 1 00  35.31 1 9  17.6454 1 .7645 
No 10015 32.2991 20.0642 .2005 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 1 00 · 36. 1089 1 2. 1638 1 .2164 
No 1 0015 31 .9436 1 5.0565 . 1505 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 100 32. 1 807 1 3. 1339 1 .3134 
No 1001 5 37.8486 1 8.2532 . 1 824 
Total Persons Yes 100 5034.5900 3037.5889 303.7589 
No 10015 4413.8100 2751 .5569 27.4950 
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TABLE 4.6: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T•TEST FOR TSDF HOST AND NON-HOST TRACTS FOR EPA REGION IV 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets 
Social Capital Rate 
Environment Capital Assets 
Environmental Capital Rate 
Population Density 
Young Dependency Ratio 
Old Dependency Ratio 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 
% Industrial Labor 
% Managerial Labor. 
Mean Value of Household 
Median Gross Rent 
% Units Built Before 1 960 
% Units Built before 1 970 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 
Water Area Sq Km 
Peak Ground Acceleration 
% Hydrologic in Tract 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 
% Non-Hispanic White 
% Non-Hispanic Black 
% American Indian 
% Families 50% of Poverty 
% Families Below Poverty 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 
% Female House w/ Kids' 
% Black Female House 
% Renter Occupied Units 
% 1 8+ w/out High School 
% 1 8+ 1 year of College 
Total Persons 
















. 1 85 
. 121  
168. 1 82 .000 
1 0.350 .001 
9.51 1 .002 . 
8.960 .003 
8.470 .004 
2.047 . 1 53 
. 1 01 .751 
6.945 .008 
2.401 . 121  
8.466 .004 
1 .942 .1 64 
1 .729 . 1 89 
7.312 .007 




2.070 . 1 50 
5.872 .01 5 
2.285 . 1 31 
1 .562 .21 1 
9.1 24 · .003 
1 4.942 .000 
.224 .636 
T-Test DF (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
-1 .306 1 01 1 3 . 1 92 -373641 9 .94 2861 421 .67 
-.573 101 1 3  .567 -1 653.3983 2884.8263 
-.390 101 1 3  .696 -401 34. 1 607 1 02858.6682 
-.1 03 1 01 1 3  .91 8 -308.9507 3004.281 6 
-1 .253 1 01 1 3 .21 0 -1 1 6.3279 92.8704 
2.758�** 1 01 13  .006 3 . 1 36E-02 1 . 1 37E-02 
-1 .584 1 01 1 3 . 1 1 3  -4.81 64E-02 3.040E-02 
1 4.1 9*** 1 01 1 3  .000 .9363 6.600E-02 
2.895*** 1 01 1 3  .004 4.0645 1 .4041 
-2.83*** 1 01 1 3 .005 -4.7656 1 .681 4 
-3.00*** 1 0 1 1 3  .003 -1 4489.6588 4828.431 1 
-1 .345 10 1 1 3  . 1 79 -21 .028 1 5.629 
2.51 0*** 1 01 1 3  .01 2  5.4801 2.1 832 
2.541 *** 101 1 3  .01 1 5.9444 2.3390 
-1 .703* 1 01 1 3  .089 -27.7322 1 6.2889 
- .909 1 01 1 3  .363 -4.4981 4.9478 
4.51 9*** 1 01 1 3  .000 1 .671 236004 .369805705 
-.945 1 01 1 3  .345 -9 .3959E-03 9.94502E-03 
-1 .004 101 1 3  .31 5  -.9460 .941 9 
-4.26*** 1 0 1 1 3  .000 -1 1 .9335 2.7994 
4 .60*** 1 0 1 1 3  .000 1 2.5542 2.731 3 
.687 1 01 1 3  .492 .1 700 .2474 
2.033** 1 01 13  .042 1 .61 49 .7943 
1 .708* . 1 01 1 3  .088 2.35 1 7  1 .3767 
2.721 *** 1 01 1 3  .007 2.0841 .7659 
5.234*** 1 0 1 13  .000 2.8623 .5468 
1 .765* 1 01 1 3  .078 2.9992 1 .6996 
1 .496 1 01 1 3  . 1 35 3.01 28 2.01 42 
2.757*** 1 01 1 3  .006 4.1 653 1 .5 106 
-3. 1 0*** 1 01 1 3  .002 -5.6679 1 .8301 
2.243** 1 0 1 1 3  .025 620.7800 276.821 9 
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Host neighborhoods have a lower percentage of. college-educated adults, and a greater percentage 
of high school dropouts. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 also indicate that gender matters, with the most socially 
vulnerable gender groupings - female headed households with children, and African�American, female 
headed households - burdened unequally. Overall, there is strong and consistent statistical confirmation for 
demographic inequality arguments at the regional level and in-tract measure of environmental encumbrance. 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 feature statistical differences between environmentally affected and unaffected 
neighborhoods for EPA Region IV as a whole, at the 1 Mile concentric zone of environmental impact . Of 
social capital variables, population density (t=3.01, p=.003), the youth dependency ratio (t=2.32, p=.20), and 
old dependency ratio (t=-1. 72, p=.085) are significant. Affected neighborhoods have higher population 
density, a higher rate of dependent youth, and a lower rate of dependent elderly. At the 1 Mile zone of 
environmental impact for EPA Region IV, all economic rationality variables show non-random differences 
between affected and unaffected neighborhoods. Large quantity generator activity is powerfully positively 
related to TSDF caused environmental impact (t=14.279, p=.000). In fact, LOG presence is the sharpest 
distinguishing characteristic between affected and unaffected neighborhoods. As predicted, affected 
neighborhoods have cheaper average property prices ($55,743 versus $73,623) , higher rates of industrial 
labor (36 percent versus 32 percent), lower rates of managerial-technical labor (45 percent versus 51 
percent), and a greater percentage of older housing units. Overall, the commercial suitability argument for 
TSO installation siting appears valid. 
Again, scientific rationality measures, as a whole, behave unpredictably. Average PGA is higher, 
not lower, in affected neighborhoods, as is the average land area in square km (i.e., 50 km less). The only 
variable to unfold as expected is the percent hydrologic unit code encased in the neighborhood. Unaffected 
tracts have a greater percentage of watershed activity. Conversely, inequality variables perform strongly 
and predictably. Affected neighborhoods are unambiguously poorer, have a higher percentage of African­
Americans, and a greater percentage of female-headed households with children. Of inequality measures, 
the later variable performed sharpest, with more than 11 .5 percent of households in affected neighborhoods 
headed by women with children. 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10, compare neighborhoods within and outside 1 .5 miles to the nearest 
commercial TSO installation. Mean differences between affected and unaffected neighborhoods on social 
capital and environmental capital indicators are considerable, but statistically insignificant. Unaffected 
neighborhoods have a substantially higher environmental capital rate ($4 1 ,481 versus $3.04). 
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TABLE 4.7: MEAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 MILE FOR EPA REGION IV 
Zone 1 Mlle N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 151 2689594.27 1571 4483.73 1278826.55 
No 9964 3908876.97 286231 14.95 286747.76 
Social Capital Rate Yes 1 51 1 238.8n1 891 5. 1733 725.5065 
No 9964 1 693.0653 28900.3105 289.5247 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 151 1 7245.6093 1 96855.21 73 1601 9.8504 
No 9964 41 048.7632 1 030886.2061 10327.4683 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 151 4.5575 49.6581 4.041 1 
No 9964 31 0.6403 301 1 8. 1 292 301 .7249 . 
Population Density Yes 1 51 853.2300 882.6583 71 .8297 
No 9964 625.2017  924.3640 9.2603 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 151 .3676 . 1 209 9.842E-03 
No 9964 .3461 .1 1 30 1 . 1 32E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 1 51 .2055 . 1 221 9.934E-03 
No 9964 .2483 .3044 3.049E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 151 .9603 1 .5444 . 1257 
No 9964 . 1 915 .6338 6.350E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 151 35.7272 1 2.0670 .9820 
No 9964 32. 1461 1 3.9972 . 1402 
% Managerial Technical labor Yes 151 · 44.9135 14.0639 1 . 1445 
No 9964 50.7647 1 6.7593 . 1 679 
Mean Value of Household Yes 151 55743.0067 25668.5037 2088.8732 
No 9964 73622.5253 48274,-9n6 483.621 1  
Median Gross Rent Yes 151 337.993 1 1 3.280 9.219 
No 9964 368.526 1 56.037 1 .563 
% Units Built Before 1960 Yes 1 51 45.031 7 25.91 27 2.1087 
No 9964 31 .7922 21 .6005 .21 64 
% Units Built before 1 970 Yes 1 51 62. 1642 24.9099 2.0271 
No 9964 49.2188 23.2026 .2324 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 151 45.3333 108.0638 8.7941 
No 9964 95.3231 1 62.6669 1 .6296 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 1 51 1 . 1 321 4.3158 .3512 
No 9964 6. 1 764 49.5974 .4969 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 151  5.9701 15294 4. 1 36493725 .336623085 
No 9964 4.44542n52 3.671 474258 3.67810081 E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 1 51 2.08542E-02 6.090545E-02 4. 95641 572E-03 
No 9964 4.02203E-02 9.939530E-02 9.9574701 6E-04 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 151 1 .8086 5.3305 .4338 
No 9964 2.9685 9.41 95 9.437E-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 1 51 57.0133 34.6227 2.8176 
No 9964 74.2325 27.6862 .2774 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 1 51 39.5660 35.2979 2.8725 
No 9964 21 .6603 26.9n0 .2703 
% American Indian Yes 1 51 .5306 1 .8743 . 1 525 
No 9964 .4220 2.4694 2.474E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 151  1 1 . 1357 9.2423 .7521 
No 9964 7.9875 7.8742 7.888E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 1 51 24.7253 1 4.9200 1 .2142 
No 9964 19 . 1501 1 3.6646 . 1 369 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 1 51 · 1 2.4935 9. 1 460 .7443 
No 9964 8.8752 7.5854 7.599E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 151  1 1 .5572 6.9954 .5693 
No 9964 7.3008 5.3969 5.407E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 151 29.9702 15.4084 1 .2539 
No 9964 25.6779 1 6.9283 . 1 696 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 151 40.7676 1 9.9432 1 .6230 
No 9964 32.2010 20.01 83 .2005 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 151 37.5835 1 3.5997 1 . 1 067 
No 9964 31 .8999 1 5.041 1 . 1 507 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 151 32.2788 1 5.3695 1 .2508 
No 9964 37.8761 1 8.2454 . 1 828 
Total Persons Yes 151 431 2.6093 281 6.6015  229.21 18  
No 9964 4421 .5739 2754.21 84 27.5919 
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TABLE 4.8: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T•TEST FOR EPA REGION IV WITH AN IMPACT ZONE OF 1 MILE . 
F Sig. T-Test 
SOCIAL C�PITAL 
Social Capital Assets .734 .392 -.522 
Social Capital Rate .109 .741 -.193 
Environmental Assets .311 .577 -.284 
Environment Capital Rate .062 .804 -.125 
Population Density .086 .770 3.011 *** 
Young Dependency Ratio .092 .761 2.321 ** 
Old Dependency Ratio 3.591 .058 -1.724* 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 235.985 .000 14.279*** 
% Industrial Labor 13.294 .000 3.126*** 
% Managerial Labor 9.624 .002 -4.267*** 
Mean Value of Household 12.896 .000 -4.541 ··� 
Median Gross Rent 17.493 .000 -2.395** 
% Units Built Before 1960 22.867 .000 7.451 *** 
% Units Built before 1970 5.079 .024 6.797*** 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 25.795 .000 -3.764*** 
Water Area Sq Km 4.316 .038 -1.250 
Peak Ground Acceleration 6.854 .009 5.055*** 
% Hydrologic in Tract 8.950 .003 -2.387** 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 3.887 .049 -1.510 
% Non-Hispanic White 36.747 .000 -7.554*** 
% Non-Hispanic Black 52.206 .000 8.053*** 
% American Indian .671 .413 .538 
% Families 50% Poverty 11.421 .001 4.863*** 
% Families Below Poverty 5.219 .022 4.969*** 
% Public Assistance 1989 16.405 .000 5.798*** 
% Female House w/ Kids 39.894 .000 9.571*** 
% Black Female House 2.401 .121 3.096*** 
% Renter Occupied Units .200 .654 . 5.219*** 
% 18+ w/out High School 5.958 .015 . 4.615*** 
% 18+ 1 year of College 12.922 .000 -3.750*** 
Total Persons .005 .943 -.482 




































































































TABLE 4.9: MEAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 .5 MILES FOR EPA REGION IV 
Zone 1 .5 mlles N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 260 3610721 .57 1761 6767.23 1092545.52 
No 9855 3898061 .01 28704832.47 2891 52.33 
Social Capital Rate Yes 260 1 382.91 33 7544.9540 467.9182 
No 9855 1694.2888 29054.7943 292.6776 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 260 10806.1 038 150284.0454 9320.2208 
No 9855 41481 .9256 1036562. 7544 10441 .6056 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 260 3.0359 38.2081 2.3696 
No 9855 314.0658 30284.2291 305.0621 
Population Density Yes 260 1 1 03.3557 91 9.4186 57.01 99 
No 9855 61 6.0807 920.9899 9.2774 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 260 .3714 . 1 31 1  8.1 29E-03 
No 985? .3457 . 1 1 26 1 . 1 34E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 260 .2099 .1 178 7.305E-03 
No 9855 .2486 .3058 3.080E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 260 .7462 1 .3659 8.471 E-02 
No 9855 . 1 886 .6280 6.326E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 260 34.2751 1 1 .3156 .7018  
No 9855 32.1 448 1 4.0363 . 1414 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 260 44.5749 14.3769 .8916 
No 9855 50.8384 1 6.7650 . 1689 
Mean Value of Household Yes . 260 53679.2164 25071 .3993 1554.8622 
No 9855 73874.7275 4841 5.91 56 487.7080 
Median Gross Rent Yes 260 341 .200 1 1 1 .034 6.886 
No 9855 368.779 156.469 1 .576 
% Units Built Before 1960 Yes 260 48.6495 26.6249 1 .6512 
No 9855 31 .5503 2 1 .41 17  .21 57 
% Units Built before 1 970 Yes 260 67.1 805 24.121 1 1 .4959 
No 9855 48.9433 23.0748 .2324 
.Land Area Sq Km Yes 260 27.6275 84.8587 5.2627 
No 9855 96.3431 163.2729 1 .6447 
Water Area Sq Km Yes · 260 .7025 3.3335 .2067 
No 9855 6.2435 49.8668 .5023 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 260 5.559779671 3.8071 26992 .2361 07993 
No 9855 4.439389834 3.675751609 3. 702694E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 260 1 .28787E-02 4. 73375E-02 2.93575E-03 
No 9855 4.06449E-02 9.98604E-02 1 .0059E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 260 1 .5421 4.6164 .2863 
No 9855 2.9884 9.4630 9.532E-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 260 48.6022 36.2078 2.2455 
No 9855 74.6449 27.31 00 .2751 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 260 48.3543 37.3672 2.3174 
No 9855 21 .2304 26.5330 .2673 
% American Indian Yes 260 .4676 1 .5078 9.351 E-02 
No 9855 .4224 2.4818  2.SOOE-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 260 . 1 2.2712 9.9853 .61 93 
No 9855 7.9227 7.81 23 7.870E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 260 26.7983 1 6.3328 1 .0129 
No 9855 1 9.0337 1 3.5677 . 1 367 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 260 1 3. 1 960 9.3996 .5829 
No 9855 8.8166 . 7.5386 7.594E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 260 1 2.8104 7.4555 .4624 
No 9855 7.2207 5.3106 5.350E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 260 30. 1463 1 4.4936 .8989 
No 9855 25.6258 1 6.9583 . 1708 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 260 44.2309 20.3715  1 .2634 
No 9855 32.01 49 1 9.9395 .2009 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 260 38. 1 992 1 4.0355 .8704 
No 9855 31 .8208 1 5.0272 .1514 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 260 32.3130 1 5.6080 .9680 
No 9855 37.9371 1 8.2601 . 1839 
Total Persons Yes 260 3972.6885 2537.5050 1 57.3694 
No 9855 4431 .7470 2759.6944 27.7992 
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TABLE 4.10: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T·TEST FOR EPA REGION IV WITH AN IMPACT ZONE OF 1 .5 MILES 
F-Test Sig. T-Test DF (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
. . L : . . 
Social Capital Assets .112 .738 -.161 10113 .872 -287339.4 1789074.42 
Social Capital Rate .131 .718 -.173 10113 .863 -311.3755 1803.5848 
Environmental Assets .882 .348 -.477 10113 .633 -30675.82 64305.7441 
Environment Capital Rate .108 .742 -.166 10113 .868 -311.0299 1878.2386 
Population Density 3.242 .072 8.421*** 10113 .000 487.2750 57.8634 
Young Dependency Ratio 5.664 .017 3.610*** 10113 .000 2.566E-02 7.107E-03 
Old _ Dependency Ratio 5.453 .020 -2.036** 10113 .042 -3.86E-02 1.900E-02 
BUSINESS . RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 294.0 .000 13.499*** 10113 .000 .5575 4.130E-02 
% Industrial Labor 35.6 .000 2.426** 10113 .015 2.1302 .8779 
% Manageri� Labor 14.02 .000 -5.967*** 10113 .000 -6.2635 1.0498 
Mean Value of Household 22.6 .000 -6.702*** 10113 .000 -20195.51 3013.3354 
Median Gross Rent 29.99 .000 -2.823*** 10113 .005 -27.579 9.768 
% Units Built Before 1960 55.5 .000 12.622*** 10113 .000 17.0992 1.3547 
% Units Built before 1970 5.99 - .014 12.564*** 10113 .000 18.2373 1.4515 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 86.04 .000 -6.762*** 10113 .000 -68.7157 10.1621 
Water Area Sq Km 8.656 .003 -1.792* 10113 .073 -5.5410 3.0929 
Peak Ground Acceleration 1.89 .170 4.847*** 10113 .000 1.12039 .231163026 
% Hydrologic in Tr�ct 32.91 .000 -4.470*** 10113 .000 -2.77E-02 6.21164E-03 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 10.71 · .001 -2.457*** 10113 .014 -1.4463 .5887 
% Non-Hispanic White 111.6 .000 -15.032*** 10113 .000 -26.0427 1.7325 
% Non-Hispanic Black 162.7 .000 1 6.069*** 10113 .000 27.1238 1 .6879 
% American Indian .319 .572 .292 10113 .770 4.517E-02 .1547 
% Family 50% Poverty 48.7 .000 8.788*** 10113 .000 4.3485 .4948 
% Families Below Poverty 28.36 .000 9.056*** 10113 .000 7.7645 .8573 
% Public Assistance 1989 39.22 .000 9.181 *** . 10113 .000 4.3794 .4770 
% Female House w/ Kids 119.7 .000 16.548*** 10113 .000 5.5898 .3378 
% Black Female House 5.195 .023 4.257*** 10113 .000 4.5205 1.0618 
% Renter Occupied Units 1.903 .168 9.745*** 10113 .000 12.2160 1.2535 
% 18+ w/out High School 5.033 .025 6.767*** 10113 .000 6.3784 .9426 
% 18+ 1 year of College 15.62 .000 -4.919*** 10113 .000 -5.6241 1.1433 
Total Persons .715 .398 -2.653*** 10113 .008 -459.0586 173.0485 
* p <.1 0; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
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In fact, only six of the 260 affected neighborhoods have an environmental organization present. However, 
mean differences between affected and unaffected neighborhoods on environmental capital measures do 
not eclipse statistical error. Age-based measures of social capital potential are true to form. The youth 
dependency is positively directed (t=3.61 0, p=.000), and old dependency ratio is negatively associated with 
environmental risk (t=-2.036, p=.042) . 
. At the 1.5 Mile radius of impact, no surprises detected on economic rationality indicators .. All 
measures perform significantly and mathematical signs behaving as expected. Environmentally affected · 
neighborhoods have a larger industrial workforce (34 percent versus 32 percent), a lower percentage of 
laborers in managerial-technical occupations (44 percent versus 50 percent), more affordable private 
property ($25,071 versus $48,416) and significantly more LOG activity (.746 versus '.189). For all economic 
rationality variables, the null hypothesis of no difference between neighborhoods within and outside 1 .5 
Miles the nearest commercial TSO installation is rejected. 
On measures of the hydrologic suitably of a residential area, unaffected neighborhoods have 
greater water area in square kilometers, and significantly more watershed activity (4.06 percent versus 1.29 
percent; t= -4.470, p=.000). Once more, earthquake potential is appreciably higher in affected 
neighborhoods (5.6%g versus 4.1 %g), deepening suspicion that TSDF siting outcomes may not be 
scientifically driven as routinely claimed by industry insiders and federal regulators. 
Race, class, and gender inequality valuations show that affected neighborhoods have a higher 
percentage of African-Americans (48.4 percent versus 21.2 percent), a greater percentage of persons in 
extreme poverty (1 2 percent versus 8 percent; t=8.79, p=.000), and almost 40 percent of persons without a 
high school diploma. The sharp rise across all measures of demographic inequality as the zone of 
environmental impact is expanded to 1.5 miles is puzzling. Examination of population density figures for 
affected communities across estimates of environmental risk - in-tract; 1 mile; and 1.5 miles - shows a 
gradual increase from 513  to 853 to 1103 persons. This may provide a clue. 
Patterns of residential settlement by race reveal that African-Americans are crowded into multi­
story, high-density housing projects (Massey and Denton 1993). Many of these housing projects were 
erected during the heyday of American industrialism, when a sizable proportion of Black males were 
employed in routine production (Wilson 1 987). From coal camps to on-site factory housing, industrialists 
and state functionaries, to steady the rate of surplus extraction, induced laborers to live close to the shop 
1 01 
· floor. It is reasonable to assume this norm obtained for African-American labor. Given the persistent history 
of differential treatment of African�Americans in housing markets, it is likely such residential settlements 
remain stubbornly in place. The very high presence African-American persons within 1 .5 miles of a 
commercial TSD facility is possibly attributable to housing discrimination, Black spatial isolation and 
concentration, and historically persistent residential settlements traceable to the 20th Century long swing of 
American industrialism. Insofar as class and gender hierarchy intersect with race, the explanation for spikes 
in other inequality measures obtains. 
BIVARIATE RESULTS FOR Sue-REGIONS 
As done with descriptive statistics, EPA Region IV is subdivided into Deep South and Southern 
states, and similar tests of mean comparison are conducted. Tables 4.1 1 to 4. 1 6  present results of bivariate 
. . 
tests comparing TSDF host and non-host communities on theoretically pertinent attributes for the Deep 
South states of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Tables 4. 1 7  to 4.22 do the same for the 
Southern states of Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Again, interpretative emphasis is on . 
directionality of signs and values of significance. 
As Tables 4.1 1 to 4.1 6 uniformly indicate, at-risk neighborhoods in the Deep South have a greater 
percentage of African-Americans, a higher percentage of LQG activity, more female-headed households 
with children, and significantly higher Peak Ground Acceleration averages. Overall , the variable pool for the 
Deep South sub-region under performs. Not until the analysis is moved to the 1 .5 Mile radius of TSO 
instal lation impact do mean differences for other variables become significant. Lower population density in 
the Deep South may be behind variable underperformance. As with test results for EPA Region IV, mean 
differences between affected and _unaffected neighborhoods on the variable of percent African-American 
increases incrementally as radii of collateral damage expand to 1 .5 miles from the nearest commercial TSO 
installation (t-values =1 .85; 3 .28; and 6.09). 
At the 1 .5mile zone of TSDF impact, affected neighborhoods are characterized by higher 
population density (733 versus 449, t=3.57, p=.000), concentration of large quantity generators of hazardous 
waste (t= 8.64, p=.000), percent housing units built before 1970 (t=.289, p=.004), peak ground acceleration 
(t=2.32, p=.020), percent African-American persons (t=6.09, p=.000), percent of families living in extreme 
poverty (t=2.21 , p=.027) , percent of families at or below the official poverty line (t=2.86, p=.004), percent of 
persons on public assistance (t=2. 1 8, p=.004), percent female-headed households (t=5.98, p=.000), percent 
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TABLE 4.1 1 :  MEAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES FOR TSDF HOST AND NON-HOST TRACTS FOR DEEP SOUTH 
TSDF Host N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 45 1 91327.84 453077.47 67540.80 
No 3922 34791 59.68 351 79457.66 561739.99 
Social Capital Rate Yes 45 37.9591 79.3688 1 1 .8316 
No 3922 1 489.0797 21051 .01 49 336.1 393 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 45 .0000 .0000 .0000 
No 3922 27023.3985 7501 12.901 1 1 1 977.6837 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 45 .0000 .0000 .0000 
No 3922 5.6000 1 27.6777 2.0387 
Population Density Yes 45 387.1667 376.3852 56.1082 
No 3922 455.7494 725.241 1 1 1 .5805 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 45 .3956 8.488E-02 1 .265E-02 
No 3922 .3747 . 1 1 45 1 .828E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 45 . 1 846 9.346E-02 1 .393E-02 
No 3922 .2042 . 1 160 1 .853E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 45 1 .2444 1 .4948 .2228 
No 3922 . 1 866 .6088 9.722E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 45 34.9508 1 1 .2324 1 .6744 
No 3922 34.4024 13.9793 .2232 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 45 47.9910  14.3088 2 . 1330 
No 3922 49.0566 1 6.8484 .2690 
Mean Value of Household Yes 45 62621 .9194 28458.2 162 4242.3004 
No 3922 65621 .0142 3891 5.0916  621 .3900 
Median Gross Rent Yes 45 344.022 125.448 18.701 
No 3922 336.1 96 1 46.067 2.332 
% Units Built Before 1 960 Yes 45 29. 1021  1 7.5836 2.621 2 
No 3922 32.7753 20.5415 .3280 
% Units Built before 1970 Yes 45 48. 1320 1 9.6679 2.931 9 
No 3922 50.4629 21 .6562 .3458 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 45 84.9905 1 65.9091 24.7323 
No 3922 12 1 .6528 171 .7743 2.7429 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 45 1 .541 0  5.71 50  .8519 
No 3922 4.2626 23. 1 939 .3704 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 45 6.73301 1400 4.029371 265 .600663204 
No 3922 5.002462887 3. 181 834739 5.0807031 9E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 45 4.60481 556E-02 . 1 03736989 1 .54641 973E-02 
No 3922 4.84567183E-02 . 1 09777498 1 .75290965E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 45 1 .261 6  2.6440 .3941 
No 3922 1 .0062 2.8152 4.495E-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 45 59.01 24 30.3215 4.5201 
No 3922 67.3185 28.3803 .4532 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 45 38.6706 3 1 . 1 928 4.6499 
No 3922 30.6983 28.6910  .4581 
% American Indian Yes 45 . .2656 .4123 6.1 46E-02 
No 3922 .3260 1 .6832 2.688E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 45 9.081 1 7.3273 1 .0923 
No 3922 9. 1 704 8.7240 . 1393 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 45 20.3760 1 2.3889 1 .8468 
No 3922 2 1 . 1 1 65 14.4675 .2310 
% Public Assistance In 1 989 Yes 45 1 0.4305 7.7628 1 . 1 572 
No 3922 1 0.3347 8.291 3 . 1 324 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 45 10.05 1 8  5.3383 .7958 
No 3922 8.3659 6. 1 087 9.754E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 45 27.8175 1 2. 16 1 9  1 .8 130 
No 3922 27.6805 1 4.9732 .2391 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 45 33.5802 1 5. 1 894 2.2643 
No 3922 32.01 59 20. 1984 .3225 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 45 33.2596 1 1 .8518 1 .7668 
No 3922 33.71 96 15.0103 .2397 
% 1 8+ With 1 year of College Yes 45 35.5768 14.1929 2.1 1 58  
No 3922 36.4783 1 8.4362 .2944 
Total Persons Yes 45 5155.3778 2524.4308 376.3199 
No 3922 4167.9577 2390.81 53 38. 1762 
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TABLE 4.1 2: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T·TEST FOR HOST AND NON-HOST TRACTS FOR DEEP SOUTH STATES 
F Sig. T-Test DF . (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets 1.265 .261 -.627 3965 .531 -3287831.84 5244902.49 . 
Social Capital Rate .710 .399 -.462 3965 .644 -1451.1205 31 38.4914 
Environment Capital Assets .226 .635 -.242 3965 .809 -27023.3985 111834.1674 
Environmental Capital Rate .335 .563 -.294 3965 .769 -5.6000 1 9.0354 
Population Density 4.332 .037 -.633 3965 .527 -68.5827 108.2893 
Young Dependency Ratio 1.277 .259 1.217 3965 .224 2.083E-02 1.712E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio .313 .576 -1.129 3965 .259 -1 .9600E-02 1.736E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 62.156 .000 11.28*** 3965 .000 1.0578 9.379E-02 
% Industrial Labor 3.375 .066 .262 3965 .793 .5484 2.0917 
% Managerial Labor 1.311 .252 -.423 3965 .673 -1.0657 2.5221 
Mean Value of Household .927 .336 -.515 . 3965 .606 -2999.0948 5819.2253 
Median Gross Rent .501 .479 .358 3965 .720 7.826 21.867 
% Units Built Before 1960 ·.744 .388 -1.194 3965 .232 -3.6732 3.0751 
% Units Built before 1970 .493 .483 -.719 3965 .472 -2.3309 3.2436 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 2.515 .113 -1.424 3965 .154 -36.6623 25.7435 
Water Area Sq Km 1.538 .215 -.787 3965 .431 -2.7216 3.4591 
Peak Ground Acceleration 5.472 .019 3.616*** 3965 .000 1.730548513 .478628463 
% Hydrologic in Tract .074 .785 -.146 3965 .884 -2.40856E-03 1.64485E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons .923 .337 .606 3965 .545 .2554 .4218 
% Non-Hispanic White .452 .501 -1.95** 3965 .051 -8.3062 4.2582 
% Non-Hispanic Black 1.009 .315 1.85* 3965 .064 7.9723 4.3058 
% American Indian .193 .661 -.241 3965 .810 -6.0413E-02 .2510 
% Families 50% of Poverty .237 .627 -.068 3965 .945 -8.9317E-02 1.3058 
% Families Below Poverty .639 .424 -.342 3965 . .  732 -.7405 2.1658 
% Public Assistance in 1989 .002 .969 .077 3965 .939 9.579E-02 1.2422 
% Female House w/ Kids .035 .851 1.843* 3965 .065 1.6859 .9146 
% Black Female House 2.064 .151 .061 3965 .951 .1370 2.2406 
% Renter Occupied Units 3.713 .054 .518 3965 · .605 1.5644 3.0209 
% 18+ w/out High School 2.542 .111 -.205 3965 .838 -.4600 2.2457 
% 18+ 1 year of College 2.292 .130 -.327 3965 .744 -.9015 2.7578 
Total Persons .000 .996 2.753*** 3965 .006 · 987.4201 358.6689 
* p <.1 0; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
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TABLE 4.1 3: MEAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 MILE FOR DEEP SOUTH STATES 
Zone 1 mlle N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 55 3578052.87 15845499.44 21 36606.71 
No 3912 3439949.1 6 35176937.54 562417.21 
Social Capital Rate Yes 55 931 .7349 3883.4402 523.6430 
No 3912 1 480.2232 21073.4412 336.9272 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 55 .0000 .0000 .0000 
. No 391 2  27092.4767 751 070.021 1 1 2008.2855 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 55 .0000 .0000 .0000 
No 3912 5.6143 1 27.8405 2.0439 
Population Density Yes 55 500.0127 432.8032 58.3592 
No 3912 454.3382 725.5009 1 1 .5995 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 55 .3895 8.967E-02 1 .209E-02 
No 3912 .3748 . 1 1 45 1 .831 E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 55 .1 940 8.91 4E-02 1 .202E-02 
No 3912 .2041 . 1 1 62 1 .857E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 55 . 1 . 1 091 1 .4360 .1 936 
No 3912  . 1858 .6076 9.71 5E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 55 33.8989 1 1 . 1069 1 .4976 
No 3912 34.41 58 13.9870 .2236 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 55 47.6408 1 5.2424 2.0553 
No 3912 49.0643 16.8426 .2693 
Mean Value of Household Yes 55 61 5n.8318 29793.5805 401 7.3656 
No 3912 65643.3598 38922.8056 622.3070 
Median Gross Rent Yes 55 338.800 1 21 .944 16.443 
No 391 2  336.249 1 46. 159 2.337 
% Units Built Before 1 960 Yes 55 33.3359 1 9.9809 2.6942 
No 3912 32.7251 20.521 8 .3281 
% Units Built before 1970 Yes 55 53.5412 21 .8589 2.9474 
No 391 2  50.3928 21 .6303 .3458 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 55 70. 1 998 1 53.0733 20.6404 
No 3912 121 .9545 1 71 .8899 2.7482 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 55 1 .2629 5. 1 930 .7002 
No 3912 4.2735 23.2225 .3713 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 55 6.433386800 3.887747384 .524223750 
No 391 2  5.002251 708 3. 1 82701732 5.08857895E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 55 3. 79060364E-02 9.5249291 4E-02 1 .284341 1 8E-02 
No 3912 4.85773477E-02 .1 09891n8 1 .75697579E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 55 1 .2999 2.7258 .3675 
No 391 2 1 .0050 2.81 45 4.SOOE-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 55 54.2375 32.3645 4.3640 
No 391 2  67.4069 28.31 54 .4527 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 55 43.4035 33.6171 4.5329 
No 3912 30.61 1 4  28.61 94 .4576 
% American Indian Yes 55 .2326 .3817 5. 1 47E-02 
No 3912 .3267 1 .6853 2.694E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 55 1 0. 1 907 7.9855 1 .0768 
No 391 2  9 . 1551 8.7185 .1 394 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 55 22.6247 1 4.5578 1 .9630 
No 3912 21 .0868 14.4436 .2309 
% Public Assistance in 1989 Yes 55 1 1 .5034 8.6786 1 . 1 702 
No · 391 2  1 0.31 94 8.2789 . 1 324 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 55 1 1 .3952 6.5274 .8802 
No 3912 8.3427 6.0867 9.731 E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 55 27.8090 1 2.66 1 4  1 .7073 
No 391 2  27.6803 1 4.9740 .2394 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 55 35.2950 1 5.2701 2.0590 
No 391 2  31 .9878 20.2057 .3231 
% 1 8+ Without High School Yes 55 34.331 1 1 3. 1 681 1 .7756 
No 391 2  33.7057 1 5.0023 .2399 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 55 35.31 06 15.4682 2.0857 
No 391 2  36.4844 18.43 1 4  .2947 
Total Persons Yes 55 4883.2727 2436.3527 328.5177 
No 391 2  41 69.2592 2392.5661 38.2529 
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TABLE 4.1 4: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T-TEST FOR DEEP SOUTH STATES WITH AN IMPACT ZONE OF 1 MILE 
F Sig. T-Test DF 2-tailed Mean Std. Error 
· Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets .001 .969 .029 3965 .977 1 381 03.71 4750487.45 
Social Capital Rate . 1 34 .71 4  - . 1 93 3965 .847 -548.4883 2842.561 7 
Environment Capital Assets .277 .599 -.267 3965 .789 -27092.4767 1 01 286.851 7 · 
Environmental Capital Rate .4 1 1  .522 -.326 3965 .745 -5.61 43 1 7.2402 
Population Density 2.200 . 1 38 .466 3965 .641 45.6745 98.0788 
Young Dependency Ratio .99 1 .31 9 .949 3965 .343 1 .471 E-02 1 .551 E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio .483 .487 -.645 3965 .51 9 -1 .01 40E-02 1 .573E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 64.266 .000 1 0.86*** 3965 .000 .9233 8.504E-02 
% Industrial Labor 4.863 .027 -.273 3965 .785 -.51 69 1 .8944 
% Managerial Labor .551 .458 -.623 3965 .533 - 1 .4234 2.2841 
Mean Value of Household .509 .476 -.771 3965 .441 -4065.5279 5270.1 91 7  
Median Gross Rent .949 .330 . 1 29 3965 .898 2.551 1 9.805 
% Units Built Before 1 960 .1 96 .658 .21 9  3965 .826 .61 08 2.7856 
% Units Built before 1 970 . 1 75 .676 1 .072 3965 .284 3.1 483 2.9375 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 7. 1 40 .008 -2.22** 3965 .026 -51 .7547 23.3071 
Water Area Sq Km 2.242 . 1 34 -.961 3965 .337 -3.01 05 3.1 328 · 
Peak Ground Acceleration 4.890 .027 3.301 *** 3965 .001 1 .431 1 35092 .43360751 5  
% Hydrologic in Tract . 1 22 .727 -.7 1 6  3965 .474 - 1 .0671 E-02 1 .48963E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 1 .707 . 1 9 1  .772 3965 .440 .2949 .3820 
% Non-Hispanic White 3.962 . . 047 -3.42*** 3965 .001 - 1 3. 1 695 3.8528 
% Non-Hispanic Black 6.254 .01 2 3.283*** 3965 .001 1 2.7921 3.8961 
% American Indian .379 .538 -.41 4 3965 .679 -9.41 1 1  E-02 .2274 
% Families 50% of Poverty .365 .546 .876 3965 .381 1 .0356 1 . 1 825 
% Families Below Poverty .803 .370 .784 3965 .433 1 .5379 1 .961 4 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 1 .458 .227 1 .053 3965 .293 1 . 1 840 1 . 1 249 
% Female House w/ Kids 1 .392 .238 3.690*** 3965 .000 3.0525 .8273 
% Black Female House 1 .535 .21 6  .063 3965 .949 . 1 288 2.0293 
% Renter Occupied Units 3.707 .054 1 .209 3965 .227 3.3073 2.7356 
% 1 8+ w/out High School 1 . 1 1 8  .290 .307 3965 .759 .6254 2.0339 
% 1 8+ 1 year of College 1 .369 .242 -.470 3965 .638 -1 . 1 738 2.4976 
Total Persons . 1 45 .703 2 . 1 97** 3965 .028 7 1 4.01 35 324.9552 
* p <.1 O; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
1 06 
TABLE 4.1 5: MEAN COMPARISONS OF 'VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 .5 MILES FOR DEEP SOUTH ST ATES 
Zone 1 .5 miles N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 84 2423569.35 12887840.69 14061 78.70 
No 3883 3463892.40 35306934.09 566599.66 
Social Capital Rate Yes 84 636.8521 31 62.5590 345.0635 
No 3883 1490.6987 21 151 .6464 339.4380 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 84 756.5714 4968.6333 542.1223 
No 3883 27278.4489 753866.7594 1 2097.9253 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 84 . 1 832 1 .1815  . 1289 
No 3883 5.6523 128.3163 2.0592 . 
Population Density Yes 84 732.5593 645.7148 70.4533 
No 3883 448.9665 722.7035 1 1 .5978 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 84 .3890 . 1 1 18 1 .21 9E-02 
No 3883 .3747 .1 1 43 1 .833E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 84 . 1 979 9.456E-02 1 .032E-02 
No 3883 .2041 . 1 1 62 1 .866E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 84 .7857 1 .271 3  . 1387 
No 3883 . 1 859 .6086 9.766E·03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 84 33.0961 10.9744 1 .1974 
No 3883 34.4371 14.0073 .2248 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 84 47. 1777 15.8958 1 .7344 
No 3883 49.0849 16.8397 .2702 
Mean Value of Household Yes 84 59289.3541 29537.0251 3222.7536 
No 3883 65723.2290 38978.8506 625.5260 
Median Gross Rent Yes 84 344.286 1 24.667 1 3.602 
No 3883 336.1 1 2 1 46.271 2.347 
% Units Built Before 1960 Yes 84 35.7926 21 .4519 2.3406 
No 3883 32.6674 20.4891 .3288 . 
% Units Built before 1970 Yes 84 57. 1769 23.7141  2.5874 
No 3883 50.290? 21 .5667 .3461 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 84 47.3297 1 27.4779 13.9090 
No 3883 122.8357 1 72.2267 2.7639 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 84 .831 9 4.231 1 .4617 
No 3883 4.3053 23.3061 .3740 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 84 5.822294631 3.654301330 .398716963 
No 3883 5.004782953 3.1 85036 156 5.1 1 129176E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 84 2.553697E-02 7.876388E-02 8.593844E-03 
No 3883 4.892462E-02 . 1 1 0226959 1 .  768903E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 84 1 . 1 672 2.3692 .2585 
No 3883 1 .0057 2.8221 · 4.529E-02 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 84 47.9832 34.2126 3.7329 
No 3883 67.6406 28. 1342 .4515 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 84 49.6034 35.6432 3.8890 
No 3883 30.381 8 28.4290 .4562 
% American Indian Yes 84 .2546 .6032 6.581 E-02 
No 3883 .3269 1 .6899 2.712E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 84 1 1 .2424 8.4874 .9260 
No 3883 9. 1246 8.7090 . 1398 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 84 25.5682 16.9351 1 .8478 
No 3883 21 .01 1 6  1 4.3730 .2307 
% Public Assistance in 1989 Yes 84 12.2802 8.7466 .9543 
No 3883 10.2938 8.2704 . 1 327 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 84 12.3047 7.3610 .8031 
No 3883 8.3003 6.0456 9.702E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 84 29.6842 1 3. 1 1 35 1 .4308 
No 3883 27.6387 14.9786 .2404 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 84 37.6655 16.4742 1 .7975 
No 3883 31 .91 18  20.2043 .3242 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 84 35.4831 1 4.9570 1 .631 9 
No 3883 33.6761 14.9772 .2404 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 84 34.9835 1 6.9942 1 .8542 
No 3883 36.5002 1 8.4222 .2956 
Total Persons Yes 84 4495. 1071 2403.4969 262.2430 
No 3883 41 72.3237 2393.9735 38.4181 
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TABLE 4.1 6: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T·TEST FOR DEEP SOUTH STATES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 .5 MILES 
F Sig. T-Test DF (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets .236 .627 -.270 3965 .787 -1 040323.06 3858261 .59 
Social Capital Rate .469 .493 -.370 3965 .71 2 -853.8466 2308.6701 
Environment Capital Assets .402 .526 -.322 3965 .747 -26521 .8775 82263.7925 
Environmental Capital Rate .591 .442 -.391 3965 .696 -5 .4690 1 4.0022 
Population Density .007 .934 3.566*** 3965 .000 283 .5928 79.5333 
Young Dependency Ratio .394 .530 1 .1 38 3965 .255 1 .433E-02 1 .259E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio . 1 52 .697 - .487 3965 .626 -6.2222E-03 1 .277E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 78.941 .000 8.638*** 3965 .000 .5998 6.944E-02 
% Industrial Labor 8.455 .004 -.872 3965 .383 -1 .34 1 0  1 .5385 
% Managerial Labor .500 .480 -1 .028 3965 .304 -1 .9072 1 .8550 
Mean Value of Household .638 .424 -1 .503 3965 . 1 33 -6433.8750 4279.4965 
Median Gross Rent 1 .440 .230 .508 3965 .61 1 8 . 1 74 1 6.085 
% Units Built Before 1 960 2.878 .090 1 .382 3965 . 1 67 3 . 1 252 2.261 9 
% Units Built before 1 970 3 .694 .055 2.889*** 3965 .004 6.8863 2.3836 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 27.665 .000 -3.99*** 3965 .000 -75.5060 1 8.9035 
Water Area Sq Km 4.468 .035 -1 .365 3965 . 1 72 -3.4733 2 .5441 
Peak Ground Acceleration 4.805 .028 2.320** 3965 .020 .81 751 1 678 .35241 5905 
% Hydrologic in Tract 3.334 .068 - 1 .934** 3965 .053 -2 .3387E-02 1 .209370E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 1 . 1 35 .287 .521 3965 .603 . 1 61 5 .31 03 
% Non-Hispanic White 1 6.366 .000 -6.30*** 3965 .000 -1 9 .6574 3 . 1 1 82 
% Non-Hispanic Black 22.532 .000 6.094*** 3965 .000 1 9.221 6 3 . 1 539 
% American Indian .229 .632 - .392 3965 .695 -7 .2320E-02 . 1 847 
% Families 50% of Poverty 2 .543 . 1 1 1  2 .206** 3965 .027 2. 1 1 78 .9599 
% Families Below Poverty 7 .452 .006 2.863*** 3965 .004 4.5566 1 .591 5  
% Public Assistance in 1 989 3 .907 .048 2 . 1 75** 3965 .030 1 .9864 .91 32 
% Female House w/ Kids 1 2.'332 .000 5.976*** 3965 .000 4.0044 .6701 
% Black Female House 1 .805 . 179 1 .241 3965 .21 5  2.0455 1 .6478 
% Renter Occupied Units 2.335 . 1 27 2.591 *** 3965 .01 0  5.7537 2.2204 
% 1 8+ w/out High School .004 .948 1 .094 3965 .274 1 .8070 1 .651 7 
% 1 8+ 1 year of College .321 .571 -.748 3965 .455 -1 .51 67 · 2.0285 
Total Persons .004 .953 1 .222 3965 .222 322.7834 264.0361 
* p <.1 0; - p <.05; ••• p <.01 
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renter occupied housing units (t=2.59, p=.01 O}, and significantly smaller land area in square Km (t=-3.99, 
p=.000), and percentage of watershed overlap with census tract boundaries. Overall, the behavior of 
demographic inequality indicators in the Deep South supports the environmental justice movement 
accusation that socially marginalized strata of the population shoulder a disproportionate share of hazardous 
waste facilities. Environmentally compromised neighborhoods in the Deep South (1 .5 Mile zone of impact} 
are undeniable impoverished and Black. 
As Tables 4.1 1 ,  4.13, and 4.1 5 reveal, the Deep South is almost completely void of environmental 
capital assets. Not one of the 55 affected neighborhoods at the 1 Mile radius measure of environmental risk, 
has an environmental organization. Of the 84 at-risk neighborhoods at the 1 .5 Mile measure of 
environmental impact, only two have an environmental organizational presence. Though notable 
analytically, the absence of environmental organizations in the Deep South is irrelevant statistically. · Mean 
differences between affected and unaffected neighborhoods could be a function of statistical chance. 
The picture of environmental risk is considerably different for the Southern States of Florida, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Whereas economic rationality variables perform relatively 
poorly in the Deep South, they hop off the page for the Southern sub-region . As Tables 4. 1 7  and 4.1 8 
indicate, host communities are significantly different than non-host communities on every measure of 
economic suitability for TSDF operations. Host communities are characterized by higher LOG activity 
(t=9. 1 5, p=.000) ,  a greater percentage of the workforce in industrial occupations (t=3.51 , p=.000), private 
property that is , on average, $22,500 dollars cheaper, and a higher percentage of homes built in decades 
past (see Table 4. 1 9  and 4.20 for descriptive statistics). 
Estimates of social capital, across spatial measures of environmental risk, show sizable mean 
differences between affected and unaffected neighborhoods, but none that rise above statistical error. 
Again, at whatever spatial operationalization of environmental hazard, differences on environmental capital 
assets and rates are large, but insignificant statistically. It may be fruitful to probe these manifest differences 
qualitatively. 
On scientific rationality variables, as with the Deep South, affected communities in the South have 
higher average peak ground acceleration figures, smaller land area in square km, and larger percentages of 
watershed overlap. As Table 4.21 and 4.22 show, neighborhoods within 1 .5 miles of a commercial TSO 
installation are more suitable on hydrologic criteria (.006 percent versus 3.5 percent; t=-4.09, p=.000), than 
neighborhoods outside this zone of impact. Overall, t-test results on scientific rationality variables for 
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TABLE 4.1 7: MEAN COMPAR ISONS OF VARIABLES ON TSDF HOST COMMUNITIES FOR SOUTHERN STATES 
TSDF Host N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 55 1 9 1 085.55 37481 8.32 50540.49 
No 6093 421 6280. 18 23430630.36 3001 70.76 
Social Capital Rate Yes 55 58.4566 1 62.01 97 21 .8467 
No 6093 1 840.0918 32902.8644 421 .5199 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 55 1 738.2545 1 2891 .2407 1 738.2545 
No 6093 501 44.8533 1 1 73280.5261 15030.9446 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 55 .3176 2.3554 .31 76 
No 6093 504.5015  3851 4.7798 493.4144 
Population Density Yes 55 616.7326 692. 1788 93.3334 
No 6093 741 .761 9  1 020.5686 1 3.0745 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 55 .3626 . 1 1 79 1 .590E-02 
No 6093 .3276 . 1 085 1 .390E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 55 .2125 . 1 593 2.1 48E-02 
No 6093 .2764 .3753 4.808E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 55 1 .0364 1 .6326 .2201 
No 6093 . 1 983 .66 1 3  8.473E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 55 37.2655 1 0.5176 1 .4182 
No 6093 30.7156 1 3.821 3 . 1 n1 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 55 44.2963 1 1 .9765 1 .6 149 
No 6093 51 .7981 1 6.6201 .21 29 
Mean Value of Household Yes 55 56053.3467 21 635.7484 291 7.3637 
No 6093 78569.751 8 52738.7546 675.6383 
Median Gross Rent Yes 55 349.891 1 1 4.492 1 5.438 
No 6093 388.928 1 58.425 2.030 
% Units Built Before 1 960 Yes 55 44.21 78 24.44 1 8  3.2957 
No 6093 31 .3952 22.41 87 .2872 
% Units Built before 1 970 Yes 55 6 1 . 1 604 24.8735 3.3539 
No 6093 48.6390. 24.2304 .3104 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 55 52.4965 83. 1 n3 1 1 .2 1 56 
No 6093 77.5990 1 53.6047 1 .9678 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 55 1 .7345 4.8498 .6539 
No 6093 7.3576 60.6077 .7764 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 55 5.623722369 4. 7681 22730 .642933538 
No 6093 4.0971 24543 3.91 3660490 5.013806E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 55 1 .801 1 80E-02 2.534834E-02 3.4 1 7970E-03 
No 6093 3.45961 7E-02 9. 1 31 1 46E-02 1 . 1 69794E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 55 2.6307 7.6899 1 .0369 
No 6093 4.21 86 1 1 .6662 . 1 495 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 55 64.7352 32.5470 4.3886 
No 6093 78.4544 26.5499 .3401 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 55 30.8290 32.8557 4.4303 
No 6093 16.0780 24.4080 .31 27 
% American Indian Yes 55 .8589 2.9719  .4007 
No 6093 .4836 2.8540 3.656E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 55 1 0.0853 9.2847 1 .2520 
No 6093 1.2n1 7.2221 9.252E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 55 22.531 9 14.4524 1 .9488 
No 6093 17.9829 13.0375 . 1 670 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 55 1 1 .4525 8.8802 1 . 1 974 
No 6093 7.9906 6.9908 8.956E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 55 1 0.31 82 6.6953 .9028 
No 6093 6.6732 4.8378 6.1 98E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 55 29.4430 17. 1 623 2.3142 
No 6093 24.4454 1 7.9644 .2301 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 55 36.7288 1 9.4498 2.6226 
No 6093 32.4814 1 9.9769 .2559 
% 18+ Without High School Yes 55 38.4401 12.021 0 1 .6209 
No 6093 30.8004 14.9764 . 1 9 1 9  
% 18+ With .1 year of College Yes 55 29.4021 1 1 .6033 1 .5646 
No 6093 38.7306 18.081 1 .2316 
Total Persons Yes 55 4935.7636 3420.7238 461 .2503 
No 6093 4572.0625 2949.9705 37.7922 
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TABLE 4.1 8: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T-TEST HOST AND NON-HOST TRACTS FOR SOUTHERN. STATES 
F Sig. T-Test DF (2-tai led) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets 4.873 .027 -1 .274 61 46 .203 -40251 94.64 31 59643.83 
Social Capital Rate .488 .485 -.402 61 46 .688 -1 781 .6352 4436.9795 
Environment Capital Assets .361 .548 -.306 61 46 .760 -48406.5987 1 58217.9524 
Environmental Capital Rate .037 .847 -.097 61 46 .923 -504. 1 839 51 93.7505 
Population Density 2 .440 .1 1 8  -.907 61 46 .365 -1 25.0293 1 37.9048 
Young Dependency Ratio .741 .389 2.379** 61 46 .01 7 3.498E-02 1 .471 E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio 2.220 . 1 36 -1 .261 ' 61 46 .207 -6.3867E-02 5.065E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 1 07.341 .000 9. 1 54*** 61 46 .000 .8381 9.1 56E-02 
% Industrial Labor 6.337 .012 3.505*** 61 46 .000 6.5499 1 .8686 
% Managerial Labor 1 0.925 .001 -3.34*** 61 46 .001  -7.50 1 8  2.2464 
Mean Value of Household 8.249 .004 -3. 1 6*** 61 46 .002 -2251 6.4051 71 1 7. 1 684 
Median Gross Rent 8.451 .004 -1 .823* 61 46 .068 -39.038 21 .41 3 
% Units Built Before 1 960 2 . 191 . 1 39 4.21 9*** 61 46 .000 1 2.8226 3.0391 
% Units Built before 1 970 .305 .581 3.81 4*** 61 46 .000 1 2.521 4 3.2827 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 4.468 .035 - 1 .21 0 61 46 .226 -25. 1 025 20.7406 
Water Area Sq Km 1 .469 .226 -.688 61 46 .491 -5.6231 8.1 732 
Peak Ground Acceleration 2.777 .096 2.874*** 61 46 .004 1 .526597826 .531 220986 
% Hydrologic in Tract 5.257 .022 -1 .346 61 46 . 1 78 - 1 .6584E-02 1 .231 76E-02 
RACE, CLASS,· GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 1 .473 .225 -1 .007 6 146 .31 4 -1 .5879 1 .5762 
% Non-Hispanic White 1 0.600 .001 -3.81 *** 61 46 .000 -1 3.71 92 3.6040 
% Non-Hispanic Black 1 8.463 .000 4.446*** 61 46 .000 1 4.751 0 3.31 78 
% American Indian 2.208 . 1 37 .970 61 46 .332 .3752 .3867 
% Families 50% of Poverty 2.332 . 1 27 2.863*** 61 46 .004 2.8082 .981 0 
% Families Below Poverty . 1 83 .669 2.573*** 61 46 .01 0 4.5490 1 .7677 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 4.688 .030 3.646*** 61 46 .000 3.4620 · .9494 
% Female House w/ Kids. 1 4.661 .000 5.541 *** 61 46 .000 3.6451 .6579 
% Black Female House .71 5 .398 2.055** 61 46 .040 4.9976 2.4323 
% Renter Occupied Units .029 .866 1 .570 61 46 . 1 1 6  4.2474 2.7052 
% 1 8+ w/out High School 5.541 · .01 9 3.772*** 61 46 .000 7.6397 2.0253 
% 1 8+ 1 year of College 1 6.01 3 . .000 -3.82*** 61 46 .000 -9.3285 2.4427 
Total Persons .431 .51 2 .909 61 46 · .363 363.701 1 400.1 697 
* p <. 1 0; - p <.05; *** p <.01 
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TABLE 4.1 9: M EAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 MILE FOR SOUTHERN STATES 
Zone 1 mile N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Social Capital Assets Yes 96 21 80581 .53 15699530.69 1 602326.64 
No 6052 421 1 990.92 234291 99.87 301 167.43 
Social Capital Rate Yes 96 141 4.8440 10809. 1 123 1 1 03.2004 
No 6052 1 830.6460 32986.7503 424.0236 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 96 27125.9063 246812.6784 251 90.2135 
No 6052 50070.0773 1 1 76848.5784 151 27.6381 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 96 7.1 686 62.2467 6.3530 
No 6052 507.8085 38645.0208 496.7571 
Population Density Yes 96 1 055.5941 1005.0106 102.5735 
No 6052 735.6475 1017.6334 13.0810  
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 96 .3551 . 1345 1 .373E-02 
No 6052 .3275 . 1081 1 .390E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 96 .2 122 .1 374 1 .403E-02 
No 6052 .2768 .3765 4.839E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 96 .8750 1 .6043 . 1 637 
No 6052 . 1 951 .6503 8.359E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 96 36.n47 12.5200 1 .2n8 
No 6052 30.6790 13.8078 . 1 775 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 96 43.3509 13. 1 708 1 .3442 
No 6052 51 .8639 16.6142 .2136 
Mean Value of Household Yes 96 52400.1 381 22466.8287 2293.01 1 1  
No 6052 78780.2410 52822.0938 678.9943 
Median Gross Rent Yes 96 337.531 108.667 1 1 .091 
No 6052 389.389 158.657 2.039 
% Units Built Before 1960 Yes 96 51 .7324 26.6216 2.7171 
No 6052 3 1 . 1 892 22.2508 .2860 
% Units Built before 1 970 Yes 96 67. 1046 25.3068 2.5829 
No 6052 48.4599 24. 1359 .3103 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 96 31 .0869 67.5025 6.8894 
No 6052 78. 1 087 153.9988 1 .9796 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 96 1 .0571 3.7503 .3828 
No 6052 7.4064 60.8098 .7817 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 96 5. 704699327 4.269639252 .435768231 
No 6052 4.085497924 3.913726155 5.030845E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 96 1 .  1 08496E-02 2.086447E-02 2.1 29471E-03 
No 6052 3.481 840E-02 9.1 57979E-02 1 . 1n199E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 96 2. 1000 6.3566 .6488 
No 6052 4.2378 1 1 .6990 . 1504 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 96 58.6037 35.921 1 3.6662 
No 6052 78.6446 . 26.3494 .3387 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 96 37.3675 36.2146 3.6961 
No . 6052 1 5.8744 24.1574 .3105 
% American Indian Yes 96 .7014  2.3202 .2368 
No 6052 .4836 2.8627 3.680E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 96 1 1 .6772 9.8901 1 .0094 
No 6052 7.2328 7. 1 769 9.225E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 96 25.9288 15.0665 1 .5377 
No 6052 1 7.8982 12.9849 . 1 669 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 96 1 3.0607 · 9.4008 .9595 
No 6052 7.941 6 6.9439 8.926E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 96 1 1 .6501 7.2818 .7432 
No 6052 6.6273 4.7808 6.1 45E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 96 31 .2083 16.7 181  1 .7063 
No 6052 24.3836 17.9624 .2309 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 96 43.9030 21 .6375 2.2084 
No 6052 32.3389 19.8968 .2558 
· % 18+ Without High School Yes 96 39.4469 13.5585 1 .3838 
No 6052 30.7327 14.951 8 . 1 922 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 96 30.5418 15. 1 1 97 1 .5432 
No 6052 38.7758 18.0688 .2323 
Total Persons Yes 96 3985.6667 2975.8323 303.71 96  
No 6052 4584.6695 . 2953.3492 37.9634 
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TABLE 4.20: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T·TEST FOR SOUTHERN STATES AT IMPACT ZONE 1 MILE 
F Sig. T-Test OF (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCiAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets 1.952 .162 -.846 6146 .397 -2031409.39 2399838.44 
· Social Capital Rate .035 .851 -.123 6146 .902 -415.8020 3369.8024 
Environment Capital Assets .145 .704 -.191 6146 .849 -22944.1711 120162.6884 
Environmental Capital Rate .064 .801 -.127 6146 .899 -500.6399 3944.5068 
Population Density .714 .398 3.057*** 6146 .002 319.9466 104.6623 
Young Dependency Ratio 2.027 .155 2.468*** 6146 .014 2.756E-02 1.117E-02 
C>ld Dependency Ratio 3.866 .049 -1.682* 6146 .093 -6.4687E-02 3.847E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 174.353 .000 9.786*** 6146 .000 .6799 6.947E-02 
% Industrial Labor 7.400 .007 4.297*** 6146 .000 6.0957 1.4184 
% Managerial Labor 11.002 .001 -4.99*** 6146 .000 -8.51 30 1.7042 
Mean Value of Household 14.001 .000 -4.89*** 6146 .000 -26380.1028 5399.2151 
Median Gross Rent 17.877 · .000 -3.19*** 6146 .001 -51.858 16.254 
% Units Built Before 1960 14.277 .000 8.945*** 6146 .000 20.5432 2.2965 
% Units Built before 1970 1.550 .213 7.504*** 6146 .000 18.6447 2.4847 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 16.535 .000 -2.99*** 6146 .003 -47.0218 15.7424 
Water Area Sq Km 3.028 .082 -1.023 6146 .306 -6.3493 6.2071 
Peak Ground Acceleration 1.910 .167 4.016*** 6146 .000 1.619201403 .403189846 
% Hydrologic in Tract · 13.520 .000 -2.54*** 6146 .011 -2.3733E-02 9.35138E-03 
RACE, CLASS, GENDE� 
% Hispanic Persons 5.354 .021 -1.786* 6146 .074 -2.1378 1.1969 
% Non-Hispanic White . 44.496 .000 -7.35*** 6146 .000 -20.0410 2.7284 % Non-Hispanic Black 70.430 .000 8.57*** 6146 .000 21.4931 . 2.5089 
% American Indian 1.227 .268 .742 6146 .458 .2178 .2937 
% Families 50% of Poverty 17.900 .000 5.98*** 6146 .000 4.4444 .7434 
% Families Below Poverty 5.149 .023 5.99*** 6146 .000 8.0306 1.3393 
% Public Assistance in 1989 22.638 · .000 7.121 *** 6146 .000 5.1191 .7189 
% Female House w/ Kids 65.425 .000 10.11*** 6146 .000 5.0227 .4968 
% Black Female House 1.314 .252 3.697*** 6146 .000 6.8248 1.8458 
% Renter Occupied Units 2.699 .100 5.642*** 6146 .000 11.5641 2.0496 
% 18+ w/out High School 4.714 .030 5.673*** 6146 .000 8 .7142 1.5359 
% 18+ 1 year of College 13.626 .000 -4.44*** 6146 .000 -8.2339 1.8544 
Total Persons .089 .766 -1.971** 6146 .049 -599.0029 303.8421 
* p <.1 0; - p <.05; *** p <.01 
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TABLE 4.21 : MEAN COMPARISONS OF VARIABLES AT IMPACT ZONE OF 1 .5 MILES FOR SOUTHERN STATES 
. Zone 1 .5 miles N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
· Social Capital Assets Yes 176 417731 6.94 1 9481,843. 10  1468499. 1 8  
No 5972 41 80357.85 23433843.67 303238.00 
Social Capital Rate Yes 176 1738.9879 · 8894.5254 670.4501 
No 5972 1826.6632 33200. 1 094 429.6152 
Environmental Capital Assets Yes 176 15602.4716  1 82600.4202 1 3764.0246 
No 5972 5071 7.0395 1 1 84691 .3366 1 5330.1 1 1 5 
Environmental Capital Rate Yes 176 4.3974 46.4130 3.4985 
No 5972 514.5966 38902.9993 503.41 1 6  
Population Density Yes 1 76 1280.3267 977.6727 73.6949 
No 5972 724.7385 101 5.0322 1 3. 1347 
Young Dependency Ratio Yes 176 .3630 . 1 389 1 .047E-02 
No 5972 .3269 . 1074 1 .390E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio Yes 176 .21 57 . 1 272 9.592E-03 
No 5972 .2776 .3787 4.900E-03 
Large Quantity Generators Yes 176 .7273 1 .4120 . 1064 
No 5972 . 1 904 .6404 8.286E-03 
% Industrial Labor Yes 1 76 34.8378 1 1 .4629 .8640 
No 5972 30.6544 1 3.8542 . 1 793 
% Managerial Technical Labor Yes 1 76 43.3326 1 3.4634 . 1 .0148 
No 5972 . 51 .9785 1 6.61 88 .21 50 
Mean Value of Household Yes 176 51 001 .6507 22230.3747 1675.6775 
No 5972 791 74.8394 53003.6928 685.8770 
Median Gross Rent Yes 1 76 339.727 1 04.250 7.858 
No 5972 390.01 9 1 59.213  2.060 
% Units Built Before 1 960 Yes 176 54.7857 · 26.7148 2.0137 
No 5972 30.8240 21 .9620 .2842 
% Units Built before 1 970 Yes 1 76 71 .9550 22.8785 1 .7245 
No 5972 48.0672 23.9658 .3101 
Land Area Sq Km Yes 1 76 1 8.2241 51 .71 84 3.8984 
No 5972 79. 1 1 76 1 54.7783 2.0029 
Water Area Sq Km Yes 1 76 .6407 2.8183 .2124 
No 5972 7.5038 6 1 .2099 .7921 
Peak Ground Acceleration Yes 1 76 5.434488440 3.881881061 .292607795 
No 5972 4.071 770698 3.91 9080609 5.071 358E-02 
% Hydrologic in Tract Yes 1 76 6.837295E-03 1 .61 395477E-02 1 .216564E-03 
No 5972 3.526151 E-02 9.21 1 02633E-02 1 . 1 91 922E-03 
% Hispanic Persons Yes 1 76 1 .721 0  5.3646 .4044 
No 5972 4.2n6 1 1 .7637 . 1 522 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons Yes 176 48.8976 37.2137 2.8051 
No 5972 79. 1 991 25.7605 .3333 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons Yes 176 47.7581 38.2475 2.8830 
No 5972 15.2803 23.3773 .3025 
% American Indian Yes 1 76 .5693 1 .1n6 . 1 340 
No 5972 .4846 2.8807 3.728E-02 
% Families 50% Below Poverty Yes 1 76 12.7623 1 0.6136 .8000 
No · 5972 7. 1 41 3  7.0612  9.1 37E-02 
% Families at or Below Poverty Yes 1 76 27.3853 1 6.0532 1 .2101 
No 5972 11.14n 1 2.8563 . 1 664 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 Yes 176 1 3.6331 9.6893 .7304 
No 5972 7.8562 6.8540 8.869E-02 
% Female Household w/ Kids Yes 1 76 1 3.051 8 7.5090 .5660 
No 5972 6.5187 4.6401 6.004E-02 
% Black Female Household Yes 1 76 30.3669 1 5. 1 388 1 . 141 1 
No 5972 24.3170 1 8.0108 .2331 
% Renter Occupied Units Yes 1 76 47.3643 21 .3287 1 .60n 
No 5972 32.081 9 1 9.7669 .2558 
% 1 8+ Without High School Yes 1 76 39.4956 1 3.4246 1 .01 1 9  
No 5972 30.61 45 1 4.9378 .1 933 
% 18+ With 1 year of College Yes 176 31 .0385 1 4.7821 1 . 1 1 42 
No 5972 38.8714  1 8.0943 .2341 
Total Persons Yes 1 76 3723.3523 2568.31 47 1 93.5940 
No 5972 4600.4243 2961 .4787 38.3220 
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TABLE 4.22: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST FOR SOUTHERN STATES AT IMPACT ZONE 1 .5 MILES 
F Sig. T-Test OF (2-tailed) Mean Std. Error 
Difference Difference 
SOCIAL CAPITA� 
Social Capital Assets .005 .946 -.002 6146 .999 -3040.91 1784334.05 
Social Capital Rate .014 .905 -.035 6146 .972 -87.6753 2505.3810 
Environment Capital Assets .598 .439 -.393 6146 .694 -351 14.5679 89337.6057 
Environmental Capital Rate .120 .729 -.174 6146 .862 -510.1992 2932.6555 
Population Density .874 .350 7.164*** 6146 .000 555.5882 77.5503 
Young Dependency Ratio 8.122 .004 4.348*** 6146 .000 3.6O6E-02 8.294E-03 
Old Dependency Ratio 6.921 .009 -2.164** 6146 .030 -6.1889E-02 2.859E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 208.396 .000 10.41 *** 6146 .000 .5369 5.160E-02 
% Industrial Labor 24.443 .000 3.97*** 6146 .000 4.1833 1.0548 
% Managerial Labor 16.497 .000 -6.84*** 6146 .000 -8.6459 1.2648 
Mean Value of Household 25.219 .000 -7.03*** 6146 .000 -281 73.1887 4005.9056 
Median Gross Rent 30.935 .000 -4.16*** 6146 .000 -50.292 12.077 
% Units Built Before 1960 30.862 .000 14.17*** 6146 .000 23.9617 1.6911 
% Units Built before 1970 .152 .696 13.05*** 6146 .000 23.8878 1.8306 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq .Km 51.822 .000 -5.21 *** 6146 .000 -60.8935 11.6868 
Water Area Sq Km 6.240 .013 -1.487 6146 .137 -6.8631 4.6144 
Peak Ground Acceleration .004 .952 4.55*** 6146 .000 1.3627177 43 .299652593 
% Hydrologic in Tract 33.165 .000 -4.09*** 6146 .000 -2.8424E-02 6.9467 4E-03 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 14.814 .000 -2.87*** 6146 .004 -2 .5565 .8895 
% Non-Hispanic White 124.552 .000 -15.2*** 6146 .000 -30.3015 2.0004 
% Non-Hispanic Black 214.725 .000 17.75*** 6146 .000 32.4779 1.8301 
% American Indian .388 .533 .388 6146 .698 8�472E-02 .2184 
% Families 50% of Poverty 73.649 .000 10.23*** 6146 .000 5.6210 .5496 
% Families Below Poverty 26.284 .000 9.73*** 6146 .000 9.6377 .9911 
% Public Assistance in 1989 54.509 · .000 10.87*** 6146 .000 5.7769 .5316 
% Female House w/ Kids 161.281 .000 17.99*** 6146 .000 6.5331 .3630 
% Black Female House 4.626 .032 4.410*** 6146 .000 6.0499 1.3717 
% Renter Occupied Units 4.330 .037 10.09*** 6146 .000 15.2824 1.5153 
% 18+ w/out High School 6.459 .011 7.795*** 6146 .000 8.881 1 1.1393 
% 18+ 1 year of College 19.865 .000 -5.69*** 6146 .000 -7.8329 1.3773 
Total Persons 2.497 .114 -3.89*** 6146 .ooo . -877.0720 225.6946 
* p <.1 0; .. p <.05; ... p <.01 
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Southern states are mixed. Measures of hydrologic suitability behave predictably on directionality, but 
measures of seismology play in the opposite direction hypothesized. Bivariate test results suggest that 
commercial TSO installations are more likely to appear in relatively more dangerous earthquake zones than 
not, partially disconfirming the scientific rationality argument. 
As for demographic variables in the South, we find strong bivariate confirmation of the inequality 
hypothesis. As in the Deep South and EPA Region IV as whole, environmentally burdened neighborhoods 
have a significantly higher percentage of African-Americans. At the 1 .5mile zone of environmental impact, 
the variable of percent non-Hispanic Black emerges as the most important distinguishing feature between 
affected and unaffected neighborhoods (48 percent versus 1 5  percent; t=1 7 .75, p=.000). At this distance 
from the nearest commercial TSO installation, the percentage of African Americans in a neighborhood 
surpasses the explanatory power of au economic rationality variables, including the consistently strong LOG 
activity measure. As for other inequality indicators,_ affected neighborhoods in the South, at every spatial 
measure of TSDF impact, are unvaryingly poor and uneducated. Impacted areas have higher rates of family 
poverty, rates of public assistance, and larger percentages of female-headed households. 
SUMMARY OF T-TEST RESULTS 
Table 4.23 is a summary of all tests of mean comparison. Emphasis is placed on directionality and 
statistical significance. Only those variables significant at the . 1 0  level or better are indicated. Beginning 
with measures of social capital, we find no statistically significant differences between TSDF host and nori­
host neighborhoods on social capital assets and rates, as well as environmental capital assets and rates. 
Again, differences on civic vitality, as measured by nonprofit organization counts, are large but insignificantly 
related to TSDF presence. Popula_tion density and age dependency ratios perform decently. 
Population density is significant in five of the nine t-tests conducted. However, the density variable 
behaves in the theoretically incorrect direction. Two reasons for the surprise: 1 )  commercial TSO 
installations are said to locate to rural, sparsely populated areas (Oakes 1 997), and 2) population density is 
said to enhance social intercourse, build trust, and increase social capital potential (Fukuyama 1 995; 
Durkheim 1 933) . The old dependency ratio is significant in four of nine tests, and the youth dependency 
ratio is significant in six of nine tests. Mathematical signs for both dependency ratios behave as predicted. 
Overall, environmentally burdened neighborhoods in EPA Region IV, the Deep South, and South, have 
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TABLE 4.23: SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIRCANT VARIABLES FROM INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TESTS FOR THE DEEP SOUTH, SOUTH, AND EPA REGION IV 
Deep South Deep South · ·_ Deep South . South South - South EPA IV -EPA IV EPA 
SOCIAL CAPITAL I TSDF 1 Mlle , 1.5 MIies TSDF 1 Mlle 1 .5 MIies TSDF 1 Mlle 1 .5 MIies 
Social Capital Assets 
Social Capital Rate 
Environmental Assets 
Environment Capital Rate 
Population Density 
I 
+ + + + + 
Young Dependency Ratio + + + + + + 
Old Dependency Ratio 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
large Quantity Generators 
I 
+ + + + + + + + + 
% Industrial Labor + + + + + + 
% Managerial Labor 
Mean Value of Household 
Median Gross Rent 
% Units Built Before 1 960 
I 
+ + + + + + 
....., % Units Built before 1 970 + + + + + + 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
land Area Sq Km 
Water Area Sq Km 
Peak Ground Acceleration I + + + + + + + + + 
% Hydrologic in Tract 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% Hispanic Persons 
% Non-Hispanic White 
% Non-Hispanic Black I + + + + + + + + + 
% American Indian 
% Family 50% Poverty + + + + + + + 
% Families Below Poverty + + + + + + + 
% Public Assistance 1 989 + + + + + + + 
% Female House w/ Kids + + + + + + + + + 
% Black Female House + + + + + + 
% Renter Occupied Units + + + + + 
% 1 8+ w/out High School + + + + + + 
% 1 8+ 1 year of College 
Total Persons I + + + 
higher population density, a lower percentage of workforce inactive elderly, and a higher percentage of 
workforce inactive youth. 
Business rationality measures do much better than social capital variables. LOG presence is 
consistently the distinguishing feature between environmentally burdened and unburdened neighborhoods. 
On this neighborhood characteristic, differences are significant in all tests. Weber's theory of cost 
minimization appears correct. Commercial TSO installations gravitate to areas with heavy LOG activity, 
cheaper land, and suitably skilled labor. In all tests, but the Deep South, the business rationality variables 
behave as predicted - unaffected neighborhoods are shielded by higher property values, higher rates of 
managerial-technical labor, and physically younger neighborhoods. Overall, patterns of land use in EPA 
Region IV, and the sub-regions of the South and Deep South, are shaped strongly be commercial interests, 
even land uses for environmentally risky technologies as TSO installations. 
Differences between host and non-host neighborhoods on scientific rationality estimates are mixed. 
Peak ground acceleration is the strongest performing variable among scientific rationality measures. Host 
communities have, invariably, higher seismological risk. This finding of non-random earthquake risk is a 
punishing blow to industry and state claims that TSO installation siting is a scientific matter. Land area in 
square km is significant in six of nine tests. Predictions, culled from the scientific literature, on the behavior 
of this variable were incorrect. Land area in square km is negatively related to TSDF location outcomes. 
The hydrology variables performed as predicted, with environmentally affected neighborhoods having less 
water area in square km, and less watershed overlap. Apparent TSDF indifference to seismology is 
potentially offset by consideration of human water sources in location outcomes. 
As for demographic inequality, host communities are disproportionately African-American, poverty 
stricken, less educated, and have a higher percentage of female-headed households with children. 
Bivariate results, almost uniformly, confirm the environmental inequality hypothesis. The Southeast remains 
a place of disproportionate dumping of toxic hazards by race, class, and gender. The theoretical guess 
provided the literature by the Robert Bullard and wife Linda McKeever in the early 1 980s on discriminatory 
outcomes obtain years later. 
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METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Bivariate comparisons are the first stage in this dissertation's evaluation of competing explanations 
for the distribution of commercial TSO installations in the Southeastern United States. Bivariate test results 
are important, but possibly misleading. Bivariate comparisons, if done correctly, could meet the first two 
. conditions of probabilistic causation - time-order and association. To meet the third condition in non­
experimental research - elimination of alternative explanations - one must exercise statistical control. For 
example, suppose we determine statistically the placement of a commercial TSO installation in Tennessee is 
correlated positively with the percentage of African-Americans living in the area. Now, suppose we have 
reason to believe that the observed correlation between race and toxic exposure may be caused or 
influenced by the variable of economic class. This requires we retest the original relationship, controlling for 
the influence of class. This can be achieved by dividing our unit of analysis into economic class categories, 
and examining the original association between X and Y in each category separately. If results indicate the 
covariance insignificant, we can conclude the original association between the placement of an undesirable 
land-use and race as spurious. By dividing our unit of analysis into separate categories ·to measure the 
effect of X (race) on Y (placement), net the effect of Z (economic class), we are exercising what scientists 
call statistical control. 
Multivariate comparisons are required to determine if neighborhood characteristics are related to 
TSO installation location, net other controlled characteristics. Because TSO installation presence or 
absence is measured nominally, bivariate logistic regression is a suitable statistical methodology. The 
logistic regression tables asses whether or not, social capital, economic rationality, scientific rationality, and 
demographic inequality variables, are good predictors of TSO installation siting, net all variables. 
Unlike regular multiple regression, the logistic regression method makes no assumption about the 
scattering of independent variables. Predictors do not have to be normally distributed, nor related linearly to 
the response variable. Logistic regression does require safeguard against high variable inter-correlation. 
Use of highly correlated variables in model specification could artificially inflate or deflate relations between 
predictors and the response variable. To guarantee conformity with this requirement, a correlation matrix 
was created. Following Allison's (1999: 141) advise, independent variables were dropped from the analysis 
if correlated highly (i.e., .650) with other variables. Decisions about which variable to drop were guided 
analytic economy and theoretical considerations. For example, the variable of managerial-technical labor 
rate was dropped from the analysis because of high collinearly with: industrial labor rate (-.876); housing 
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price ( .653) ;  percent high school dropout (- .852); percent college educated (.886); and percent of families at 
or below the poverty line (-.61 8) . .  Removal of the managerial-technical labor rate does not significantly 
compromise the economic rationality argument. Similar decisions were made for other variables. 
Like t-tests above, binary logistic regression models were run for EPA Region IV as whole and the 
sub-regions of the Deep South and South, at three approximations of spatial risk. Each table presents 
results for fully satu rated and reduced models, with variables marked for statistical significance. The 
Backward Wald Test was used to taper the cluster of variables to achieve predictive parsimony. Tapered 
models generally explain. less variation in the response variable, but have the analytic advantage of 
interpretive simplicity. Again, interpretative emphasis is on mathematically sign and level of statistical 
significance. Below is the revised diagrammatic model of the argument, and re-articulation of variable 
definition statements (see Table 4.24; Figure 4.1 ). 
BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EPA REGION IV1 
Beginning with Table 4.25 , commercial TSO installation presence in EPA Region IV is predicted by 
the following neighborhood characteristics: social capital assets, population density, large quantity 
generator activity, age of physical neighborhood, size of land area, area seismology, total persons, and the 
percentage of African-Americans. All hypotheses are partially confirmed. 
Beginning with social capital variables, the social capital assets available to a community is 
negatively related to TSDF presence. Meaning, the more social capital assets a community possesses, the 
greater the likelihood that community is unburdened by hazardous waste. Other social capital measures are 
wiped out by statistical adjustment. The strongest predictor of the variable lot is the concentration of large 
quantity generators of hazardous waste (Wald=64.73). This is a statistical confirmation of Alfred Weber's 
theory of industrial location. As with other for-profit enterprises, commercial TSO . installations are compelled 
apparently by a logic of accumulation.2 Profit is maximized by cost reductions in input commodities. 
1 Interpretation of regression tables will focus almost exclusively on parsimonious models . Fu lly saturated 
models are kept for the reader. 
2 Radical political economists (see Marx, Volume I ,  Capital) have developed an elegant heuristic of capital 
accumulation. It is expressed symbolically as M-C-M'. In step one of the circuit, entrepreneurs invest 
money capital in input commodities of production, including means of production (i .e., instruments and 
objects of labor), and human labor. In step two, these forces of production are put into action for the 
production of commodities to be sold in market. Upon sale of the commodity, money capital is returned to 
investors plus profit, and the circuit of accumulation of begins anew. The circuit heu ristic can be adorned 
reasonably with specificity to accommodate any analysis of firm behavior. 
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FIGURE 4.1 : REVISED MODEL OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 
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TABLE 4 .24 : REVISED VARIABLE DEFINITION STATEMENTS AND HYPOTHESIZED DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP 
Variable 
Industrial Labor Rate 
Average Price of 
Housing 
Gross Rental Value 
Large Quantity 
Generators 
Percentage of Homes 






Number of machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors; 
transportation and material moving occupations; and handlers, 
equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers, divided by the total number 
laborers, as defined by the Standard Occupational Classification system, 
residing in the census tract area. 
Aggregate price of specified owner-occupied housing units, divided by 
the total number of owner-occupied hou·sing units in the census tract 
area. Price is based on the respondent's estimate the property's (house 
and lot, mobile home and lot, or condominium unit) market worth. 
Gross rent is the contract rent plus the estimated average monthly cost 
of utilities paid for by the renter. 
Number of large quantity generators of waste per census tract area. A 
facility is classified as a large quantity generator if it: generates or 
imports greater than or equal to 1 ,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) of 
hazardous waste in a calendar month; generates or accumulates at any 
time, more than 1 kilogram of acute hazardous waste in a calendar 
month; or more than 1 00 kilograms of residue, contaminated soil, waste, 
or other debris resulting from the clean-up of a spill of acute hazardous 
· waste. 
Number of housing units constructed before 1 960, divided by the total 
number of housing units in census tract. 
Maximum acceleration experienced by an object during the course of 
earthquake motion estimated for each census tract centroid. 
Acceleration estimates are calculated at the 1 O percent probability of 
being exceeded in 50 years, and expressed as %g. 
Percentage of the Hydrologic Unit Code encased in the census tract, 
weighted by the size of the land area (square km). 
Land Area Square Km Total land area in square kilometers. 
Water Area Square Total water area in square kilometers. 
Km 
Social Capital Assets Total assets of all non-profit organizations as inventoried by the National 
Center of Charitable Statistics in a census tract area. 
Social Capital Rate Total assets of non-profit organizations as inventoried by the National 
Center of Charitable Statistics in a census tract area, divided by the _total 























Percent of Famllles 










Total assets of non-profit organizations with a specified environmental 
focus In a census tract area as inventoried by the National Center of 
Charitable Statistics 
Total assets of non-profit organizations with a specified environmental 
focus in a census tract area as inventoried by the National Center of 
Charitable Statistics, divided by the total number of persons residing in 
the census tract area. 
Number of persons per square kilometer, calculated by the total number 
of persons residing in the census tract area, divided by the total land 
area (square km). 
The ratio of the number of young persons of an age (under 1 5) when 
they are generally economically inactive, to the number of persons of 
working age (1 5 to 64). 
The ratio of the number of elderly persons of an age (over 65) when they 
are generally economically inactive, to the number of persons of working 
age ( 15  to 64). 
Number of persons identifying themselves as Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
Cuban, or other Hispanic, divided by the total number of persons residing 
in the census tract area. 
Total number of persons identifying themselves as non-Hispanic White 
divided by the total number of persons. 
Total number of persons identifying themselves as American Indian 
divided by the total number of persons. 
Total number of families with income less than 1989 poverty level 
($ 1 2,675, defined by 1 991 Statistical Abstract of the United States), 
divided by the total number of families. 
Total number of renter occupied housing units, divided by the total of 
housing units in a census tract. 
Total number of persons 
Measured dichotomously as presence or absence of a facility in a 
census tract area. Adjacent tracts within 1 and 1 .5 miles of facility will be 








TABLE 4.25: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATI_NG ODDS OF TSDF PRESENCE IN 
EPA REGION IV, FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000*** 7.1 33 .008 1 .000 -.000*** 8 .936 .003 
Social Capital Rate .000 .001 .981 1 .000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .2 1 1  .646 1 .000 
Environmental Capital Rate .000 .026 .871 1 .000 
Population Density - .001 ** 5.6 1 8 .01 8 .999 - .001 *** 7.548 .006 
Youth Dependency Ratio -. 1 55 .01 5 .902 .857 
Old Dependency Ratio -.665 .41 2  .521 .51 4  
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .500*** 59. 1 88 .000 · 1 .649 .51 6*** 64.734 .000 
Industrial Labor Rate .01 0 .664 .41 5  1 .01 0 
Mean Home Value -.000 .793 .373 1 .000 
Median Gross Rent .001 . 1 6 1 .688 1 .001 
Built before 1 960 .01 5** 5.394 .020 1 .01 5 .01 5*** 7.781 .005 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.003** 3.767 .052 .997 -.003** 5.531 .01 9  
Water Area -.01 0 .425 .51 4 .990 
Peak Ground Acceleration .067*** 8.099 .004 1 .069 .068*** 9.1 1 7  .003 
Hydrologic Unit Code .2 1 4  .026 .872 1 .238 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic .008 .244 .621 1 .008 
Percent Black .01 5*** 1 1 .009 .001 1 .01 5 .01 3*** 1 4. 1 51 .000 
American Indian .020 .621 .431 1 .020 
Percent Poverty - .0 1 3  .893 .345 .987 
Percent Renter .002 .059 .808 1 .002 
Total Persons .000*** 1 8 .098 .000 1 .000 .000*** 25.751 .000 
Constant -5.77*** 27 .958 .000 .003 -6.01 3*** 339 .294 .000 
Nagelkerke R-Square . 1 41 
-2 Log Likelihood 971 .779 
Chi-Square 1 50.550*** 





· 1 .676 
1 .01 5 
.997 
1 .070 
1 .01 4 
1 .000 
.002 
. 1 34 
978.789 
1 43.540*** 
Proximity to LQGs powerfully influences location calculi of TSOF operators. TSOFs gravitate toward 
commercially suitable areas, all things held equal. 
As with t-Test results, the scientific rational ity variables of land area in square km, and peak ground 
acceleration behave unexpectedly. Be it full or reduced model, TSOF presence in EPA Region IV is 
predicted by increased risk of seismological activity. In fact, 20 of the 100 commercial TSO installations 
operating in the Southeastern United States are located in areas with peak ground acceleration figures of 
9.5%g and above - a threshold level minimally hazardous to building structure integrity. Even more 
surprising, six installations sit in areas with PGA scores of 1 6%g and above, with one installation in 
Tennessee at 21 .8%g. Though most installations are located in low risk earthquake areas, it is perplexing 
to discover a statistically valid positive, relationship between TSOF presence and seismological risk - so 
much for scientific rationality. 
Consistent with claims of envi ronmental injustice, African-Americans in the Southeast are burdened 
disproportionately by hazardous waste, all things held equal . A percentage increase in African-American 
composition increases the odds that a tract has a TSO installation· by about 1 .4 (see Exp B column in Table 
4.26). Overall, model performance for prediction of TSOF presence in EPA Region IV is relatively good 
( . 1 55 A-square). Meaning, almost 1 6  percent of environmental health destiny in the Southeast at the 
neighborhood level of analysis is explainable by eight variables. At the individual level , the environmental 
health of approximately 7 mil l ion people is captured by the reduced model . 
By expanding the definition of at-risk areas to include neighborhoods within 1 and 1 .5 miles of a 
commercial TSOF, predictors behave somewhat differently. At the 1 Mile zone of impact, social capital 
variables all but disappear in significance (see Table 4.26) . Only the old dependency ratio is significantly 
related to TSOF impact. As Robert Putnam (2000) documents in Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival 
of American Community, norms of reciprocity, trust, and expressive exchange have an age dimension . The 
elder1y are more likely than young persons to cohere for col lective action. As predicted, the higher the old 
dependency ratio, the lower the l ikelihood of TSOF impact (b= -2.078, P= .01 5) .  
At 1 Mile of impact, LOG activity dwarfs the explanatory power of a l l  predictors (Wald= 70.406).3 
Again, the commercial motive seemingly prevails. Supplementary evidence is found in other economic 
rationality variables: industrial labor rate (p=.026), mean house value ( . 1 08) ,  and percent of units 
3 The Wald statistic (or Z-score squared) is analogous to the standardized beta weight in the more 
commonly used multiple l inear regression method. It allows one to compare the explanatory value of 
variables on a common unit of measurement. 
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TABLE 4.26: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 
MILE IN EPA REGION IV, FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000 .488 .485 1.000 
Social Capital Rate .000 .003 .956 1.000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .047 .829 1.000 
Environmental Capital Rate -.000 .001 .979 1.000 
Population Density .000 .010 .922 · 1.000 
Youth Dependency Ratio -1.184 1.757 .185 .306 -1.275 2.576 
Old Dependency Ratio -1.932** 4.646 .031 .145 -2.078** 5.877 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .466*** 65.917 .000 1.593 .469*** 70.406 
Industrial Labor Rate .019** 4.602 .032 1.019 .018** 4.984 
Mean Home Value -.000 2.612 .106 1.000 -.000 2.590 
Median Gross Rent .000 .137 .711 1.000 
Built before 1960 · .018*** 14.209 .000 1.019 .017*** 15.388 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.003** 5.408 .020 .997 -.004*** 10.001 
Water Area -.008 .342 .559 .992 
Peak Ground Acceleration .057*** 8.290 .004 1.058 .057*** 9.103 
Hydrologic Unit Code -.162 .015 .903 .850 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic -.010 .435 .510 .990 
Percent Black .012*** 12.429 . . 000 1.012 .011 *** 12.362 
American Indian .020 .794 .373 1.021 
Percent Poverty -.008 .577 .447 .992 
Percent Renter .002 .094 .759 1.002 
Total Persons .000** 5.601 .018 1.000 .000*** 7.200 
Constant -5.13*** 35.002 .000 .006*** -4.998 52.193 
Nagelkerke R-Square .135 
-2 Log Likelihood 1371.385 
Chi-Square 198.107*** 
p <.1 O; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
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constructed before 1 960 (.000). All business rationality variables behave as predicted. The scientific 
rationality measures of land area (b=-.004, p=.002), and peak ground acceleration (b=.057, p=.003) are 
significantly related to TSO installation environmental impact of 1 Mile. 
On race-class i·nequality measures, percent African-American matters. The blackness of a 
neighborhood is positively related to TSDF impact, net the effect of all other predictors. Meaning, the 
greater the percentage of African-Americans in a neighborhood, the greater the likelihood of TSDF-related 
environmental impact. With a Wald statistic of 12.362, the variable of percent African-American finishes 
third among ten variables in predictive power. Model performance at the 1 Mile zone of TSDF impact 
decrease slightly, with 1 3  percent of variation in commercial TSDF location explained by the reduced 
variable set. The decrease in model performance is likely a function of the disappearance of social capital 
assets from the explanation. 
At the 1 .Smile zone of impact (Table 4.27), percent African-American rivals LOG presence in 
predictive power (Wald=55.01 5 versus 72.029). Surprisingly, the percentage of families at or below the 
official poverty line is negatively related to TSDF presence, holding statistically constant other predictors. 
This disconfirms popular claims of environmental classicism - insofar as the rate of poverty is congruent 
with ones conception of social class. In regular language, the higher the rate of poverty in a neighborhood, 
the lower the probability of exposure to hazardous waste emanating from commercial TSDF operations. 
The social variables of population, youth dependency, and old dependency are significantly 
associated with TSDF impact. Population density is positively related,  and dependency ratios negatively 
related. Only the old dependency ratio behaves as predicted, indirectly confirming Robert Putnam's (2000) 
claim that the elderly are more civically involved than other strata of the population. 
Economic ration�lity and scientific rationality predictors perform similarly across spatial measures 
of environmental risk. At 1 .5 Miles from the nearest commercial TSO installation, LOG activity, industrial 
labor rate, percent housing units built before 1 960, and peak ground acceleration are positively related to 
TSDF impact, holding other variables constant. Mean household price and land area in square km are 
negatively associated. Results indicate the commercial suitability of an area renders it susceptible to TSDF 
siting, holding all else constant. Conversely, the geological and hydrological features of a neighborhood are 
insignificant predictors, and if statistically significant, perform in the opposite direction predicted by the 
scientific literature. 
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TABLE 4.27: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFRCIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 .5 
MILES IN EPA REGION IV, FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000 .057 .81 1 1 .000 
Social Capital Rate -.000 . 120 .729 1 .000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 . 171 .680 1 .000 
Environmental Capital Rate -.000 .000 .994 1 .000 
Population Density . .000* 3.029 .082 1 .000 .000** 5.272 .022 
Youth Dependency Ratio -1 .67*** 6.081 .014  . 1 88 - 1 .384** 5.025 .025 
Old Dependency Ratio -1 .70*** 6.669 .01 0 . 183 -1 .829*** 8 .021 .005 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .435*** 67 .81 0 .000 · 1 .546 .445*** 72 .029 .000 
Industrial Labor Rate .01 6** 5. 1 55 .023 1 .01 6 .01 4** 4.439 .035 
Mean Home Value -.000*** 8.850 .003 1 .000 -.000*** 9.004 .003 
Median Gross Rent .001 1 .480 .224 1 .001 
Built before 1 960 .01 6*** 18.763 .000 1 .016  .01 4*** 1 6.891 .000 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONAUTY 
Land Area -.005*** 1 3 .895 .000 .995 -.006*** 22.483 .000 
Water Area - .0 10  .51 1 .475 .990 
Peak Ground Acceleration .036** 4.786 .029 1 .036 .033** 4.264 .039 
Hydrologic Unit Code -.233 .034 .853 .792 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic -.026* 2.840 .092 .974 -.023 2.462 . 1 1 7  
Percent Black .01 9*** 53.439 .000 1 .01 9 .01 9*** 55.01 5 .000 
American Indian .027 1 .898 . 1 68 1 .027 
Percent Poverty -.01 2 2.336 . 126 .988 -:.01 6*** 6.592 .01 0  
Percent Renter .002 .229 .632 1 .002 
Total Persons .000 .573 .449 1 .000 
Constant -4.06*** 35.059 .000 .01 7 -3.426*** 40.532 .000 
Nagelkerke R-Square . 1 93 
-2 Log Likelihood 1 993.679 
Chi-Square 423.348*** 
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Apart from the variable of percent African-American, at the 1.5 Mile measure of environmental risk, 
the rate of poverty and percent Hispanic persons in a neighborhood are negatively related to TSDF impact. 
Meaning, the lower the rate of poverty, and the. lower the presence of Hispanic persons, the greater the 
probability of TSDF-related environmental impact. Thus, in the Southeast, environmental racism is a strictly 
African-American phenomenon. In other regions of the United States like the West Coast, the variable of 
percent Hispanic persons may behave differently on directionality (see Pastor et al 2001 ). 
Overall, at the 1 .Smile zone of TSO installation impact for APA Region IV, model performance is· 
relatively strong, with almost 20 percent of variation in TSDF siting explained. The A-square figure is an 
improvement over published studies, even outperforming mathematically inclined, environmental justice 
· research teams on the West Coast (see Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp 2001 ), and the East. Coast (see Anderton et 
al. 1994). 
BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE SOUTH AND DEEP SOUTH 
Tables 4.28, 4.29, and 4.30 present binary logistic regression coefficients estimating odds of 
commercial TSDF impact for three spatial conceptions of environmental risk for the Deep South. As with t­
test results, the variable set does comparatively worst in the Deep South. Social capital measures are 
statistically insignificant cross the board. This is explainable by the relative absence of nonprofit 
organization in the Deep South of large enough size to be counted by the IRS and the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics. 
Of economic rationality predictors, only the variable of LOG activity is significantly and positively 
associated with TSDF impact. At the in-tract measure, LOG presence has a Wald statistic of 46.848, 
stronger than all other variables combined (see Table 4.28). As we expand the zone of impact to 1 and 1.5 
Miles, the predictive power of LOG conce�tration diminishes slightly. Still, the explanatory weight of Alfred 
Weber's industrial location theory is undeniable. The presence of an LOG in a neighborhood increases the 
odds of commercial TSO installaUon siting by 61 to 87 percent, depending on the measure of spatial risk. 
Again, the scientific rationality variables behave peculiarly. PGA is positively associated with TSDF impact, 
and land are in square km is negatively associated. Claims by TSDF regulators that site selection is guided 
strictly by geological, physical, and hydrological considerations are, according to the data, disingenuous. 
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TABLE 4.28: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF PRESENCE IN DEEP 
SOUTH STATES OF ALABAMA, GEORGIA, MISSISSIPPI, AND SOUTH CAROLINA, FULLY SATURATED 
AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000 .381 .537 1.000 
Social Capital Rate -.000 .025 .875 1.000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .012 .914 1.000 
Environmental Capital Rate -.015 .000 .999 .985 
Population Density -.000 .789 .374 1.000 
Youth Dependency Ratio -.086 .002 .963 .918 
BUSINESS · RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .648*** 37.494 .000 1.912 .623*** 46.848 .000 1.864 
Industrial Labor Rate -.007 . 119 .731 .993 
Mean Home Value -.000 .533 .466 . 1.000 
Median Gross Rent -.001 .394 .530 .999 
Built before 1960 -.006 .308 .579 .994 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.002 1.743 .187 .998 
Water Area -.025 .562 .454 .975 
Peak Ground Acceleration .096*** 6.794 .009 1.100 .095*** 7.622 .006 1.099 
Hydrologic Unit Code 1.155 1.120 .290 . 3.173 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic .017 .290 .590 1.018 
Percent Black .019** 5.893 .015 1.019 .010* 3.517 .061 1.010 
American Indian - .171 .291 .589 .842 
Percent Poverty -.026 1.181 .277 .975 
Percent Renter -.000 .001 .977 1.000 
Total Persons .000* 3.684 .055 1.000 .000*** 5.987 .014 1.000 
Constant -4.134** 6.463 .011 .016 -6.257** 193.257 .000 .002 
Nagelkerke A-Square .159 .119 
-2 Log Likelihood 418.325 436.943 
Chi-Square 74.281 *** 55.664*** 
* p <.1 O; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
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TABLE 4.29: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 
MILE IN DEEP SOUTH STATES OF ALABAMA, GEORGIA, MISSISSIPPI, AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 
FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. 
SOCIAL CAPITA� 
Social Capital Assets -.000 .056 .81 3  1 .000 
Social Capital Rate -.000 .030 .862 1 .000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .002 .969 1 .000 
Environmental Capital Rate - 1 .263 .003 .958 .283 
Population Density - .000 .693 .405 1 .000 
Youth Dependency Ratio -1 .001 .348 .555 .367 
Old Dependency Ratio .482 . 1 02 .750 1 .620 
BUSiNESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .626*** 38.982 .000 1 .870 .580*** 42.870 .000 
Industrial Labor Rate - .01 2 .459 .498 .988 
Mean Home Value -.000 .536 .464 1 .000 
Median Gross Rent - .001 .270 .603 .999 
Built before 1 960 -.001 .01 1 .91 6 .999 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.003* 2 .941 .086 .997 -.002 2.345 . 1 26 
Water Area - .028 .670 .41 3  .973 
Peak Ground Acceleration .090*** 6.788 .009 1 .094 .077** 5 .630 .01 8  
Hydrologic Unit Code 1 .072 .951 .330 2.920 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic .01 7 .459 .498 1 .01 8 
Percent Black .01 9*** 7.968 .005 1 .01 9 .01 4*** 9 .990 .002 
American Indian -. 1 58 .275 .600 .853 
Percent Poverty - .007 .1 24 .724 .993 
Percent Renter - .008 .608 .436 .992 
Total Persons .000** 3.936 .047 1 .000 .000** 4 .887 .027 
Constant -3.99*** 7.396 .007 .01 8 -5.797*** 1 80.71 5 .000 
Nagelkerke R-Square . 1 38 
-2 Log Likelihood 504.506 
· Chi-Square 75.355*** 
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TABLE 4.30: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 .5 
MILES IN DEEP SOUTH STATES OF ALABAMA, GEORGIA, MISSISSIPPI, AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 
FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets .000 .038 .845 1.000 
Social Capital Rate -.000 . 153 .695 1.000 
Environment Capital Assets .000 .274 .601 1.000 
Environmental Capital Rate -.092 .717 .397 .912 
Population Density .000 .283 .594 1.000 
Youth Dependency Ratio -2.078* 2.862 .091 .125 
Old Depende�cy Ratio .536 .210 .647 1.709 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .520*** 33.663 .000 1.682 .478*** 32.582 .000 
Industrial Labor Rate -.004 .098 .755 .996 
Mean Home Value -.000 .985 .321 1.000 
Median Gross Rent .000 .070 .792 1.000 
Built before 1960 -.010 1.769 .183 .990 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.005*** 8.286 .004 .995 -.005*** 12.226 .000 
Water Area -.034 .917 .338 .967 
Peak Ground Acceleration .055* 3.287 .070 1.057 .048* 2.687 .101 
Hydrologic Unit Code .804 .512 .474 2.235 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic .016 .454 . . 501 1.016 
Percent Black .020*** 17.023 .000 1.020 .021 *** 32.485 .000 
American Indian .010 .013 .911 1.010 
Percent Poverty .014 1.171 .279 1.014 
Percent Renter -.017** 4.274 .039 .983 -.012* 3.162 .075 
Total Persons .000 1.828 .176 1.000 .000* 2.619 .106 
Constant -3.31 *** 8.372 .004 .036 - -4.609*** 124.935 .000 
Nagelkerke A-Square .138 
-2 Log Likelihood 504.506 
Chi-Square 75.355*** 
* p <.1 0; ** p <.05; ·- p <.01 
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Compared to the region as a whole, scientific rationality predictors perform similarly in the Deep 
South. Peak ground acceleration is significantly and positively associated with commercial TSDF presence. 
Land area in square km is negatively related with TSDF impact at 1 (b=-.002, P= .126) and 1.5 miles (-.005, 
p=.000) of environmental damage. The peak ground acceleration figure deflates in predictive power as the 
zone of negative externality is expanded. At the 1.5 Mile zone, the predictive quality of peak ground 
acceleration weakens to the .1 O significance level. 
On demographic inequality variables, all but percent African-American and total persons in a 
neighborhood are insignificant across tables. The positive association between total persons and TSDF 
impact runs counter to industry claims that TSDF neighborhoods are uninhabited rural areas (see Hess 
1998). Opposite the behavior of the LOG variable, as the field of negative externality is stretched to 1 and 
1 .5 miles, percent African-American increases in explanatory power. At the in-tract measure, the Wald 
Statistic is 3.52; at the 1 Mile measure, the Wald statistic increases to 9.99; and finally, at the 1.5 Mile 
measure, percent African-American has a Wald Statistic that rivals LOG concentration in size (32.49 versus 
32.58). At the 1.5 Mile impact zone, a unit increase in African-American composition increases the odds of 
TSDF siting by 2.1. As Table 4.30 shows, percent of housing units rented is negatively related with TSDF 
impact. As an estimate of social class, the variable disconfirms the environmental classism argument. As 
with other distribution issues - level of education, incarceration, home ownership, and income - there is 
strong debate in the environmental justice literature on the predictive powers of race versus class (see 
Downey 1998). Bivariate tests in the previous section confirm statistical associations between hazardous 
waste exposure and measures of social class, but these bivariate results disappear as other variables are 
factored. . The relationship between social class and exposure to hazardous waste in the Deep South is 
rubbed out by statistical controls, suggesting the correlation is spurious. 
Overall, reduced model performance in the Deep South is weaker than the EPA Region IV as 
whole. A-square varies _from .115 to .119, meaning slightly more than 11 percent of the variation in TSDF 
location and impact is predictable by the variable set assembled. 
Tables 4.31, 4.32, and 4.33 examine commercial TSDF impact in the Southern states of Florida, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee. As Table 4.31 indicates, social capital assets are negatively 
related with TSDF presence (Wald= 6.207). Meaning, the more social capital assets a neighborhood has, 
the more likely that neighborhood can fend off an undesirable land use. Population density is negatively 
related to TSDF impact, invalidating the popular belief TSO operations locate to rural areas and small 
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TABLE 4.31 : BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF PRESENCE IN 
SOUTHERN STATES OF FLORIDA, KENTUCKY, NORTH CAROLINA, AND TENNESSEE, FULLY 
SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald . Sig. Exp (B) B Wald Sig. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000** 4.825 .028 1 .000 -.000*** 6.207 .01 3 
Social Capital Rate -.000 .004 .951 1 .000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .045 .831 1 .000 
Environmental Capital Rate .000 .000 .996 1 .000 
Population Density -.001 ** 6.059 .01 4 .999 -.001 *** 6.369 .01 2  
Youth Dependency Ratio -.669 . 1 28 .720 .51 2 
Old Dependency Ratio -1 .365 .962 .327 .255 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .393*** 1 9.487 .000 1 .481 .423*** 22.239 .000 
Industrial Labor Rate .01 8 1 .402 .236 1 .01 8 .023* 3.51 9 .061 
Mean Home Value -.000 .774 .379 1 .000 
Median Gross Rent .002 1 . 1 1 4  .29 1 1 .002 
Built before 1 960 .029*** 1 2.066 .001 1 .029 .029**** 1 5.91 9  .000 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.001 .070 .792 .999 
Water Area -.002 .020 .887 .998 
Peak Ground Acceleration .041 1 .464 .226 1 .042 
Hydrologic Unit Code -9.480 1 .349 .245 .000 - 1 0.625** 4.1 93 .041 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic .002 .006 .937 1 .002 
Percent Black .01 2** 3.867 .049 1 .0 1 2  .01 3*** 7.485 .006 
American Indian .020 .608 .435 1 .020 
Percent Poverty .005 .080 .777 1 .005 
Percent Renter -.002 .041 .840 .998 
Total Persons .000*** 1 2.524 .000 1 .000 .000*** 1 8. 1 78 .000 
Constant -6.45*** 1 7.428 .000 .002 -6.81 4*** 1 29.679 .000 
Nagelkerke R-Square . 1 64 
-2 Log Likelihood 529.676 
Chi-Square 98.651 *** 









1 .01 3 
1 .000 
.001 
. 1 55 
534.792 
93.535**** 
TABLE 4.32: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 
MILE IN SOUTHERN STATES OF FLORIDA, KENTUCKY, NORTH CAROLINA, AND TENNESSEE, FULLY 
SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B Wald 
· SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets -.000 1 . 1 60 
Social Capital Rate .000 .609 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 .020 
Environmental Capital Rate -.000 .000 
Population Density .000 .043 
Youth Dependency Ratio - 1 .870 2 .576 
Old Dependency Ratio -2.437** 4.777 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .389*** 26 . 120 
Industrial Labor Rate .031 *** 8 .431 
Mean Home Value -.000* 2 .974 
Median Gross Rent .001 .782 
Built before 1 960 .024*** 1 7.241 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area - .001 . 1 02 
Water Area .000 .000 
Peak Ground Acceleration .048* 3 .4 15  
Hydrologic Unit Code -1 0.3 1 0  1 .572 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic -.0 1 9 1 . 1 25 
Percent Black .01 0*** 6.054 
American Indian .02 1 .81 7  
Percent Poverty -.002 .027 
Percent Renter .006 .625 
Total Persons .000 1 .737 
Constant -5.46*** 21 .388 
Nagelkerke R-Square 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Chi-Square 
* p <.1 0; ** p <.05; *** p <.01 
Sig. Exp (B) 
.282 1 .000 
.435 1 .000 
.888 1 .000 
.982 1 .000 
.836 1 .000 
. 1 08 . 1 54 
.029 .087 
.000 1 .476 
.004 1 .031 
.085 1 .000 
.376 1 .001 
.000 1 .025 
.750 .999 
.986 1 .000 
.065 1 .049 
.21 0  .000 
.289 .982 
.01 4  1 .01 0 
.366 1 .021 
.869 .998 
.429 1 .006 
. 1 88 1 .000 
.000 .004 
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- 1 .682* 2 .958 
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-.000* 3.036 
.024*** 20.1 49 
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· TABLE 4.33: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATING ODDS OF TSDF IMPACT OF 1 .5 
MILES IN SOUTHERN STATES OF FLORIDA, KENTUCKY, NORTH CAROLINA, AND TENNESSEE, 
FULLY SATURATED AND PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
B 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Social Capital Assets .000 
Social Capital Rate -.000 
Environment Capital Assets -.000 
Environmental Capital Rate -.000 
Population Density .000 
Youth Dependency Ratio - 1 .864** 
Old Dependency Ratio -2.06*** 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators .396*** 
Industrial labor Rate .023*** 
Mean Home Value -.000*** 
Median Gross Rent .001 
Built before 1 960 .023*** 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area -.003 
Water Area -.001 
Peak Ground Acceleration .028 
Hydrologic Unit Code -1 0.007 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic -.036* 
Percent Black .020*** 
American Indian .027 
Percent Poverty -.01 8* 
Percent Renter .009 
Total Persons -.000 
Constant -4.1 1 *** 
Nagelkerke A-Square 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Chi-Square 
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Sig. Exp (B) B Wald · Sig. 
.91 0  1 .000 
.604 1 .000 
.745 1 .000 
.941 1 .000 
. 1 91 1 .000 .000* 2 .886 .089 
.034 . 1 55 -1 .956*** 6.080 .01 4 
.01 3 . 1 28 -2.296*** 7.943 .005 
.000 1 .486 .422*** 37.660 .000 
.007 1 .023 .020*** 5.994 .01 4 
.002 1 .000 -.000*** 8 .669 .003 
.234 1 .001 
.000 1 .023 .023*** 28. 1 81 .000 
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population centers. In Tables 4.32 and 4.33, we find negative associations between age ratios and TSDF 
impact. Meaning, neighborhoods with higher dependency ratios, are less likely to host a commercial TSD 
installation. 
Scientific ration·ality variables behave more predictably in the American South. The effect of peak 
ground acceleration is statistically insignificant, less the 1 Mile estimation of spatial risk. The hydrology 
variable is robust. Predictive power for this variable is strong across statistical models. As hypothesized, 
TSD installations are less likely to locate in watershed areas. For reasons unknown, unlike the Deep South 
and EPA Region IV as whole, the geological and hydrological suitability of residential areas in the South 
predict the absence or presence of commercial TSD installations. 
As usual, the commercial motive is a solid predictor of TSDF location. Business rationality 
variables are significant across distance measures of environmental risk. Large quantity generator activity, 
the industrial labor rate, and percent of housing units constructed before 1960, are positively coupled with 
TSDF impact. Mean housing value, an estimate property cost, is negatively related to TSDF presence. 
Meaning, as the price of property decreases, all things held equal, the odds of TSDF siting increase. With 
one exception, the bin of business rationality variables outperforms variables linked to competing 
hypotheses. 
That exception is the variable of percent African-American. Adjusting for other variables, African­
American neighborhood composition is positively tied to environmental risk. Environmental burdens in the 
American South, as in the Deep South and EPA Region IV as a whole, are predictable by race. As Table 
4.33 reveals, percent African-American is the strongest predictor of TSDF impact, even surpassing the 
seemingly insurmountable measure of LOG activity (52.08 versus 37.660, on the Wald Statistic). At the 1.5 
Mile evaluation of environmental risk, percent Hispanic is significant, but negatively correlated. The same 
can be said of the percent of families at or below the official poverty line. Binary logistic regression results 
disconfirm the environmental classism argument. Bivariate evidence for the class argument is rendered 
spurious by application of statistical controls. 
Overall, the variable set performs best in the American South, with A-square figures ranging from 
.155 to .266. Such scores are a strong improvement over previous TSDF studies (see Table 2.2). The 
relative strength of model performance in the American South is an intriguing finding to be probed at a later 
date. For now, it is likely that improved model performance in the South is driven by the relative strength of 
social capital measures. Because social capital assets are dramatically higher in the sub-region of the 
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South, and presuming environmental concemis higher in the South than Deep South, evident by the higher 
presence of environmental organizations and higher profile environmental conflicts that have erupted in the 
region (i.e., Warren County), it is reasonable to assume social capital measure are behind improved model 
performance. 
SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 4.34 is a summary of all binary logistic regression tests. Again, emphasis is placed on 
directionality and statistical significance. Only those variables significant at the . 10 level of confidence or 
better are indicated. Beginning with social capital variables. The social capital assets variable is a solid 
predictor of TSDF impact, if the conception of spatial risk tight. Directly targeted neighborhoods with low 
social capital assets are vulnerable. It is theoretically sensible to assume that the more closely situated a 
neighborhood is to an undesirable land-use, the feistier the resistance. Other social capital measures, 
mostly structural estimates of social capital potential, behave irregularly. For example, population density is 
negatively related in some circumstances and positively related in others. This variable of population per 
square km of land is circumstantially relevant. As predicted, the old dependency ratio is negatively related 
to TSDF impact in four of the nine models executed. Meaning, the greater the ratio of persons of retired 
age to persons of working age, the lower the likelihood of commercial TSDF environmental risk. 
On estimates of economic rationality, LOG activity is consistently positively associated with TSDF 
presence. No matter the spatial conception of risk, this variable outperforms all others all the time, less 
percent African-American composition. In five of nine models, the percent of sufficiently skilied industrial 
labor is positively related with TSDF impact, all things equal. Meaning, the higher the percentage of 
industrial labor, the greater the odds of TSDF impact. Similarly, in six of the nine logistic regress.ion models 
executed, the percentage of housing unit built before 1960 is a positive predictor of the geography of 
environmental risk. 
As with bivariate comparisons, scientific rationality measures behave inconsistently with expected 
directionality. Peak ground acceleration is positively associated with TSDF impact, not negatively as 
hypothesized. TSD installations are located in more risky earthquake zones, not less risky ones in seven of 
nine models. In three of nine models the hydrology variable performs robustly, and as anticipated. 
Last, of demographic inequality measures, percent African American is the only variable to be 
positively and statistically significant across all models. In fact, only the LOG concentration variable 
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TABLE 4.36: SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FROM PARSIMONIOUS LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEEP SOUTH, SOUTH, AND EPA REGION IV 
Deep South · Deep South · Deep South South South South EPA IV EPA IV EPA IV 
SOCIAL CAPITAL I TSDF 1 Mlle 1 .5 MIies TSDF 1 Mlle 1 .5 MIies TSDF 1 Mlle 1 .5 MIies 
Social Capital Assets 
Social Capital Rate 
Environment Capital Assets 
Environmental Capital Rate 
Population Density I - . + - + 
Youth Dependency Ratio 
Old Dependency Ratio 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 
I 
+ + + + + + + + + 
Industrial Labor Rate + + + + + 
Mean Home Value - - + 
-
Median Gross Rent 




Peak Ground Acceleration I + + + + + + + 
Hydrologic Unit Code 
RACE-CLASS INEQUALITY 
Percent Hispanic 




Total Persons I + + + + + + 
performs similarly. Other inequality variables figure modestly in the final picture. The percent of families in 
poverty, and the percentage of Hispanic persons are negative predictors of TSOF impact in two and one of 
nine regression models respectively. 
In essence, this meta-summary validates the notion of a systemic contradiction between 
demographic equity and economic liberty on the distribution of commercial TSO installations in the 
Southeastern United States. This tension, as discussed in Chapter I, is reflected in and generated by the 
conflicting imperatives of the modern capitalist state. Recall, political economists of the environment note 
that the state performs two master functions: enabling capital accumulation and maintaining public 
harmony. Accumulation incentives provided by the state essentially serve the interests of entrepreneurial 
classes. Public harmony incentives essentially serve the interests of middle and lower class groupings. The 
state functions of accumulation and legitimization, Cable and Cable ( 1 995) show, serve different socio­
economic groupings on environmental issues. For example, damage done to the environment by industry 
in the name of accumulation disproportionately serves the bourgeoisie. This same damage, more likely than 
not, jeopardizes the life settings of poor minorities of color, compromising state management of public 
harmony and delivery of individual primary goods. 
Insofar as the conflicting imperatives of the modern capitalist state, but heads on the issue of 
distribution of environmental health risks stemming for TSO installation operations, evidence from binary 
logistic regression models suggests that the accumulation function is dominant. This apparent dominance is 
correctable through reform. The question of how to balance the functions of the state on geographic 
distribution of locally unwanted, environmental risky technologies is tackled in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this final chapter, hypotheses are recapitulated in relation to statistical results. The implications 
of results are discussed on environmental policy regarding fair and equitable distribution of environmental 
hazards as expressed in President William Clinton's Executive Order 12898 on environmental justice. A 
hazard allocation system is proposed to achieve procedural and distributional justice. The mechanics and 
benefits of the hazard allocation system are described and summarized in table format. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This dissertation sought to answer two questions: where are commercial TSO installations located, 
and why? These questions were applied to EPA Region IV, and to the sub-regions of the American Deep 
South and South. Four hypotheses - business rationality, social capital, scientific rationality, and 
demographic inequality - were tested empirically, using bivariate and multivariate statistical methodologies. 
Three of these hypotheses are original contributions to the scientific literature. 
This dissertation is the first to spatially link commercial TSDF location outcomes to large quantity 
generator activity, measure neighborhood social and environmental capital assets, and concretely estimate 
the geological and hydrological suitability of neighborhoods for TSO installation siting. The fundamental 
contributions of this dissertation to social science are expansion of explanatory possibilities for TSDF 
location outcomes. What appear as speculations in the scientific literature, are refined and tested 
objectively in this dissertation. Perhaps most rewarding is that all hypotheses are partially confirmed, with 
substantial improvement to existing prediction models of commercial TSDF location outcomes. 
Summarizing statistical findings briefly. Beginning with the business rationality argument, evidence 
suggests commercial TSO installations are fundamentally economic agents. Inferring logically from 
outcomes, to minimize operating costs, TSO installations locate rationally to areas with affordable property, 
sufficiently skilled labor, and adjacent to hazardous waste streams. The evidence suggests cost reduction 
is the overriding factor in the patterning of environmental health risks in the Southeastern United States. 
Recall, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the regulatory framework that 
encourages this commercial orientation. Though RCRA contains provisions designed to protect the public 
and physical environment from harm, it mandates market solutions to proper treatment, storage, and 
disposal of hazardous waste. Market coordination of the hazardous waste stream propels commercial 
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TSDF operators into an instrumental calculus that differentially harms strata of the population. More 
remarkable, the hazardous waste management industry is regulated by a system of voluntary compliance. 
,This regulatory arrangement of voluntary compliance deepens the temptation to accumulate, and ignore 
threats to system legitimacy arising from disproportionate dumping.1 In fact, as shown by the data, the drive 
to accumulate is so strong that operators locate installations in geologically questionable areas. In sum, the 
construction and enforcement of RCRA is manifestly tilted toward the state function of enabling capital 
accumulation. 
Evidence for the . scientific rationality hypothesis on TSDF location is mixed. Commercial TSDF 
operators appear sensitive to hydrological concerns. They tend locate to areas with lower then average 
watershed overlap. However, TSD installations appear consistently in areas with higher than average 
seismological risk. Two explanations may account for this distortion of scientific logic: 1) the Southeastern 
United States, compared to other regions of the country, h�s lower risk of catastrophic earthquake activity, 
and 2) TSDF operators have made crucial design improvements in recent years that could withstand 
tectonic movement, rendering geological considerations less important. Nevertheless, the fact that TSD 
installations are relatively indifferent to earthquake risk strengthens the notion that the commercial motive, if 
regulated too loosely, can result in potentially catastrophic outcomes. The failure to correctly predict TSDF 
location outcomes using seismological data amplifies environmental injustice claims, and critiques of the 
state as a passive regulator of industry use of the environment. Perhaps, by stretching the object of 
analysis to the national level the PGA figure will behave as expected. 
Of the four hypotheses advanced, the social capital argument received least confirmation. Only the 
variable of social capital assets was statistically significant. By pooling the assets of all nonprofit 
organizations in a census tract, one can adequately predict the location of commercial TSDFs . . Again, 
reasoning from period data on location outcomes, commercial TSD installations seemingly avoid 
neighborhoods with stronger than average potential for collective action. Whereas scientific guidelines 
promulgated by the EPA apparently do little to temper the profit motive, the potential for neighborhood action 
can. As environmental justice institutes from Ann Arbor to Atlanta have started, linking and coordinating the 
1 Of the 2256 commercial and non-commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facilities in the United 
States, 1113 (about 49 percent) have violated EPA law in the last 2 years. The strongest predictor of 
violation is EPA inspection. In 1564 onsite inspections conducted by officials in the last 2 years, 896 
violations were discovered, constituting a fifty-seven percent hit rate (Zahran, Hastings, and Zilney 2003). 
Policies of market coordination and voluntary compliance are failing. 
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activities of nonprofit organizations can enliven civic concern for fair and equitable distribution of 
environmental health risks, and potentially offset the systemic tilt toward accumulation. 
Totaling nonprofit organization assets in a neighborhood is, admittedly, an imperfect measure of 
social capital. Still, it represents an improvement over established measures (see Pastor et al 2001 ). As 
James Coleman and Robert Putnam use the term, social capital is located in the associational fabric of 
society. What better place to look for it concretely than the nonprofit sector. Of course, qualitative studies 
can probe more deeply the amounts of trust and reciprocity that actually obtain in a neighborhood, but the 
measure used in.this dissertation is defendable. 
As for the variable of environmental capital assets, it flopped in all statistical tests. Though one 
notices manifest differences between environmentally burdened and unburdened neighborhoods on the 
characteristic of environmental capital assets, these differences never supercede statistical chance. 
Perhaps by expanding the object of analysis to the. continental United States, the environmental capital 
variable, may behave more predictably. 
On measures of race, class, and gender inequality, at whatever spatial estimate of environmental 
impact and regional or sub-regional level of analysis, African-Americans are burdened disproportionately by 
environmental hazards stemming from commercial TSDF operations. Because this dissertation used a 
cross-sectional design, it i� unclear whether this discriminatory outcome is linkable to discriminatory intent.2 
This dissertation cannot comment on possible time-sensitive dynamics related to TSDF siting. For many 
scholars (see Bullard 1990; Pulido 1996), is unimportant if discriminatory outcomes are intended·or caused 
by anonymous systemic forces. These scholars emphasize differential harm. By design, this dissertation 
accepts the emphasis on outcomes. Be it market coordination, structured residential choice, malicious 
intent on the part of TSDF operators, or objective business decisions, African Americans live in 
environmentally higher risk locations. This fact, for the Southeastern United States, is irrefutable. 
Overall, statistical models perform relatively well. Between 11 and 27 percent of variation in 
geographic distribution of commercial TSO installations is explainable by the reduced variable set. This is 
an improvement over existing models. 
2 Stretesky and Hogan's (1998) study of Superfund sites in Florida is an excellent example of a longitudinal 
design strategy to distinguish discriminatory outcome from discriminatory intent. They advanced a 
sociological notion of 11structured choice" to explain patterns of African-American residential decisions. This 
notion of structured choice brilliantly implicates market forces as the culprit of environmental racism. Price 
signals, we learn, are racially determined, and operate on the population differently. The migratory 
behaviors of Blacks and Whites interpenetrate, and the collateral effects of environmental risk, amplify social 
distancing strategies by racial groups. 
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To end this section, the following summary statement is ventured: the location of commercial TSO 
installations in the Southeastern United States is predictable by neighborhood social capital assets, large 
quantity generator activity, cheap property, affordable and skilled labor supply, hydrological conditions, and 
African American composition. This prediction is understandable in the context of a state committed more 
strongly to capital accumulation than protection of disadvantaged populations from disproportionate 
exposure to environmental hazards. 
ENVIRONMENT AL JUSTICE POLICY 
For the policy-minded, the next question is how do we design procedurally fair environmental 
justice policy to reduce negative environmental outcomes by race, and maintain systemic commitments to 
economic growth and market coordination? Results from statistical tests in Chapter IV imply the current 
system of TSOF site selection for the Southeastern United States is broken. The hazardous waste 
permitting process is said to emphasize, in order of importance, scientific criteria, commercial criteria, and 
population criteria (see EPA 2003; Freeman 1988). Results from logistic regression models suggest this 
ordering of criteria in the abstract is inconsistent with the ordering of criteria in reality. Fixing this 
inconsistency is possible. 
MAXIMIZING ENVIRONMENTAL Eaurrv: A RISK ALLOCATION PROPOSAL 
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 directing federal agencies 
to evaluate the environmental health policies effects on minority and low-income populations (see Appendix 
for text}. The Order promotes fair treatment of all people in the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people 
should be burdened disproportionately by negative environmental consequences from industrial, municipal, 
and commercial operations. Of great concern to environmental justice advocates is the distribution of 
commercial treatment, storage, and disposal installations. This dissertation confirms widespread suspicion 
that poor communities of color are burdened disproportionately by environmental hazards. 
The sting of a regular industrial facility is a decision generally left to business enterprises based on 
their own scientific and economic criteria. Public involvement is limited and generally favorable, given the 
anticipated economic benefits of industrial investment. The siting of a TSO installation is different: Federal 
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law requires hazardous waste handl�rs obtain a permit from the EPA, and go through a lengthy process of 
negotiation with government officials and residents of a sited community (see EPA 1 996) . The reason for 
such differential treatment is that TSO installations handle some of the most dangerous substances known 
to humankind, and public concern over the potential negative effects of such facilities on human health and 
property. 
As specified in the introduction, most individuals want the benefits of proper and safe disposal of 
hazardous waste, but few want to bear the burden of a TSO installation in their community. How this 
dilemma is managed, in the context of the proportionately criterion of Order 12989, is the purpose of this 
policy proposal. The proposal is more thought experiment than serious recommendation. 
The proposed hazardous waste allocation system, summarized in Table 5 . 1 , builds on the current 
site selection criteria. Technical and economic criteria still drive the identification of sites suitable for a 
commercial TSO installation, and the first step is geological and scientific evaluation. Floodplains, 
watersheds, seismic hazard zones, groundwater aquifer and recharge areas, and preservation areas are 
excluded from consideration as per existing Environmental Protection Agency guidelines. Second, areas 
are assessed economically. Commercially suitable areas are those zoned for industrial use, are close to 
major transportation routes, possess large quantity generators of hazardous waste nearby, and an adequate 
labor supply. Third, site-specific characteristics ought to be considered, involving the screening of sites 
culturally and ecologically. Considerations should include: ecological habitat and endangered species, 
surrounding land uses of cultural importance, and areas of archaeological significance. This site· evaluation 
process ought to _be shepherded by the EPA and handled jointly by private and public sector actors to 
guarantee all criteria are given fair consideration . 
After the evaluation process is complete, a national list of feasible sites should be drawn, organized 
regionally and by facility type to give operators flexibility in site selection. The national feasibility list acts as 
a sampling frame, with each area on the list having an equal chance of being selected for a TSO.installation. 
This list should be made public to allow citizens to make informed and rational residential choices. All 
commercial TSO operators meeting administrative and technical standards delineated in the EPA permit 
application would then be given a regional list of sites matching facility design specifications and commercial 
criteria. 
Sites would then be selected randomly from regional feasibil ity lists. Areas not selected would be 
required to pay a small fee for non-selection: A $2 dollar fee per household would suffice. This fee could be 
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TABLE 5.1 : SUMMARY OF THE BROAD MECHANICS OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE ALLOCATION PROGRAM 
1 .  Areas are evaluated geologically and scientifically for suitability of a treatment, storage, and disposal 
facility 
2. Areas are evaluated commercially and economically for suitability of a treatment, storage, and 
disposal facility . 
3. Areas are evaluated culturally and ecologically for suitability of a treatment, storage, and disposal 
facility 
4. A national feasibility list of potential areas is drawn on the basis of above criteria ·and made available 
to the public. · '· · 
5. Commercial TSO operators meeting EPA-permit requirements, randomly draw sites from regional 
feasibility list. 
6. Non-selection and generator fees are collected. Fees are pooled into a national fund for 
compensation to the selected community. 
7. The selected community is given the right to buy-out, sell or accept selection. Communities accepting . 
the TSO installation enter a publicly financed negotiated compensation agreement. 
added to existing property assessments, and collected by municipalities. Such payment for non-selection 
would diffuse the cost of proper hazardous waste disposal. Large quantity generators of hazardous waste 
should also pay a small fee for every ton of waste generated. For example, at $1 dollar per ton, a minimum 
of $250 million dollars could be collected annually. If tonnag·e fees were collected from small quantity 
generators of hazardous waste, $750 million dollars could be collected annually. 
Non-selection and generator fees could be pooled for a negotiated compensation agreement with 
the selected community. The special needs of the selected community could then be addressed to offset the 
direct burden of the TSO installation. Offsetting benefits may include direct payments to affected residents, 
grants for local health care, parks and recreational amenities, and distribution of abatement devices to 
reduce the risk of exposure to hazardous substances. Selected communities would ·also be given the 
option of buying-out or selling their compensation agreement to other communities desiring such facilities for 
economic ends. Buy-out and buy-in options harness the power of market allocation, enabling a socially 
optimal and equitable distribution of TSO installations. 
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What are the advantages of this simple hazardous waste allocation program? Seven advantages 
over the current syste_m (see Table 5.2 for summary) are identified. First, the program helps guarantee fai r 
and equitable distribution of environmental burdens as di rected by Executive Order 12898. Site selection is 
based only on scientific, economic, and cultural criteria, not population characteristics or the propensity of 
groups to resist the placement of a facility in their community. Post-list assembly randomization counters 
the effects of random birth assignment. Second, the proposal eliminates the free-rider problem of �igh­
income, predominantly White communities. Under this proposal, all communities are invested in the 
benefits of proper hazardous waste disposal, no matter income status or racial composition. The elimination 
of the free-rider problem will undoubtedly encourage greater public concern and involvement in 
management and reduction of the hazardous waste stream. Greater public involvement wil l  deepen 
democratic adjudication of potentially harmful land uses. 
TABLE 5.2: SUMMARY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE ALLOCATION PROGRAM 
1 .  Fulfills the promise of Executive Order 12989 by guaranteeing fair and equitable distribution of 
environmental burdens. 
2. Eliminates the free-rider problem, investing all Americans in the problem of hazardous waste 
management and reduction. 
3. Reduces transaction costs on commercial TSO operators, enabling re-direction of energies toward 
engineering and scientific matters. 
4. Selected communities are compensated fairly for bearing the environmental burden directly, diffusing the 
cost of proper management of hazardous waste. 
5. The power of market allocation is harnessed to achieve a socially optimal distribution of environmental 
burdens. 
6. Inoculates TSDF operators and government officials from accusations of discrimination, significantly 
reducing legal and political costs. 
7. Provides poor communities of color with a procedurally fair system, freeing them of shouldering a 
disproportionate share of the hazardous waste stream. 
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Third, generator fees and public financing of the non-selection fund significantly reduces the cost of 
operations for TSD facilities. Under the current system, local officials and residents typically coerce TSDF 
operators into host fees, tonnage fees, and compensatory schemes. Such practices cause TSD operators 
to rationally calculate liability and compensation demands into site selection. This reasoning retards the 
current process, with TSD operators selecting population characteristics, not scientifically suitable areas. 
TSD installation operators also pass these transaction costs to hazardous waste generators. This proposal 
eliminates these costs, increasing incentive for proper hazardous waste disposal and commercial 
investment in waste conservation and recovery technologies. TSDF operators can pass transaction cost 
savings to hazardous waste producers to offset generator fees. This action fulfills the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act requirement of commercialization of waste management. 
Fourth, selected communities are guaranteed a publicly financed compensation package for 
bearing the hazardous waste burden directly. The compensation agreement can offset residential 
instabilities arising from population out-migration, shocks to property values, and potential threats to human 
health. Negative economic and social burdens of facility placement can be adequately neutralized. 
Fifth, buy-out and buy-in options harness the power of market allocation, giving communities a 
choice in the matter. High-income communities will likely purchase their way out of selection, and lower­
income communities will more likely purchase selection for the economic benefits that accompany a TSD 
installation. Relatively poor communities court such facilities for job growth and economic gain currently. 
This proposal is different because high-income communities are brought into the market, and their historic 
non-participation is prevented. As the proposal constrains choices for free riders it expands choice making 
for disadvantaged populations, increasing the aggregate level of choice in the system. 
Sixth, this proposal of fair and equitable distribution of environmental hazards inoculates the federal 
government and commercial TSD operators from accusations of discrimination. Because the current system 
produces uneven distribution of TSD facilities by race and community social capital, federal agencies and 
TSD operators are embroiled in expensive legal and political wrangling. This proposal significantly reduces 
these costs, enabling federal agencies to properly direct energies away from the courtroom to the delivery of 
public goods. The cost savings to tax payers could offset non-selection fees. 
Seventh, this hazardous waste allocation program meets the demands of environmental justice 
advocates. It is procedurally just, color-blind, and optimizes equity and fairness in distribution of 
1 48 
environmental health risks. The coercive toxic assault on poor communities of color can be managed more 
effectively. 
This hazardous waste allocation proposal is an example of win-win for all stakeholders. The 
existing EPA permit process is difficult. Applications range from 500 to 2000 pages of text. TSDF operators 
must meet strict administrative and technical requirements. Administrative requirements involve record 
keeping and reporting, preparedness and prevention strategies , and emergency procedures should 
something go wrong. Technical requirements include standards for groundwater monitoring, facility closure 
and post-closure .procedures, and specific engineering standards for design and operation of the installation. 
Our program maintains these important technical and administrative safeguards, while simplifying the post 
permit burden on TSDF operators. 
TSDF operators receive of a cost reduction with the negotiated compensation procedure shifted to 
generators and the public, are protected against accusations of discrimination and racial animus, and 
extricated from the time-consuming and expensive process of hiring lobbyists and consultants to navigate 
the political thicket of site selection. These savings enable TSOF operators to concentrate energies on 
technological improvements, and decrease barriers to commercial involvement in hazardous waste 
management. 
Poor communities of color are given a procedurally fair system of hazardous waste allocation. The 
environmental justice movement has struggled valiantly for fairness in the application of environmental laws 
and policies, and for equity in the distribution of environmental hazards. This proposal can reduce the toxic 
burden on disadvantaged communities, without denying them the economic opportunity to host a TSO 
installation .should they desire one for job growth and community improvement. More important, 
implementation of this proposal allows poor communities of color to concentrate energies on other social 
problems. 
Governments benefit from the proposal in numerous ways. Because the program is transparent 
and fair, government actors are perceived as legitimate and neutral actors. Less energy is spent defending 
decisions, and more energy and tax dollars are spent on technical and scientific management of the 
country's environmental resources. Above all, our program brings federal agencies into compliance with 
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TABLE A.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR FLORIDA 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 2448 -131231 538450545 4683983.48 24421491.36 
Social Capital Rate 2448 -15.44 498268.36 1735.1117 14797.3322 
Environmental Capital Assets 2448 .00 45572208.00 68540.5016 1398553.0011 
Environmental Capital Rate 2448 .00 7604.42 18.6101 293.5926 
Population Density 2448 .00 12120.18 1122.4301 1237.5404 
Young Dependency Ratio 2448 .00 1.05 .3103 .1243 
Old Dependency Ratio 2448 .00 12.73 .3753 .5638 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 2448 .00 7.00 .1017 .4409 
% Industrial Labor 2448 .00 100.00 23.9909 10.0513 
% Managerial Technical Labor 2448 .00 93.85 56.9410 15.1310 
Mean Value of Household 2448 22282.05 600000.00 98371.5432 67478.8776 
Median Gross Rent 2448 .0 1001.0 474.872 169.731 
% Units Built Before 1960 2448 .oo 100.00 24.2879 22.5371 
% Units Built before 1970 2448 .00 100.00 41.6234 27.0626 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
. Land Area Sq Km 2448 .00 2857.04 57.1295 192.0032 
Water Area Sq Km 2448 .00 2794.48 12.4418 76.6528 
Peak Ground Acceleration 2448 .5000000 2.2354490 .992392804 .412992275 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 2448 .0000000 1.2003000 2.07841989E-02 7 .808485E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 2448 .00 100.00 81.8547 24.5166 
% Black Persons 2448 .00 100.00 15.1957 24.4627 
% Hispanic Persons . 2448 .00 100.00 9.4251 17.1022 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 2448 .00 100.00 74.3783 28.2209 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 2448 .00 100.00 14.8211 24.1381 
% American Indian 2448 .00 15.17 .3556 .6291 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 2448 .00 56.20 5.9734 6.2610 
% Families at or Below Poverty 2448 .00 80.77 15.2445 11.9039 
% Public Assistance in 1989 2448 .00 100.00 6.5585 - 6.4465 
% Female Households wl Kids 2448 .00 36.84 6.1991 4.5974 
% Black Female Households 2448 .00 100.00 24.0857 1 8 .5744 
% Renter Occupied Units 2448 .00 100.00 33.1177 20.6298 
% 18+ Without High School 2448 .00 100.00 26.9433 14.5407 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 2448 .00 100.00 42.8610 16.6697 
Total Persons 2448 .00 71872.00 5285.1005 3695.2867 
Valid N 2448 
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TABLE A.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR GEORGIA 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
SOCIAL CAPITAL .VARIABLES 
1, · " ·  
Social Capital Assets 1470 -4919 1736539201 5050005.83 
Social Capital Rate 1470 -2.49 986744.69 2490.5959 
Environmental Capital Assets 1470 .00 4979188.00 10056. 1224 
Environmental Capital Rate 1470 .00 1553.57 2.2053 
Population Density 1470 .00 11261.26 517.2966 
Young Dependency Ratio 1470 .00 1.46 .3691 
Old Dependency Ratio 1470 .00 2.20 . 1867 
BUSINESS· RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 1470 .00 8.00 . 1830 
% Industrial Labor 1470 .00 100.00 32.7288 
% Managerial Technical Labor 1470 .00 100.00 50.2258 
Mean Value of Household 1470 12500.00 461719.59 73136.4276 
Median Gross Rent 1470 .0 1001.0 372.650 
% Units Built Before 1960 1470 .00 100.00 31.6651 
% Units Built before 1970 1470 .00 100.00 48.7462 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 1470 .00 1237.20 102.0473 
Water Area Sq Km 1470 .00 265.76 2.6820 
Peak Ground Acceleration 1470 1.6819550 9.3133160 4.351705194 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 1470 .0000000 1.0474930 3.24282143 E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 1470 .00 100.00 68.2399 
% Black Persons 1470 .00 100.00 30.0628 
% Hispanic Persons 1470 .00 33.64 1.4504 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 1470 .00 100.00 67.4693 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 1470 .00 100.00 29.9461 
% American Indian 1470 .00 18.95 .2543 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 1470 .00 82.88 8.6811 
% Families at or Below Poverty 1470 .00 100.00 19.5284 
% Public Assistance in 1989 1470 .00 70.51 10.3792 
% Female Households w/ Kids 1470 .00 41.67 8.2056 
% Black Female Households 1470 .00 100.00 27.0338 
% Renter Occupied Units 1470 .00 100.00 34.8027 
% 18+ Without High School 1470 .00 86.78 33.2425 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 1470 .00 100.00 35.9467 
Total Persons 1470 .00 17724.00 4406.9497 
Valid N 1470 
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Std. Deviation 



































TABLE A.4:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR KENTUCKY 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCl,AL .CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital A_ssets 997 -31 1 3  284323071 31 1 1 41 5.66 1 6895670.73 
Social Capital Rate 997 -.89 51 776.64 886.1 389 4335.4692 
.Environmental Capital Assets 997 .00 481 01 437.00 86384.041 1 1 753260.5735 
Environmental Capital Rate 997 .00 3006339.81 3023.2600 952,1 1 .6494 
Population Density 997 .00 571 6.02 601 . 1783 · 974.2304 
Young Dependency Ratio 997 .00 1 .04 .3609 8.609E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio 997 .00 1 .1 3  .2092 9.795E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 997 .00 1 3.00 .2708 .8601 
% Industrial Labor 997 .00 82.08 35.271 6 1 2.8054 
% Managerial Technical Labor 997 5.00 1 00.00 46.5199 1 5.6643 
Mean Value of Household 997 1 3686. 1 3  222041 .83 53885.2327 27978.9099 
Median Gross Rent 997 .0 923.0 300.267 98.325 
% Units Built Before 1 960 997 .00 1 00.00 40.2964 22.31 53 
% Units Built before 1 970 997 .27 1 00.00 56.651 5 20.6590 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 997 .00 562.75 1 03.21 64 1 1 0 . 1 469 
Water Area Sq Km 997 .00 82.98 1 .7638 6.4906 
Peak Ground Acceleration 997 3 . 1 2076 1 0  23. 1 31 4500 5.46621 9268 . 3.924497690 
% Hydrologic Co�e in Tract 997 .0000000 1 .4 148080 4.621 289E-02 9.330920E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 997 .32 1 00.00 91 .9389 1 6.5424 
% Black Persons 997 .00 99.56 7.331 1 1 6.3635 
% Hispanic Persons 997 .00 1 3.63 .4756 .8941 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 997 .32 1 00.00 9 1 .61 43 1 6.5805 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 997 .00 99.52 7.301 6 1 6 .3148 
% American Indian 997 .00 3.78 . 1 945 .3744 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 997 .00 66.38 1 0.401 7 8.3313  
% Families a t  or Below Poverty 997 .00 88. 1 3  23.7040 1 4.3086 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 997 .00 51 .89 1 0.3228 7.2073 
% Female Households w/ Kids 997 .00 26.58 6.2293 4.0544 
% Black Female Households 997 .00 1 00.00 24. 1 1 57 1 9.3689 
% Renter Occupied Units 997 2.28 1 00.00 29 .4973 1 7.31 34 
% 1 8+ Without High School 997 · .00 77.95 36.4730 1 4.8940 
% 1 8+ With 1 year of College 997 .00 1 00.00 31 .2406 1 7 .4097 
Total Persons 997 .00 1 8861 .00 3696.3852 1 847.89 1 1 
Valid N 997 
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TABLE A.5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR MISSISSIPPI 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
· ,  
Social Capital Assets 581 0 1 688451 95 2053637.75 1 2259599 .80 
Social Capital Rate 581 .00 52403.85 664.4051 4221 .91 9 1 
Environmental Capital Assets 581 .00 1 7854 767 .00 351 79.4888 7 43243.5559 
Environmental Capital Rate 581 .00 3702.77 7.5 1 76 1 54.68 1 6  
Population Density 581 .00 5667.48 360.5258 580.2970 
Young Dependency Ratio 581 .00 .79 .42 1 4  . 1 1 53 
Old Dependency Ratio 581 .00 .80 .2203 9 .669E-02 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 581 .00 4.00 . 1 274 .4406 
% Industrial Labor 581 .00 1 00.00 35.4567 1 2 .9602 
% Managerial Technical Labor 581 .00 93.24 47.2435 1 4.7942 
Mean Value of Household 581 23851 .48 1 9 1 484.53 50631 .01 1 4  1 8788.8072 
Median Gross Rent 581 .0 786.0 287. 145 97.345 
% Units Built Before 1 960 581 .32 1 00.00 32. 1 750 1 6.8961 
% Units Built before 1 970 581 .46 1 00.00 5 1 .0843 1 8.1 666 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 581 .00 1 338.47 209 . 1 332 261 .6565 
Water Area Sq Km 581 .00 480.31 6.1 933 30.31 85 
Peak Ground Acceleration 581 1 .5894980 12 .3408300 3.1 956291 65 1 .85341 4429 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 581 .0000000 1 .5041 7 1 0  9.37823029E-02 . 1 80675607 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 581 .00 1 00.00 61 .71 52 27.7883 
% Black Persons 581 .00 1 00.00 37.21 06 27.9884 
% Hispanic Persons 581 .00 1 00.00 .7805 4.2469 ' 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 581 .00 1 00.00 6 1 . 1 83 1  27.6872 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 581 .00 1 00.00 37. 1 1 02 27.9426 
% American Indian 581 .00 88.93 .41 51 3.8300 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 581 .00 1 00.00 1 2.3469 8.7404 
% Families at or Below Poverty 581 .00 1 00.00 27.7543 1 3.8279 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 581 .00 54.48 1 3 .8597 8.5463 
% Female Households w/ Kids 581 .00 35.97 9.21 32 5.5749 
% Black Female Households 581 .00 1 00.00 30.4538 1 3.6000 
% Renter Occupied Units 581 .00 1 00.00 30.2989 1 8.4373 
% 1 8+ Without High School 581 .00 1 00.00 36.2470 1 3.7647 
% 1 8+ With 1 year of College 581 .00 1 00.00 35.8355 1 5.3389 
Total Persons 581 .00 1 3523.00 4428.9432 201 7. 1 31 2  
Valid N 581 
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TABLE A.6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR NORTH CAROLINA 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation · 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 1482 -996 233306476 3339742.47 15579119.65 
Social Capital Rate 1482 -.35 132178.32 1126.1000 6894.2511 
Environmental Capital Assets 1482 .00 2454067.00 11253.2807 131430.7384 
Environmental Capital Rate 1482 .00 2339.66 4.7133 75.1782 
Population Density 1482 .00 3412.72 402.9497 518.1840 
Young Dependency Ratio 1482 .00 .78 .3249 8.620E-02 
Old Dependency Ratio 1482 .00 1.05 .2047 .1046 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 1482 .00 8.00 .2220 .6885 
% Industrial Labor 1482 .00 100.00 35.3546 14.8423 
% Managerial Technical Labor 1482 .00 100.00 49.4822 16.9427 
Mean Value of Household 1482 9000.00 313191.16 74509.3838 35891.0936 
Median Gross Rent 1482 .0 1001.0 361.949 117.797 
% Units Built Before 1960 1482 .00 100.00 33.7719 19.8915 
% Units Built before 1970 1482 .00 100.00 50.7764 20.3116 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
· Land Area Sq Km 1482 .00 1587.22 85.1416 127.3236 
Water Area Sq Km 1482 .00 1942.99 6.9566 72.4591 
Peak Ground Acceleration 1482 1.2644370 9.5852360 4.388084789 1.663710274 
% Hydrologic Co.de in Tract 1482 .0000000 1.2115060 3.836476E-02 9.960286E-02 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 1482 .00 100.00 74.2149 25.6237 
% Black Persons 1482 .00 100.00 23.5999 25.0867 
% Hispanic Persons 1482 .00 18.97 .9717 · 1.3380 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 1482 .00 100.00 73.7092 25.5709 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 1482 .00 100.00 23.5065 25.0105 
% American Indian 1482 .00 86.39 1.0872 5.6977 
% Familie� 50% Below Poverty 1482 .00 45.72 6.4039 5.8496 
% Families at or Below Poverty 1482 .00 81.48 16.5150 11.2051 
% Public Assistance in 1989 1482 .00 56.80 7.6129 6.3462 
% Female Households wl Kids 1482 .00 37.46 7.2513 4.8053 
% Black Female Households 1482 .00 100.00 24.5406 14.8113 
% Renter Occupied Units 1482 .00 100.00 33.5637 19.8443 
% 18+ Without High School 1482 .00 100.00 30.4099 13.8543 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 1482 .00 100.00 40.1034 18.2236 
Total Persons 1482 .00 37612.00 4472.7645 2335.4077 
Valid N 1482 
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TABLE A.7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR SOUTH CAROLINA 
SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES 
. · ' , !  
Social Capital As��ts 
Social Capital Rate 
Environmental Capital Assets 
Environmental Capital Rate 
Population Density 
Young Dependency Ratio 
Old Dependency Ratio 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 
% Industrial Labor 
% Managerial Technical Labor 
Mean Value of Household 
Median Gross Rent 
% Units Built Before 1 960 
% Units Built before 1 970 
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
. ' 
Land Area Sq Km 
Water Area Sq Km 
Peak Ground Acceleration 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 
RACE, CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 
% Black Persons 
% Hispanic Persons 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 
% American Indian 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 
% Families at or Below Poverty 
% Public Assistance in 1 989 
% Female Households w/ Kids 
% Black Female Households 
% Renter Occupied Units 
% 1 8+ Without High School 
































805 . 00 
805 .00 






2989571 94 2977894.75 
1 32923. 1 6  1 082.4076 
1 2039298.00 21 922.2646 
1 744.07 4.1 566 
7798.76 437.5066 
1 .27 .3577 
1 .82 . 1 966 
9 .00 .31 93 
1 00.00 35.3627 
93. 1 5 48.4932 
427822.91 71 391 .71 88 
865.0 344.692 
1 00.00 31 .9375 
1 00.00 48.6666 
8 1 8.79 90.3433 
473.61 6.06 1 7  
1 8.9090300 9.41 7944009 
2.04831 00 4.27271 2E-02 
1 _00.00 67.3355 
1 00.00 31 .5992 
1 00.00 .9520 
1 00.00 66.7869 
1 00.00 31 .4588 
8.81 .2479 
48.28 7.51 74 
1 00.00 1 8 .3633 
48.52 8.5550 
35.90 8.2700 
1 00.00 27.3047 
1 00.00 31 .5508 
1 00.00 31 .9804 
1 00.00 38.21 1 6  
1 8081 .00 4087.0385 
Std. Deviation 
. •  , jj, . ' 





. 1 1 59 
. 1 1 95 
I• 1' • I 
.861 7 
1 4.6996 
1 6.51 93 
391 63.03 1 9  
1 30.930 
20.5688 
21 . 1 806 . .  
1 25.401 6 
28.981 9 
3.81 9672523 
. 1 1 2824929 
















TABLE A.8: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR TENNESSEE 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SOCIAL .. CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Social Capital Assets 1221 0 806594674 5063336.24 31860586.76 
Social Capital Rate 1221 .00 2414954.11 3615.8727 69923.3431 
Environmental Capital Assets 1221 .00 20338589.00 28696.8026 645250.8298 
Environmental Capital Rate 1221 .00 4470.02 5.9068 134.4905 
Population Density 1221 .00 5381.02 498.9524 738.1703 
Young Dependency Ratio 1221 .00 1.26 .3400 .1081 
Old Dependency Ratio 1221 .00 1.87 .2171 .1140 
BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
Large Quantity Generators 1221 .00 9.00 .3415 .8486 
% Industrial Labor 1221 .00 71.61 35.1422 14.2595 
% Managerial Technical Labor 1221 .00 100.00 48.2700 16.8940 
Mean Value of Household 1221 15612.90 288177.84 62938.9107 32359.8276 
Median Gross Rent 1221 .0 1001.0 320.004 128.741 
% Units Built Before 1960 1221 .00 100.00 36.0695 21.0498 
% Units Built before 1970 1221 .00 100.00 54.1318 21.4704 
SCIEN�1r1c RATIO�ALITY 
Land Area Sq Km 1221 .00 779.77 87.4353 114.3801 
Water Area Sq Km 1221 .00 93.01 1.9653 6.7207 
Peak Ground Acceleration 1221 3.9337330 23.8058500 8.919528846 4.131269213 
% Hydrologic Code in Tract 1221 .0000000 1.1563130 4.7 48120E-02 9.80713676E-02 
RACE; CLASS, GENDER 
% White Persons 1221 .00 100.00 81.5006 27.4418 
% Black Persons 1221 .00 100.00 17.4674 27.4906 
% Hispanic Persons 1221 .00 34.74 .7058 1.3672 
% Non-Hispanic White Persons 1221 .00 100.00 81.0226 27.4010 
% Non-Hispanic Black Persons 1221 .00 100.00 17.4125 27.4268 
% American Indian 1221 .00 3.67 .2609 .3976 
% Families 50% Below Poverty 1221 .00 100.00 8.5257 8.5973 
% Families at or Below Poverty 1221 .00 100.00 20.7881 14.2434 
% Public Assistance in 1989 1221 .00 56.82 9.5717 7.8855 
% Female Households wl Kids 1221 .00 41.60 7.4486 5.8297 
% Black Female Households 1221 .00 100.00 25.5454 18.9606 
% Renter Occupied Units 1221 .00 100.00 32.5202 20.6018 
% 18+ Without High School 1221 .00 87.23 34.7197 14.8028 
% 18+ With 1 year of College 1221 .00 100.00 34.4792 18.2751 
Total Persons 1221 .00 15314.00 3994.4185 2277.8001 
Valid N 1221 
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EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 1 2898 
FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS AND Low-INCOME 
POPULATIONS 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1 -1 .  Implementation 
1 -101 . Agency Responsibilities. 
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consistent with the principles set forth in the 
report on the National Performance Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental 
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations in the United States and its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands. 
1 -1 02. Creation of an lnteragency Working Group on Environmental Justice. 
(a) Within 3 months of the date of this order, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
eAdministrator•) or the Administrator's designee shall convene an interagency Federal Working 
Group on Environmental Justice ("Working Group•). The Working Group shall comprise the heads 
of the following executive agencies and offices or their designees: 
Department of Defense; Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Housing and · 
Urban Development; Department of Labor; Department of Agriculture; Department of 
Transportation; Department of Justice; Department of the Interior; Department of Commerce; 
Department of Energy; Environmental Protection Agency; Office of Management and Budget; 
Office of Science and Technology Policy; Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President for 
Environmental Policy; Office of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy; National 
Economic Council; Council of Economic Advisers; and such other Government officials as the 
President may designate. The Working Group shall report to the president through the Deputy 
Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy and the Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Policy. 
(b) The Working Group shall: 
1. provide guidance to Federal agencies on criteria for identifying disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects on minority populations and low-income populations; 
2. coordinate with, provide guidance to, and serve as a clearinghouse for, each Federal agency as it 
develops an environmental justice strategy as required by section 1-103 of this order, in order to 
ensure that the administration, interpretation and enforcement of programs, activities and policies 
are undertaken in a consistent manner; 
3. assist in coordinating research by, and stimulating cooperation among, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, and other agencies conducting research or other activities in accordance with 
section 3-3 of this order; 
4. assist in coordinating data collection, required by this order; 
5. examine existing data and studies on environmental justice; 
6. hold public meetings as required in section 5-502(d) of this order; and 
7. develop interagency model projects on environmental justice that evidence cooperation among 
Federal agencies. 
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1 -1 03. Development of Agency Strategies. 
(a) Except as provided in section 6-605 of this order, each Federal agency shall develop an agency­
wide environmental justice strategy, as set forth in subsections (b)-(e) of this section that identifies 
and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its 
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations. The 
environm,ental justice strategy shall list programs, policies, planning and public participation 
processes, enforcement and/or rule makings related to human health or the environment that 
should be revised to, at a minimum: 
1. promote enforcement of all health and environmental statutes in areas with minority populations 
and low-income populations; 
2 .  ensure greater public participation; 
3. improve research and data collection relating to the health of and environment of minority 
populations and low-income populations; and 
4. identify differential patterns of consumption of natural resources among minority populations and 
low-income populations. In addition, the environmental justice strategy shall include, where 
appropriate, a timetable for undertaking identified revisions and consideration of economic and 
social implications of the revisions. 
(b) Within 4 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall identify an internal 
administrative process for developing its environmental justice strategy, and shall inform the 
Working Group of the process. 
(c) Within 6 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall provide the Working Group 
with an outline of its proposed environmental justice strategy. 
(d) Within 1 O months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall provide the Working Group 
with its proposed environmental justice strategy. 
(e) Within 12 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall finalize its environmental 
justice strategy and provide a copy and written description of its strategy to the Working Group. 
During the 12month period from the date of this order, each Federal agency, as part of its 
environmental justice strategy shall identify several specific projects that can be promptly 
undertaken to address particular concerns identified during the development of the proposed 
environmental justice strategy and a schedule for implementing those projects. 
(f) Within 24 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall report to the Working Group 
on its progress in implementing its agency-wide environmental justice strategy. 
(g) Federal agencies shall provide additional periodic reports to the Working Group as requested by 
the Working Group. 
1-103. Reports to the President. 
Within 14 months of the date of this order, the Working Group shall submit to the President, through the 
Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy and the Office of the Assistant to the 
President for Domestic Policy, a report that describes the implementation of this order, and includes the final 
environmental justice strategies described in section 1_.103(e) of this order. 
SECTION 2-2. FEDERAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies, and activities that substantially affect human 
health or the environment, in a manner that ensures that such programs, policies, and activities do not have 
the effect of excluding persons (including populations) from participation in, denying persons (including 
populations) the benefits of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to discrimination under, such 
programs, policies, and activities, because of their race, color, or national origin. 
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SECTION 3-3. RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND ANALYSIS 
3-301 . Human Health and Environmental Research and Analysis. 
(a) Environmental human health research, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall include diverse 
segments of the population in epidemiological and clinical studies, including segments at high risk 
from environmental hazards, such as minority populations, low-income populations and workers 
who may be exposed to substantial environmental hazards. 
(b) Environmental human health analyses, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall identify 
multiple and cumulative exposures. 
(c) Federal agencies shall provide minority populations and low-income populations the opportunity to 
comment on the development and design of research strategies undertaken pursuant to this order. 
3-302. Human Health and Environmental Data Collection and Analysis. 
To the extent permitted by existing law, including the Privacy Act, as amended (5 U.S.C._ section 552a): 
(a) each Federal agency, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain, and analyze 
information assessing and comparing environmental and human health risks borne by populations 
identified by race, national origin, or income. To the extent practical and appropriate, Federal 
agencies shall use this information to determine whether their programs, policies, and activities 
have disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority 
populations and low-income populations; 
(b) In connection with the development and implementation of agency strategies in section 1-103 of 
this order, each Federal agency, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain and 
analyze information on the race, national origin, income level, and other readily accessible and 
appropriate information for areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have a substantial 
environmental, human health, or economic effect on the surrounding populations, when such 
facilities or sites become the subject of a substantial Federal environmental administrative or 
judicial action. Such information shall be made available to the public, unless prohibited by law; and 
(c) Each Federal agency, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain, and analyze 
information on the race, national origin, income level, and other readily accessible and appropriate 
information for areas surrounding Federal facilities that are: (1) subject to the reporting 
requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. section 
1 1001-1 1050 as mandated in Executive Order No. 12856; and (2) expected to have a substantial 
environmental, human health, or economic effect on surrounding populations. Such information 
shall be made available to the public, unless prohibited by law. 
(d) In carrying out the responsibilities in this section, each Federal agency, whenever practicable and 
appropriate, shall share information and eliminate unnecessary duplication of efforts through the 
use of existing data systems and cooperative agreements among Federal agencies and with State, 
local, and tribal governments. 
SECTION 4-4. SUBSISTENCE CONSUMPTION OF FISH AND WILDLIFE 
4-401 . Consumption Patterns. 
In order to assist in identifying the need for ensuring protection of populations with differential patterns of 
subsistence consumption of fish and wildlife, Federal agencies, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall 
collect, maintain, and analyze information on the consumption patterns of populations who principally rely on 




Federal agencies, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall work in a coordinated manner to publish 
guidance reflecting the latest scientific information available concerning methods for evaluating the human 
health risks associated with the consumption of pollutant-bearing fish or wildlife. Agencies shall consider 
such guidance in developing their policies and rules. 
SECTION 5-5. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
(a) The public may submit recommendations to Federal agencies relating to the incorporation of 
environmental justice principles into Federal agency programs or policies. Each Federal agency 
shall convey such recommendations to the Working Group. 
(b) Each Federal agency may, whenever practicable and appropriate, translate crucial public 
documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health or the environment for limited English 
speaking populations. 
(c) Each Federal agency shall work to ensure that public documents, notices, and hearings relating to 
human health or the environment are concise, understandable, and readily accessible to the public. 
(d) The Working Group shall hold public meetings, as appropriate, for the purpose of fact-finding, 
receiving public comments, and co·nducting inquiries concerning environmental justice. The 
Working Group shall prepare for public review a summary of the comments and recommendations 
discussed at the public meetings. 
SECTION 6-6. GENERAL PROVISI.ONS 
6-601 . Responsibility for Agency Implementation. 
The head of each Federal agency shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with this order. Each Federal 
agency shall conduct internal reviews and take such other steps as may be necessary to monitor 
compliance with this order. 
6-602. Executive Order No. 1 2250. 
This Executive order is intended to suppleme.nt but not supersede Executive Order No. 12250, which 
requires consistent and effective implementation of various laws prohibiting discriminatory practices in 
programs receiving Federal financial assistance. Nothing herein shall limit the effect or mandate of 
Executive Order No. 12250. 
6-603. Executive Order No. 12875. 
This Executive order is not intended to limit the effect or mandate of Executive Order No. 12875. 
6-604. Scope. 
For purposes of this order, Federal agency means any agency on the Working group, and such other 
agencies as may be designated by the President, that conducts any Federal program or activity that 
substantially affects human health or the environment. Independent agencies are requested to comply with 
the provisions of this order. 
· 6-605. Petitions for Exemptions. 
The head of a Federal agency may petition the President for an exemption from the requirements of this 
order on the grounds that all or some of the petitioning agency's programs or activities should not be subject 
to the requirements of this order. 
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6-606. Native American Programs. 
Each Federal agency responsibility set forth under this order shall apply equally to Native American 
programs. In addition, the Department of the Interior, in coordination with the Working Group, and, after 
consultation with tribal leaders, shall coordinate steps to be taken pursuant to this order that address 
Federally-recognized Indian Tribes. 
6-607. Costs. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, Federal agencies shall assume the financial costs of complying with this 
order. 
6-608. General. 
Federal agencies shall implement this order consistent with, and to the extent permitted by, existing law. 
6-609. Judicial Review. 
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended 
to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law 
or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. This order shall not be 
construed to create any right to judicial review involving the compliance or non-compliance of the United 
States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person with this order. 
William J. Clinton 
The White House 
1 1  February 1 994 
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